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1 State and Local Incentive 
Competition for New Investment
Over the past decade and a half, "economic development" has 
become entrenched as an important function of state and city govern 
ment. Unlike much of the other, more hidden, work undertaken by 
states and cities, the special economic development deals offered by 
local officials to lure new investment are often covered prominently in 
the press. Few have been unimpressed by the $250 million Alabama 
reputedly gave Mercedes-Benz or by the estimated $130 million South 
Carolina gave BMW (Council of State Governments 1994, p. 12). Pos 
sibly as a result of such eye-grabbing deals, it has become common 
place, not only in the press but among policymakers and academics, to 
characterize the current level of economic development effort as too 
highly competitive and probably detrimental to sound fiscal policy. 
State and local competition for new industrial investment has been 
widely criticized for being a zero-sum, or worse, a negative-sum 
game in other words, providing no national benefits and for being 
potentially harmful to economic growth because it reduces the ability 
of state and local governments to finance investments in education and 
infrastructure. Indeed the subtext of much popular reporting and even 
academic discussion is that states and cities have become imprudently 
generous to private investment while cutting back on more typical gov 
ernmental activities. It is unsurprising then that some prominent 
researchers have called for the federal government to severely limit 
state and local economic development efforts (Burstein and Rolnick 
1996; Rolnick and Burstein 1996; Schweke, Rist, and Dabson 1994) or 
for a major reorientation of the state and local economic development 
effort (LeRoy 1994; Smith and Fox 1990).
Notwithstanding the existence of both this sort of criticism of eco 
nomic development policy and a number of academic and policy jour 
nals dedicated to the issue of state and local economic development 
policy, very little is known about the size of the economic development 
effort. We have some idea of the staff size at state development agen 
cies and of the budgets of those agencies (although for reasons that will
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become clear, it is most unlikely that these budget numbers say much 
about the size of the state economic development effort), and we have 
some knowledge of what economic development instruments states are 
able to use (although there are important discrepancies among the vari 
ous directories of state instruments). However, there is virtually no reli 
able information on the really important questions: How much are 
states willing to provide to a firm? What are state incentives actually 
worth to a firm? What sort of places offer the biggest incentives? At the 
city level, the situation is that much worse; here there is not even a reli 
able directory of instruments or budgets. One result is that public and 
even academic debate on economic development issues is often seri 
ously flawed.
Possibly two of the most crucial issues for economic development 
concern are 1) measuring the worth to the firm of incentives offered 
and 2) identifying the spatial pattern of incentives (in other words, 
determining which communities offer the largest and smallest incen 
tives). These issues are important because almost all economic devel 
opment policy is based on the idea emanating from modern location 
theory that the purpose of incentives is to influence business location 
decisions by improving the relative profitability of investing at a partic 
ular site (Blair and Premus 1987; Chapman and Walker 1990). Unfor 
tunately, the academic and policy literature on economic development 
has tended to focus on other issues, usually the cost of incentive pro 
grams to government or the nominal size of incentive deals. The Ala 
bama incentive package to Mercedes-Benz was reported by one source 
to be composed of $112 million in infrastructure improvements, $30 
million to build a training facility, $60 million for training, $8.7 million 
for tax abatements on machinery and construction materials, and $39 
million in other incentives (Council of State Governments 1994, p. 12). 
What is unclear is the extent to which Mercedes-Benz benefits from 
each dollar of public money spent. Is Mercedes-Benz able to capture 
the full $30 million in state funds spent on the training facility or the 
$112 million spent on infrastructure? These problems are even more 
stark in the BMW deal. Fifty million dollars of BMW©s $130 million 
package was for expansion of the Greenville-Spartanburg airport. It 
seems unreasonable to assume that BMW will be able to capture all of 
the benefits of airport expansion; airports are public facilities, and it is 
much more likely that many (if not most) of the airport©s improvements
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will be captured by other individual and corporate business users, not 
BMW. Much of the economic development literature ignores this prob 
lem.
More generally, the literature has mostly failed to distinguish 
between the nominal value of incentive awards and their actual value to 
the firm. For instance, the 1980s saw considerable Japanese auto plant 
investment in the United States. In a widely quoted article looking at 
this issue, Milward and Newman (1989) claimed that Mazda had 
received state incentives worth around $15,000 per employee for its 
investment in Flat Rock, Michigan. This figure included $19 million in 
worker training, $5 million in road improvements, $3 million in on- 
site railroad improvements, $21 million in an economic development 
loan to be recaptured, and $5 million in water system improvements. 
This gives a total of $53 million for what was then projected to be 
3,500 employees at the new plant. In the same article, various other 
Japanese auto manufacturers were reported to be receiving vast incen 
tive deals. Similar claims about the nominal value of economic devel 
opment deals are commonly made in the press and in the academic and 
policy literature. However, there are problems with such measures 
beyond the matter of a firm©s ability to capture directly the benefits of 
an incentive. Consider the case of Mazda just cited. The costs and ben 
efits associated with various types of economic development incentives 
vary greatly; adding up nominal awards across different programs has 
the effect of comparing apples with oranges. Most obviously, a $1 mil 
lion capital on-site railroad improvement award is likely to be much 
more costly for government, and much more beneficial to the recipient 
firm, than a $1 million capital loan. In the Mazda case, consider the 
$19 million worker training award. If this award provides workers with 
general and transferable skills, then it is unlikely that it was worth the 
full $19 million to Mazda, but if the training were highly customized to 
Mazda©s special needs, then it may indeed have replaced $19 million in 
expenses that Mazda would otherwise have incurred.
So, the question remains, How should the worth of incentives be 
measured? The first concern of this book is to measure, from the point 
of view of the firm, the true benefits of state and city incentives. A 
cogent answer to this question is a prerequisite to any sensible debate 
on the impact of incentives on a firm©s investment decisions. Moreover, 
an answer also allows us to begin to provide innovative and useful
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responses to a related issue that has dogged the economic development 
literature: can development incentives reasonably be expected to influ 
ence a firm©s location decisions? In all of this, our purpose is not to add 
to the already extensive econometric and survey literature on whether 
economic development incentives measurably affect the location deci 
sions of firms. While our results do complement this research, our pur 
pose is limited to measuring the worth of incentives to the firm.
Unfortunately, providing a comprehensive and cogent measurement 
of the worth of economic development incentives to firms is a daunt- 
ingly complex task. A vast proportion of the work going into the 
answers provided in this book is methodological. As a result, much of 
the book is itself devoted to methodology (although more technical dis 
cussions are segregated into Chapter 3 and Appendixes B and C and 
may be avoided by readers not interested in such issues). Simply put, 
the answers we give in this book derive from the output of a very large 
computer simulation model (the Tax and Incentive Model, or TAIM). It 
has been our experience that the answers provided by TAIM and 
equally by competing models are often crucially dependent on the 
assumptions incorporated into the model. Understanding the assump 
tions is an important part of understanding the answers themselves. 
One of the criticisms we have of some although certainly not all of 
the work done in the same tradition as ours (researchers using the 
hypothetical firm method) is that public policy conclusions are made 
on the basis of data and assumptions the underpinnings of which are 
inadequately discussed.
The second concern we focus on is the spatial pattern of economic 
development incentives. In particular, do poorer, more distressed 
places tend to offer bigger incentives than wealthier, less distressed 
places? We believe this matter has received insufficient attention in the 
literature. An answer to this question is crucial; if competitive state and 
local economic development policy is to provide net benefits for the 
nation, then it should, we believe, tend to promote the redistribution of 
employment from areas of low economic distress. 1 For this to occur, 
economic development efforts should be concentrated or more active 
in poorer, economically troubled places.
Although our research concentrates on these two issues the worth 
and spatial pattern of incentives our results also shed light on a set of 
related, secondary questions:
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  Would it be feasible for the federal government to limit the state 
and local economic development effort?
  What is the role of enterprise zones in delivering incentives to 
firms?
  What proportion of the total incentive package is a tax-based enti 
tlement and what proportion derives from non-tax awards (such 
as grants, loans, and loan guarantees)?
Here we focus on taxes and incentives across the 24 most important 
industrial states and a sample of 112 cities within those states. We mea 
sure the value of incentives available in these states and municipalities 
from the standpoint of a business. 2 That is, we assess the after-tax 
income effects of state and local tax and incentive regimes. This 
enables us to explore the size and redistributional impacts of state and 
local incentive programs in considerable detail.
THE EXPANSION OF AND JUSTIFICATION 
FOR STATE AND LOCAL INCENTIVES
Although states were subsidizing private industry with public 
money over a century and a half ago, and although explicit "smoke 
stack chasing" began nearly 60 years ago with Mississippi©s "Balance 
Agriculture with Industry" program, it is only over the past two 
decades that there has been explosive growth in state and local eco 
nomic development activity (McCraw 1986; Netzer 1991). Many, if 
not the majority of, state-level economic development agencies were 
established during this period, and although no accurate historical cen 
sus of municipal economic development agencies exists, it is likely that 
the majority of local economic development departments were either 
established or greatly increased over the past 20 years (Eisinger 1988, 
pp. 16-17). So too, the instruments of economic development have 
expanded rapidly, and the use made of any single instrument has inten 
sified. Eisinger (1988), using data from the annual survey of economic 
development incentives by Site Selection and Industrial Development 
(and the magazine©s precursors), developed a measure of state-level 
policy penetration that assesses the use by states of economic develop-
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ment instruments available at a particular time period. He found that 
from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s there were large increases both in 
the variety of instruments available to state officials and in the use 
made of any particular instrument. Eisinger (1995) claims that there is 
some evidence of a slowdown in the economic development effort dur 
ing the early 1990s, and data from the Council of State Governments 
suggest that this is indeed the case (Council of State Governments 
1994, pp. 4-6). What limited information we have on the expenditures 
of state and local economic development agencies suggests a substan 
tial increase in spending during the 1980s (Fisher 1990) but some 
"state fiscal crisis-induced" cutbacks during the early 1990s (Brad- 
shaw, Nishikawa, and Blakely 1992). State appropriations for state 
economic development agencies rose from $255 million in 1982 to 
$999 million in 1988 (National Association of State Development 
Agencies 1988) but declined somewhat in the early 1990s (although 
these figures are far from being unambiguous indicators of the devel 
opment effort). The net result is that both relocating and new plants in 
the United States now appear to regularly receive incentive packages 
consisting of various combinations of federal, state, and locally 
financed subsidies. These can include a mix of property tax abate 
ments, sundry tax credits and exemptions for such things as investment 
in plant and machinery or research and development, job training cred 
its and wage subsidies, road and other infrastructure improvement 
incentives, and various sorts of capital grants, loans, and loan guar 
antees.
The usual justification for these types of incentives is that they are 
necessary for the local expansion of employment opportunities, given 
the competitive investment environment in which states and municipal 
ities currently exist. In other words, a locality usually finds itself com 
peting for new private investment with other similarly endowed 
localities; in order to "capture" a relocating firm, the locality must 
ensure that it offers, other things being equal, the "least cost" site. This 
understanding of the role of economic development policy is based 
explicitly on traditional industrial location theory. Here, firms are held 
to be profit maximizers that evaluate alternative business sites based on 
product demand and the costs of production at various sites 
(Wasylenko 1981). Localities having high product demand (or at least 
good and cheap access to areas of high demand) and low costs for pri-
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mary inputs (such as wages, land, energy, and capital) and processing 
costs (such as taxes and general regulations) will be most attractive to 
firms. From the viewpoint of city or state government, the argument in 
favor of economic development incentives is that they might be able to 
reduce the cost structure of a potential plant just enough to induce relo 
cation from the maximum-profit site to the incentive-offering site 
(Blair and Premus 1987; Chapman and Walker 1990). Although the 
range of incentive instruments is extraordinarily diverse, "all focus on 
reducing the costs of doing business" at a particular site (Gerking and 
Morgan 1991, p. 34). 3
This raises a more basic question: Why should states and localities 
want to use scarce revenues to encourage new industrial investment? 
The political justification is almost always that, since states and munic 
ipalities are part of a competitive interjurisdictional locality market, 
incentives are necessary to lure new investment and the jobs (for resi 
dents of the state or municipality) and the taxes resulting from that 
investment. Consequently, incentive programs are usually judged in 
the popular media, by politicians, and very often by development offi 
cials on their ability to retain or generate new employment. The cen 
tral financial justification is that new investment, and its resultant 
direct, indirect, and induced jobs and spending, will help maintain or 
expand the state or local government©s revenue base and presumably 
improve the government©s ability to provide its residents with services 
(or reduce the per-capita costs of providing the current level of ser 
vices). The principal economic justification is that the new investment 
and its associated multiplier will enhance the income of the locality©s 
residents.4
CRITICISMS OF INCENTIVE COMPETITION
A number of criticisms have been leveled at incentive competition. 
Some individuals have worried about the effects on the ability of state 
and local government to provide services. Without proper analysis and 
administration, incentives may become overly generous, resulting in a 
net drain on a local government©s revenue base. Incentive competition 
could, in fact, divert resources from state and local programs, such as
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investments in education, that in the long run are important contribu 
tors to economic growth, locally and nationally. As a corollary of this 
argument that the net fiscal impact of incentives could be negative, 
some have noted that the economic growth sought by development 
officials can in the long run raise the costs of providing municipal ser 
vices. There is evidence that larger city size is associated with higher 
per-capita costs of supplying city services to residents (Muller 1975, 
pp. 3-19; Ladd and Yinger 1991, pp. 83-85). Thus, leaving aside the 
issue of the direct costs and benefits of an incentive regime itself, 
incentive-induced development may result in fewer or more costly 
public services for a locality©s residents.
Others have argued that, without a commitment to the long-term 
management of incentives, job creation may never materialize or may 
materialize only at the expense of job loss elsewhere in the state, 
municipality, or metropolitan area. Indeed, the professional economic 
development literature is littered with stories in which incentives did 
not produce the requisite revenue or job benefits (Glickman and Wood 
ward 1989; Guskind 1990; Hovey 1986). Related to these issues is a 
much broader concern that states and municipalities often provide 
incentive packages based more on politics and perceptions than on a 
formal consideration of either the local costs and benefits or of the 
optimal size of the incentive package necessary to induce relocation. 
Certainly, this has been a constant theme in the coverage by the popu 
lar press of the various deals for foreign auto manufacturers. Neverthe 
less, the focus of scholarly criticism has not been on these practical 
issues of program administration but on the economic justification for 
development incentives. Indeed, criticisms of the economic justifica 
tion raise fundamental questions about the merit of locational subsi 
dies.
Since American labor is highly mobile over 13 percent of the met 
ropolitan population moves across metropolitan areas in any given 
four-year period some economists have argued that, at least in the 
long run, labor will tend to move from areas of high unemployment to 
areas of low unemployment (Marston 1985). 5 Job-creating incentives 
in a single locality are therefore unnecessary and probably 
counterproductive. Without the incentives, unemployed or underem 
ployed workers in a locality would eventually find jobs elsewhere. If 
government were genuinely concerned with the welfare of its citizens,
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it would more logically spend revenues not on locational incentives to 
encourage investment, but on increasing the mobility of the unem 
ployed so that these individuals would benefit from the work opportu 
nities in more vigorous labor markets elsewhere.
Moreover, if workers are mobile, using incentives to create jobs in 
one location merely provides inducement for job-seekers from else 
where to move into that location (Logan and Molotch 1987). Thus, the 
original unemployed inhabitants of that locality may benefit very little, 
if at all, from incentive-induced new investments. By extension, in the 
long run, such investment may have little or no positive effect on the 
locality©s unemployment or labor force participation rates. This sort of 
argument has led others to claim that while the public rhetoric of 
incentives is always couched in language focusing on the job gains for 
unemployed and underemployed locals, the true beneficiaries of incen 
tive-induced growth are not local job-seekers but the owners of that 
immobile and scarce resource, land (Logan and Molotch 1987). There 
fore, economic development policy is likely to have a regressive 
impact on the local distribution of income.
Rubin and Zorn (1985) have argued that, because state and local 
programs tend to be competitive and therefore merely encourage the 
movement of employment opportunities from one place to another but 
do not actually result in net national job creation, the overall benefits to 
the nation of state and local incentive programs are close to nil. Incen 
tives merely result in the spatial reshuffling of investment, which 
would, sans incentives, have occurred somewhere anyway. Borrowing 
a term from game theory, a number of critics have characterized state 
and local incentive competition as essentially a zero-sum game. 6
Insofar as the incentive-induced reshuffling of investment results in 
a spatial pattern less efficient than the pattern would have been without 
such incentives, it is plausible to argue that state and local incentives 
produce net economic welfare losses for the national economy and 
thus may more usefully be characterized as negative-sum. 7 The conten 
tion here is that incentive competition induces firms to choose loca 
tions based on their tax consequences rather than on the basis of real 
resource cost differentials (such as the price and productivity of land 
and labor, transportation costs, and so on). Taken together, these criti 
cisms present a damning picture of economic development practice in
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the United States. However, there is reason to believe that many of the 
criticisms are misplaced.
WHY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 
MAY BE USEFUL: REVISIONIST RESEARCH
There is an expanding body of research suggesting that the preced 
ing arguments against the use of incentives are misplaced. For 
instance, there is evidence that some groups of people, especially older, 
less-skilled, or minority workers, are relatively nonmobile, and that 
even for skilled, younger, or nonminority workers, spatial mobility is 
quite limited in the short run. Moreover, a number of economists have 
argued that interjurisdictional competition for investment may be 1) 
economically efficient, 2) have a much smaller negative impact than 
has been claimed, or 3) have effects not nearly as strong as assumed in 
the literature. Given some assumptions about the nature of competition 
among localities, 8 Gates and Schwab (1991) contend that, in equilib 
rium, business taxes become true benefits taxes in that they equal the 
value businesses place on the government services they receive. In 
these circumstances, interjurisdictional competition fosters economic 
efficiency. Netzer, while disagreeing with Gates and Schwab about the 
efficiency of local taxes, nevertheless argues that incentive competition 
does not have the negative impacts claimed by its critics: "If markets 
are not functioning perfectly, economic development policy instru 
ments that offset the imperfections can move toward, rather than away 
from, efficiency in resource allocation" (Netzer 1991, p. 230). Thus,
economic development incentives are ... neither very good nor 
very bad from the standpoint of efficient resource allocation in the 
economy. With all the imperfections, the offering of incentives 
does not represent a fall from grace, but neither does competition 
in this form operate in ways that truly parallel the efficiency-creat 
ing operations of private competitive markets. Given the low cost- 
effectiveness of most instruments, there is little national impact, 
only a waste of local resources in most instances. (Netzer 1991, 
pp. 239-240)
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Netzer also maintains that the supposed zero-sum nature of Ameri 
can economic development policy rests on an implausible assumption: 
that the American economy is closed. Although the proportion of for 
eign direct investment (FDI) in the United States (measured as a share 
of total employment or assets) is still much smaller than in a number of 
European countries, foreign investment has become an increasingly 
important part of the American economy, and states and localities very 
often target their incentives to encourage FDI (Glickman and Wood 
ward 1989). In fact, a large number of American states have overseas 
offices chartered specifically to encourage such investment (Archer and 
Maser 1989; Kudrle and Kite 1989). Thus, incentives do not merely 
move a set number of jobs around the United States; they may also 
serve to encourage new investment from abroad. Other critics have 
shown that the level of interjurisdictional competition is much more 
limited than had previously been thought (Hanson 1993). Indeed, Han- 
son argues that there is inertia in the economic development efforts of 
states and cities; for example, the best predictor of what a locality will 
offer this year is what it offered last year.
Insofar as state and local economic development programs are con 
cerned, some of the most interesting recent empirical work has sug 
gested that incentives might be beneficial both to localities and to the 
nation. Bartik (1991b) claims that incentive-induced employment 
growth might have advantageous long-term effects on a locality©s labor 
force participation and unemployment rates. Moreover, incentive com 
petition may have significant benefits from the national perspective. 9
Bartik©s argument, backed by various empirical results, is that 
incentive-induced employment growth in a locality©s labor market may 
be long-term, progressive, and salutary. Employment growth in a met 
ropolitan area will lead to a permanent drop in the area©s unemploy 
ment rate and to an increase in its labor force participation rate. In 
percentage terms, the real earnings effects of incentive-induced job 
growth are greater for black and less-educated workers than for white 
or more educated workers, and greater for lower-earning males than for 
higher-earning males (Bartik 1991b, pp. 184-185). As a result, the 
impact of employment growth on income distribution may be modestly 
progressive. Based on these results and on a speculative benefit-cost 
analysis, Bartik goes on to make two major claims:
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  In places of high unemployment, economic development incen 
tives are more likely to be cost-effective.
  From the national standpoint, to the extent that incentives are 
concentrated in places of high unemployment, economic devel 
opment policy may tend to be positive-sum.
Translated crudely, economic development policy is likely, all else 
being equal, to be more beneficial if pursued more vigorously by 
poorer places and to be less so if pursued more vigorously by wealthier 
places. The reason for both of Bartik©s claims is that the wage level 
necessary to induce movement of unemployed individuals into jobs 
(the reservation wage) is likely to be lower in high-unemployment 
areas than in low-unemployment areas. Thus, the true benefits of 
employment the wage offer made to the individual minus his or her 
reservation wage are greater from a benefit-cost viewpoint in loca 
tions with high unemployment than in those with low unemployment. 
To the extent that areas with a low reservation wage are net investment 
recipients, reshuffling of jobs may produce net national benefits. These 
findings and claims clearly challenge much of the traditional scholarly 
wisdom about the local and national impact of spatially competitive 
economic development incentives, and they set the stage for the argu 
ment of this monograph.
Bartik©s positive scenario rests on three critical and logically 
sequential arguments:
  Economic development incentives probably can influence firm 
location and expansion decisions and thus can result in shocks 
(sudden growth) to local labor demand.
  Reservation wages are indeed higher in low-unemployment areas 
and lower in high-unemployment areas.
  The pattern of incentives at the state and local level tends to result 
in the relocation of investment from areas of low unemployment 
to areas of high unemployment.
Most of the rest of this book focuses on the first and third arguments. 
We ignore the second because providing a cogent answer would take 
us much too far from the central focus of our research and because the 
academic literature on the issue, while quite thin, is generally support 
ive of Bartik©s position. 10 In the case of the first argument, the literature
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is massive but still inconclusive; in the case of the third, the literature is 
small and contradictory.
ISSUE 1: CAN INCENTIVES REASONABLY BE EXPECTED 
TO INFLUENCE BUSINESS LOCATION DECISIONS?
It should be obvious that to claim any benefits from economic devel 
opment policy we must be reasonably sure that it works that incen 
tives can reasonably be expected to influence the investment behavior 
of expanding and relocating firms. From a theoretical perspective, 
taxes and incentives are a locationally variable business cost, and thus, 
at the margin, will influence location and investment decisions. At the 
same time, the costs of locally supplied labor are about 14 times state 
and local business tax costs, and regional variations in construction, 11 
energy, and labor costs are often larger than variations in state and local 
taxes (and incentives). Small differences in labor costs can outweigh 
quite large differences in tax costs. Cornia, Testa, and Stocker found 
that "a mere 2 percent difference in wages could offset as much as 40 
percent in taxes" (1978, p. 2). Thus, some have claimed that where 
taxes and incentives do influence location decisions, it is largely as tie 
breakers between essentially similar locations (Schneider 1985).
Unfortunately, measuring the impact of taxes and incentives on 
growth is extremely complex. It is very difficult to evaluate the 
achievements of economic development policy, because it is hard to 
know what industrial investment would have occurred in its absence 
(Diamond and Spence 1983). 12 Our practicable ability to model and 
predict accurately changes to a local economy, a task necessary if we 
are to measure the precise impact of an incentive program, is quite lim 
ited. Moreover, our ability to measure cause and effect is circum 
scribed by often significant (and variable) time lags between the 
introduction of a policy instrument, spending allocations to that instru 
ment, offers to individual firms, investment decisions on the part of a 
particular firm, the actual construction of a factory by the investing 
firm, and the achievement of a normal employment level at the factory 
site. 13 Nevertheless, there is a vast literature on the economic impact of
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development incentives. Because there are a number of recent compre 
hensive reviews, we will merely provide a summary of the literature.
In the United States, five basic methods of evaluating the impact of 
incentives have been developed. Considerable work has been done 
using two of these methods. Unfortunately, the results of this research 
effort cannot be said to support any strong statements on the impact of 
incentives on firm investment and location behavior.
The Survey Technique
In a number of studies, researchers have surveyed executives to 
determine what role incentives (and other locational factors) play in a 
firm©s relocation and expansion decisions. The surveys often distin 
guish between "must have" location factors and merely "desirable" 
factors. There is evidence that the location choice of large manufactur 
ing firms tends to be based on a sequential evaluation of factors at suc 
cessively narrower spatial scales, with decisions first on a broad 
geographic region, then a state, a metropolitan area (or county), a city, 
and, finally, a plant site. Therefore, some surveys have attempted to 
distinguish the impact of incentives (and other locational factors) at 
various spatial scales (Schmenner 1982).
The advantages and disadvantages of the survey technique are well 
known (Calzonetti and Walker 1991). At their best, surveys provide 
direct information about the actual siting decisions made by execu 
tives. Also, the more complex statistical assumptions that beset econo 
metric analyses can be avoided. Unfortunately, survey researchers 
often have difficulty finding the cohort of individuals within a corpora 
tion who were responsible for a particular location decision. Moreover, 
executives may have a direct interest in saying that incentives were 
important even if they were not admitting that an incentive had little 
effect in one©s location decision might cause later political problems  
although, given the findings of the literature, this problem may have 
been exaggerated. Finally, while surveys may rank the importance of 
various locational factors, they do not provide a precise measure of the 
impact of each locational factor on local growth. In fact, the results 
from the survey-based literature are unclear, with some research indi 
cating incentives are indeed important to location decisions (Premus 
1982; Walker and Greenstreet 1989; Calzonetti and Walker 1991;
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Rubin 1991), and other work indicating the opposite (Morgan 1964; 
Stafford 1974; Schmenner 1982). 14
The Case Study Technique
Other researchers have taken a different tack and, using variations 
on the case study method, have evaluated the impact of specific eco 
nomic development programs. The advantage of this method is that the 
work has covered a variety of different incentive instruments, from 
enterprise zones, research parks, and property tax abatements to export 
promotion schemes. Unfortunately, there are also major problems with 
this approach. In the first place, incentive programs are often very 
small relative to the local economy in which they operate. Thus, even 
where subsidies are effective, measuring their impact on a local econ 
omy is rendered difficult by economic white noise, by the other local 
factors that influence growth. Moreover, impact evaluations need to 
establish some sort of comparative control economy in order to mea 
sure precisely the effect of incentives. In the best of all worlds, the con 
trol economy would be identical to the economy receiving the 
incentive except that the control would not receive the incentive, but 
choosing a control is itself fraught with practical methodological and 
political difficulties. Unsurprisingly, given the range of programs cov 
ered, the published research using the single program approach is as 
contradictory, in terms of both detailed method and results, as the sur 
vey-based literature. 15 However, even work focusing on broadly similar 
types of programs shows discrepant results. For instance, in a recent 
widely quoted volume on enterprise zones, one study found clear evi 
dence of impact success (Rubin 1991), while studies reported in two 
other papers found little or none (Elling and Sheldon 1991; Grasso and 
Crosse 1991).
The Econometric Technique
A third strategy has been to use econometric techniques to measure 
the impact of incentives on state and local growth. At the outset it 
should be noted that, although the econometric literature is large, 
nearly all published models concern taxes. There is very little work on 
non-tax incentives, and most of this research focuses on infrastructure
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programs. 16 Moreover, of the tax models, very few have data on local 
abatements or on the various tax credits commonly in use at the state 
level. Most merely use effective tax rates (ETRs) 17 as the exogenous 
(independent) tax and incentive variable within the location equation. 
For reasons we discuss in Chapter 3, we doubt very much that tradi 
tional ETR measures provide an accurate depiction of the tax liability 
faced by firms. In fact, we believe the econometric literature would be 
much improved if greater use were made of more defensible measures 
of tax and incentive incidence.
Econometric models have been developed for various spatial scales 
and for a number of different state and local taxes. State and local 
growth measures have included "levels of or "changes in" indicators 
such as employment, gross state product, per-capita personal income, 
number of new plant openings, and small-firm birth rates. The models 
also range widely in their technical sophistication, from simple regres 
sions with poorly specified locality growth variables and with no treat 
ment of time lags in the growth variable or of endogeneity in the 
explanatory variables, to considerably more complex models that 
address most, if not all, of these issues. Almost all develop equations 
that use variables such as local labor costs, transportation costs, energy 
costs, infrastructure provision, and tax costs to explain (predict) local 
growth.
Since impressive reviews of this literature have been published 
recently, we will not repeat that work. Nevertheless, a number of points 
should be noted. No definite conclusions can be reached on the basis of 
the published research. Even the reviews seem to disagree about the 
impact of (tax) incentives on economic growth. Eisinger (1988), in an 
admittedly partial assessment of both the econometric and survey evi 
dence, suggests that the majority of work still indicates that state and 
local taxes have little or no influence on economic growth. Neverthe 
less, also in 1988, Newman and Sullivan, in a much more involved 
review, wrote, "The most recent studies, employing more detailed data 
sets and more refined econometric techniques, have generated results 
which cast some doubt on the received conclusion that tax effects are 
generally negligible" (Newman and Sullivan 1988, p. 232). Bartik, in 
what is probably the most comprehensive assessment of recent
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research to date, takes Newman and Sullivan©s conclusions a step fur 
ther:
The most important conclusion ... is that most recent business 
location studies have found some evidence of significant negative 
effects of state and local taxes on regional business growth. The 
findings of recent studies differ from those in the 1950s, 1960s, 
and early and mid-1970s, which generally did not find statistically 
significant and negative effects of taxes on state and local growth. 
(Bartik 199 Ib, pp. 38-39)
The reason for this change is that the newer work is technically more 
sophisticated and thus better able to describe the relationship between 
incentives and growth.
However, there have been other dissenting voices. In a review of 
Bartik©s summary of the literature, McGuire (1992), who has herself 
produced important work indicating that taxes do influence growth 
(Wasylenko and McGuire 1985), argues that Bartik claims too much. 
In particular, McGuire is concerned that some studies that did find a 
significant effect of state taxes on job growth have not been replicable 
and are not robust to changes in specification or time period. 18 She 
argues that the recent literature is as contradictory and inconclusive as 
the earlier literature. Our own sense is that there is a pressing need in 
econometric studies for a better measure of state and local tax and 
incentive policy. Underlying all of the econometric literature is the 
assumption that firms select locations so as to maximize their income. 
Thus, taxes and incentives should not be evaluated from the point of 
view of government receipts or spending but from the point of view 
of the firm©s income. We provide such a firm-oriented measure later in 
this book.
The General Equilibrium Technique
A fourth and quite recent strategy has been to use applied general 
equilibrium models to measure the impact of tax policy, for example, 
on the location of economic activity (Morgan, Mutti, and Partridge 
1990). General equilibrium models have an advantage over economet 
ric models in that they specify the structural relationships, and thus 
interactions, between the economic variables in the model. Unfortu 
nately, the work in this area is still too new to draw definite conclusions 
about the impact of taxes on local growth.
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The Hypothetical Firm Technique
Given the difficulties of drawing any solid conclusions based on the 
existing literature, a few researchers have opted for an entirely differ 
ent approach to the problem of taxes, incentives, and growth. This 
solution involves looking at the impact local taxes and incentives have 
on a firm©s actual income. In order to accomplish this, researchers 
build models that replicate the operating ratios, balance sheets, income, 
and tax statements of real (or, at least, potentially real) firms; this tech 
nique is sometimes called the "hypothetical firm," or "representative 
firm," method. It allows researchers to calculate exactly what impact a 
state©s or city©s taxes would have on a firm©s income. Almost all of the 
work in this tradition has looked at comparative tax burdens. 19 Very lit 
tle research has used hypothetical firm results within an explicit eco 
nomic development framework. Bartik et al. (1987) analyzed the 
location of the General Motors Saturn plant. Using realistic simula 
tions of transportation, labor, and tax costs, they calculated that the 
best location for the new plant would be Nashville, Tennessee, about 
30 miles from Spring Hill, the actual site chosen by the company. 
However, as yet, no hypothetical firm models have explicitly incorpo 
rated economic development incentives such as grants, loans, and 
training awards. 20 All current models remain essentially tools for calcu 
lating comparative tax burdens.
Hypothetical firm models, because they focus directly on the 
income effects of taxes, have tended to show that state and local taxes 
can and do have an important influence on the returns on investment of 
the firm. Few studies, on the other hand, have directly compared the 
impact of spatial variation in taxes with spatial variation in, for exam 
ple, the costs of labor, transportation, or infrastructure. Those that have 
appear to suggest that in some circumstances taxes (and other incen 
tives) may have a major impact on the profitability of various invest 
ment locations (Bartik et al. 1987; Peters and Fisher 1996).
We will not pursue the hypothetical firm literature here, since most 
of the rest of the book is taken up with our extension of the hypotheti 
cal firm technique to include most major economic development incen 
tives. However, a few points are worth noting right away. There is 
increasing policy interest in using the hypothetical firm approach to 
look at the relationship between incentives and growth. Recently, a
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number of states (and quasi-government organizations) have commis 
sioned hypothetical firm studies (Brooks et al. 1986; Laughlin 1993; 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue 1995). 21 We believe part of the rea 
son for this movement is disappointment that the other techniques, 
those that are generally much simpler to implement, have failed to pro 
vide clear prescriptive answers on the question of taxes and growth. 
Another factor is that recent developments in computer technology 
have made hypothetical firm models much easier to build. Finally, 
there also is the misguided belief that the hypothetical firm technique 
does not suffer from the ambiguities (particularly the statistical ambi 
guities) that beset the other methods, that the effect of two competing 
states© tax regimes on a firm©s income can indeed be calculated 
directly.
In a few cases, the results of hypothetical firm studies have been 
included in econometric analyses of the relationship between taxes and 
growth (or, at least, taxes and investment). Industry-specific measures 
of the burden of taxes deriving from the hypothetical firm model 
replace ETRs as one of the dependent variables in the econometric 
equation (Steinnes 1984; L. Papke 1987, 1991; Tannenwald and Ken- 
drick 1995; Tannenwald 1996). Obviously, none of these studies was 
able to include non-tax incentives. Nevertheless, we believe that in 
general this is the right way to measure taxes (and incentives) within 
econometric models of the impact of state and local policy on growth.
Conclusions: How We Propose to Deal with the Incentive Question
Leaving aside work in the hypothetical firm tradition, solid conclu 
sions about the broad impact of business incentives on the locational 
decisions of firms cannot be drawn from the existing academic litera 
ture. As it now stands, the published research is contradictory on many 
of the most important issues. Although we are inclined to believe that 
taxes and incentives have major impacts on some locational decisions, 
we are also bound to admit that the scholarly literature again exclud 
ing research in the hypothetical firm tradition does not necessarily 
support or contradict our position.
Part of the confusion in the literature is a consequence of the way in 
which taxes and incentives have been assessed. This appears to be par 
ticularly true for the econometric studies that have relied on averaged
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tax measures (in other words, ETRs) or simple tax rates as the "incen 
tive." As noted, very few econometric (or other) studies have taken the 
results of detailed tax impact models as their "incentive measure," 
although it is clear that doing so would provide a vastly more accurate 
picture of the influence of taxes and incentives on firm investment and 
location behavior. A major move forward in the econometric literature 
would seem to be unlikely without first having a rigorous implementa 
tion of the hypothetical firm technique to cover both taxes and non-tax 
economic development incentives. We believe that our work with the 
hypothetical firm method, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, provides such 
a step. The incorporation of the results of this model may give future 
researchers a much more accurate picture of taxes and incentives, and 
thus could bring about a more reliable measure of the impact of taxes 
and incentives on location decisions. 22
ISSUE 2: THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCENTIVES
The second issue we consider refers to Bartik©s minimum require 
ment that state and local incentive programs must meet if they, taken 
together, have the potential to produce net national benefits. It is the 
requirement that the spatial pattern of incentives offered by states and 
localities does not run counter to the need to promote the redistribution 
of jobs from places with lower unemployment to places with higher 
unemployment. In practical terms, if state and local incentives do pro 
duce national net benefits, we should expect, at the very least, that 
places with higher unemployment would offer greater incentives than 
places with lower unemployment. As indicated earlier, from the 
national perspective the point of redistributing employment (even the 
identical number of jobs paying identical wages) from places of low 
unemployment to places of high unemployment is to exploit the differ 
ential between offered wages and reservation wages. Most of this book 
contains our empirical evaluation of the spatial distribution of incen 
tives. We now turn to the extant literature on this distribution. We look 
at the research in some detail because it has not been recently 
reviewed.
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Do poorer places provide more in the way of incentives? It is rea 
sonable to assume that the states and municipalities with the highest 
unemployment face the greatest political pressure to create jobs, and 
thus one might expect them to offer the largest incentives. On the other 
hand, high unemployment and slow job growth are likely to coincide 
with state and local fiscal distress, a declining tax base, and a reduced 
capacity to support new expenditure initiatives (Guskind 1990). Fur 
thermore, many of these programs are tax expenditures and thus escape 
scrutiny during the annual budget process; once enacted, during a 
recession perhaps, they will tend to persist long after their political, no 
less economic, rationale has disappeared. Indeed, Hanson (1993) found 
that there is considerable long-term inertia in state-level economic 
development policy-making. Also, it is hard to imagine a state official 
who would not believe that having more jobs is always a good thing. 
Given the tendency of states to imitate one another and their fear of 
appearing antibusiness by not having a decent menu of financial 
inducements to offer prospective businesses,23 there is every reason to 
suppose that economic development incentives will become quite 
widespread and may end up bearing little or no relationship to state and 
local economic conditions.
The empirical work on this question is sketchy and contradictory. At 
the broadest level, Fosler (1988) has claimed that, historically, states 
experiencing economic distress have tended to be the ones adopting 
new economic development instruments and institutionalizing the eco 
nomic development process. According to Eisinger (1988), the expan 
sion in economic development incentives in the Northeast and 
Midwest during the 1970s and 1980s was a direct result of deindustri- 
alization in those regions. At the local level, Fainstein (1991) has 
argued that the administrative switch from regulating growth (with 
zoning and other growth management instruments) to promoting 
growth (through incentives) was a direct result of economic restructur 
ing in the United States. All three writers have supported these claims 
with simple historical data showing policy adoption following eco 
nomic decline.
It is true that, in a number of states, severe economic decline did 
prompt the development of new and powerful instruments. For exam 
ple, the combined impact of severe employment loss in Iowa©s biggest 
manufacturing sector and the farm crisis provided the political impetus
22 State and Local Incentive Competition for New Investment
for the development, in the mid 1980s, of the state©s flagship economic 
development program, the Community Economic Betterment Account 
(CEBA). It is also true, however, that this program continues today, at a 
time when Iowa©s unemployment rate is between 2 and 3 percentage 
points below the national average.
Clarke©s (1986) more detailed study of state governments, con 
ducted for the National Governors© Association, suggests that reces 
sion and industrial restructuring, and the gubernatorial initiatives they 
trigger, are important catalysts for expansion of the state economic 
development effort. Of recent statistical analyses undertaken, Lugar 
(1987) developed models predicting state economic development pol 
icy adoption in eight categories (plus a summary category). He found 
that "overall state effort in industrial development is associated with 
lower wages and higher unemployment" (p. 47). Gray and Lowery 
(1990) ran regressions on the adoption of 43 state-level economic 
development instruments (and on two subsets of these 43). According 
to their results, the level of economic distress (measured by 1982 per- 
capita manufacturing income and by the 1983 unemployment rate) was 
an important motive for policy adoption.
At the city level, Clingermayer and Feiock (1990) ran separate 
regression models for five different categories of economic develop 
ment instruments: industrial revenue bonds (IRBs), Urban Develop 
ment Action Grants, abatements, national advertising, and business 
assistance centers. Their economic need variables (measured by city 
per-capita personal income and the city bond rating) were positively 
related to policy adoption in all five policy categories. On the other 
hand, the local development of pro-growth coalitions and various local 
institutional arrangements, such as a mayor-council form of govern 
ment, accounted for far more of the adoption of highly visible eco 
nomic development instruments than did the level of local economic 
distress. Green and Fleischman (1991) compared policy adoption by 
central cities, suburbs, and nonmetropolitan communities. They found 
that in suburban communities the 1980 poverty rate was positively and 
significantly related to the development effort, but this was not the case 
in central cities or nonmetropolitan communities. However, their other 
"economic need" measures the percentage of the population minority 
and the percentage of jobs in manufacturing were not statistically 
significant in any of the models they developed.
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Other studies broadly support these results. Bowman (1987), Rubin 
and Rubin (1987), and Feiock and Clingermayer (1986) found that 
more distressed localities tended to use a wider set of economic 
development tools or to spend more on incentives. 24 For economic 
development policy that targeted high technology, Atkinson (1991) 
found greater political and administrative commitment to policy instru 
ments in states that perceived economic distress.
In contrast, Grady (1987) found little correlation at the state level 
between changes in the level of economic distress and expanded use of 
economic development incentives. Hanson (1993) found that the state 
unemployment rate did not account for much variation in economic 
development policy choices in two of his four broad state policy cate 
gories. Interestingly, he found considerable policy inertia; states modi 
fied incrementally what they had already been doing. Confirming 
Brierly©s (1986) earlier work, Reese (1991) found in a study of tax 
abatements in Michigan that wealthier cities and cities with growing 
economies abated more.
Two recent pieces, which pay much more attention than do other 
studies to defining how policy expenditures vary spatially, have also 
demonstrated little positive correlation between the amount of incen 
tives offered by and the economic distress of a locality. Fisher©s (1991) 
simulation of the impact of investment and job creation tax credits, and 
of sales tax exemptions for manufacturing machinery and equipment, 
on the cost structure of two hypothetical firms found little evidence to 
suggest that the spatial pattern of incentives favored states and cities 
with high unemployment. "Competition does not appear to be perverse 
in its effects, [by] redistributing jobs away from distressed states; the 
pattern simply shows no consistent relation between a state©s economic 
distress . . . and the magnitude of the state tax incentives offered . . ." 
(Fisher 1991, p. 20). Sridhar©s (1996) study of the distribution of 
spending in the Illinois Enterprise Zone program uncovered no clear 
link between the intensity of incentives offered and the local unem 
ployment rate.
Overall, the literature is inconclusive about whether incentives are 
concentrated in more distressed localities. Four factors account for the 
inconclusiveness: 1) varying methodological approaches, with some 
researchers using broad historical analyses and others using statistical 
ones; 2) varying levels of sophistication, even within the body of statis-
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tical research; 3) model misspecification, especially the failure to 
include measures of the impact of locality competition on policy adop 
tion (Feiock 1989, p. 267),25 and 4) disparate independent and depen 
dent variables. The dependent variable issue requires special 
consideration. In other words, the problem is similar to that of the 
econometric literature on taxes, incentives, and growth. Not enough 
effort has been put into accurately measuring taxes and incentives.
MEASURING INCENTIVES AND THE STANDING OFFER
Most studies measure the economic development effort in ways that 
lack a sound theoretical basis for comparing variations in incentive lev 
els across localities. For instance, the increase in the number of pro 
grams offered by a state or locality says nothing about the increase in 
spending on those incentives. In fact, states often have incentives on 
their books that are essentially unfunded. 26 Conceivably, the size of the 
economic development staff might say a lot about the proper manage 
ment of the locality©s economic development instruments (although we 
doubt it), but it says nothing of how much money is available for subsi 
dizing individual firms. Similarly, total spending ignores the discrepan 
cies in the size of states. A $10 million program in Wisconsin shows a 
very different economic development effort than a similarly sized pro 
gram in California. Spending per capita solves this latter problem but 
raises a yet more fundamental one. If two states both spend an identical 
per-capita amount on a particular sort of economic development instru 
ment and if, in the first state, the program funds a much larger number 
of plants (again on a per-capita basis) than in the second state, then at 
least from the point of view of the firm, the second state would be 
offering a larger locational incentive than the first. Thus per-capita 
expenditure differences among localities ignore the way localities see 
fit to distribute their funds. Spending per job created or retained has 
more intuitive appeal for measuring policy concentration because it 
provides a seemingly clear (and comparative) measure of the actual 
value that the locality puts on each new or retained job. It indicates 
how much the locality is willing to give to create 50 or 100 or 200 jobs. 
This can be compared to spending on a similar number of jobs in other
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programs and other localities (the method has been used in a number of 
federal programs to indicate something of incentive costliness). Never 
theless, this approach has severe methodological problems.
Different sectors, and even different plants within the same sector, 
operate at different levels of capital intensity. Identical incentive 
expenditures per job might result in disparate levels of total invest 
ment. Moreover, per-job data are not available for many programs, 
especially those that are part of state tax codes. There are also very 
important conceptual and administrative difficulties involved in using 
jobs created or retained as an outcome measure (these are discussed in 
Chapter 3). The most important objection is that, if incentives do influ 
ence a firm©s location decision, it is only because the incentives alter 
the relative costs associated with operating at a particular site. Per-job 
incentive expenditures fail to capture this notion. Except for job train 
ing grants and loans and jobs tax credits, almost all incentives lower 
the cost of capital, not labor, so incentive dollars per job will not reflect 
the incentive amount per dollar of capital. Although there may be 
some, presumably sector- and asset-size-specific, relationship between 
the reduction in plant (establishment or operating) costs associated 
with an incentive and actual spending on the incentive (measured on a 
per-job basis), as far as we are aware no empirical test of this relation 
ship exists. We also do not believe that the empirical data for such a 
test are available.
Thus, it turns out that the answers to two of the most important 
questions facing economic development policy suffer from the same 
sort of problem. On the issue of whether taxes and incentives signifi 
cantly affect growth, almost all work has used inferior measures of 
state and local taxes and where indeed researchers have been con 
cerned with non-tax subsidies incentives. On the issue of what causes 
localities to offer higher or lower levels of incentives, the identical 
problem arises, but now in a more pronounced form, because much of 
this literature has been concerned with non-tax subsidies rather than 
taxes. No logically and empirically coherent measure of the economic 
development effort exists.
The intensity of a locality©s tax and non-tax incentive effort is best 
measured not by incentive spending per job, but by the locality©s stand 
ing incentive offer to the individual firm. The standing offer is obtained 
from the standard menu of taxes and incentives applicable to a firm
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locating at a particular site; it is the dollar value of the income deriving 
from that tax and incentive package available to the firm at that site. In 
this book, a comparison of spatial variation in the size of the standing 
offer to spatial variation in wage rates is used to assess the impact of 
taxes and incentives on firm investment and location behavior. The 
relationship between the size of this standing offer and the economic 
health (especially the unemployment rate) of the locality making the 
offer is used to assess whether economically distressed places pursue 
development policy more vigorously.
In this study, we analyze spatial variations in state and city standing 
offers and then correlate the standing offer of each state and city in our 
sample with the unemployment rates of those states and cities. We find 
that there are large differences among the standing offers of various 
states and cities. Indeed, in some cases the standing offer differences 
between two sites are larger than the labor costs differences. This sug 
gests to us that taxes and incentives may have an important impact on 
firm investment and location decisions.
With regard to the overall pattern of standing offers, we find a some 
what distressing pattern. There is little reason to believe that higher 
unemployment states and cities provide the largest standing offers. 
This suggests that the antecedent condition for Bartik©s argument that 
incentives may have net national benefits is not true: the spatial pattern 
of taxes and incentives in America is not likely to promote the redistri 
bution of jobs from places of low unemployment to places of high 
unemployment.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
This book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 covers some basic, 
albeit important, empirical issues, such as our choice of states, cities, 
incentives, and industrial sectors, and briefly describes our implemen 
tation of the hypothetical firm method. The methodological descrip 
tions in Chapter 2 are restricted to a few sets of issues crucial to 
understanding our results; a much more comprehensive discussion is in 
Chapter 3, which covers most of the questions that readers familiar 
with the hypothetical firm method will want answered. (Readers with
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less interest in these technical issues may want to pass over this chapter 
and proceed directly to Chapter 4.) The substantive focus in Chapter 3 
is on two separate sets of concerns: 1) the traditional methodology of 
hypothetical firm simulations and our extensions of this methodology 
and 2) our technique for the inclusion of non-tax incentives into the tra 
ditional hypothetical firm framework. The chapter, especially the sec 
ond part, provides a very extensive discussion of a range of quite 
practical modeling issues. The reason for this detail is that because we 
are the first to incorporate non-tax incentives comprehensively, on 
many technical issues there was no established literature to guide our 
decisions. Methodological assumptions play an important role in deter 
mining the results of hypothetical firm simulations; consequently, 
transparency of method is crucial.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we present our substantive results. Chapter 4 
looks at the menu of incentives that states and cities offer and the dif 
ferences these incentives make to a firm©s income. Chapter 5 considers 
the spatial pattern of the standing offer. It focuses on whether poorer 
places actually offer larger incentives. The conclusion, Chapter 6, sum 
marizes our findings and defines a future research agenda for economic 
development in the United States. We also discuss briefly a number of 
economic development policy issues for which our results have some 
bearing.
NOTES
1. Our interest is in competitive economic development policy, in other words, policy instru 
ments that encourage the relocation of investment within the United States. We are not concerned 
here with those economic development tools meant to increase productivity, such as industrial 
extension services, or those tools meant to promote exports or encourage entrepreneurship.
2. In a manner similar to that advocated by Rasmussen, Bendick, and Ledebur (1984).
3. Unfortunately for policymakers, there is evidence from the survey literature that busi 
nesses often make location decisions on the basis of non-economic factors, such as a good cli 
mate. Statistical models of the growth of high-technology industries routinely include climate 
indexes, not because of the "least cost" issue of plant heating costs but because it is believed that 
high-technology engineers prefer to work in places with attributes such as sunshine (Markusen et 
al. 1986). Opportunities for good golfing were a claimed reason Scotland was the recipient of 
such a large proportion of Japanese and American high-technology inward investment during the 
1980s. There is a range of evidence that locational behavior is influenced in a manner not obvious 
from traditional location theory. For instance, geographical models of corporate growth have indi 
cated a distance-decay relationship in the establishment of branch plants. Ray (1971) found that 
American branch plants operating in Canada were much more likely to be controlled by head 
quarters in Chicago, Detroit, or New York, while those in Mexico were more likely to be con-
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trolled by headquarters in Los Angeles. Models of corporate expansion developed by Taylor 
(1975) and Watts (1980) also support the idea of limited spatial searches.
However, neither the use of non-economic factors nor the spatial restriction of search behavior 
necessarily undermines the general appropriateness of traditional location theory. Non-economic 
factors may have a clear economic impact on the availability of inputs; for instance, if an impor 
tant cohort of a firm©s employees values sunshine and other amenities highly, then the provision of 
these through appropriate location may be considered part of the employee©s competitive benefit 
package. A more general point should also be made: personal factors may enter location deci 
sions, "but to the extent that firm©s profit-maximizing location is altered by personal preferences, 
the firm will trade off profits for personal factors" (Wasylenko 1981, p. 160). With regard to the 
spatial search issue, traditional location theory can be expanded to take into account factors such 
as the costs of locational information and the friction of distance.
4. This is the central "positive" justification for economic development policy. It is true that 
there are a number of other important justifications. Kieschnick (1981, p. 26) discusses five:
  equalizing interstate tax differentials, which may serve as an inducement for a firm to select 
an alternative business location;
  serving as a wage subsidy to offset the effects of wage rigidity or labor immobility;
  lowering the costs of capital to induce greater overall capital formation, independent of loca 
tion choices;
  serving to redistribute income from labor to capital under the politically acceptable guise of 
providing development incentives; and
  serving as a "signal" to out-of-state businesses that the state has "pro-business" regulatory 
and spending policies.
5. For a statement of this argument in the context of infrastructural incentives, see Foster, 
Forkenbrock, and Pogue (1991).
6. For restatements of the zero-sum position, see Glickman and Woodward (1989) and Rubin 
and Zorn (1985). For an early discussion of the zero-sum aspect of economic development policy, 
see Rinehart and Laird (1972). Interestingly, Rinehart and Laird argue that there may be national 
benefits from state and local competition for jobs. Wolkoff (1990) believes that critics who have 
described economic development policy in zero-sum terms have tended to misuse or, at least, to 
overly simplify game theory.
7. This would be true until a locality market equilibrium were reached and all localities pro 
vided an equivalent level of incentives. At this point, the impact of incentives might be zero-sum. 
Of course, equilibrium will not be a normal condition of the market because it will always be in 
the interest of a locality to provide some new incentive to gain some short-term advantage over all 
other localities (Netzer 1991, p. 225). However, even at the equilibrium point there may be nega 
tive economic consequences for the nation through a misallocation of resources. Most obviously, 
capital subsidies would lead to excessive national capital intensity (with potentially negative con 
sequences for jobs).
The problem with this latter argument, as Netzer fully admits, is that its assumptions cannot 
be sustained: there already exist significant imperfections in the locality market; the United States 
is not a closed economy, and incentives could attract investment from other countries; jurisdic- 
tional spillover effects exist; and state and local governments already levy an inefficient system of 
taxes. Incentives do not necessarily increase these inefficiencies.
Some researchers do not put much store in the misallocation of resources argument and claim 
that insofar as various incentives work to lower the cost of capital, they induce greater overall cap 
ital formation, independent of location factors. They may therefore be "good" from the national 
perspective (Kieschnick 1981, p. 26).
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8. These are as follows: 1) jurisdictions compete for business investment by lowering their 
taxes and by providing the services needed by business; 2) there are no interjurisdictional spill 
over effects; and 3) there are sufficient jurisdictions to approximate a competitive market.
9. Underlying Bartik©s results is a theory of skill acquisition, the "hysteresis effect." Essen 
tially, migration towards places that have experienced demand-induced job shocks will take place 
over a period of time because people are not perfectly mobile. Original residents of the place 
undergoing growth will therefore receive some short-term labor market advantages: for instance, 
some residents who would otherwise not have jobs will be employed. The human capital 
resources of these workers will improve, and they will thus be better able to compete with new in- 
migrants when the latter finally arrive. Thus, a temporary labor market advantage will have 
longer-term effects.
10. Job search theory suggests that the optimal search strategy for the job seeker is to accept 
the first job offer that exceeds the seeker©s reservation wage (Zuckerman 1984). The reservation 
wage is the lowest wage at which the worker would be willing to accept a job offer and is usually 
interpreted as a measure of the benefits, psychic and otherwise, that the individual places on lei 
sure time. Bartik (1991b) argues that, on average, the local reservation wage will vary inversely 
with the local unemployment rate. The reason for this is that in low-unemployment localities, 
where obtaining a job is relatively easy, individuals who place a high value on getting a job would 
tend to find work, while those who do not clearly place a high value on their leisure time. On the 
other hand, in high-unemployment localities, where finding a job is relatively difficult, individuals 
tend to be willing to work for low wages. As indicated, this purported relationship between the 
local unemployment rate and the reservation wage is crucial for Bartik©s broader argument about 
the potential positive net national benefits of state and local incentives. It also underpins the 
research presented in this book: if incentives do tend to promote the redistribution of investment 
(and therefore jobs) to places of high unemployment, this is beneficial only to the extent that the 
benefits of employment are greater in high-unemployment localities than in low-unemployment 
localities.
Unfortunately, only one published study has looked directly at the relationship between the 
local unemployment rate and the reservation wage. This study was conducted on British data and 
found that for every 1 percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate, the average res 
ervation wage of the unemployed declined by £0.012, or 1.6 percent (Jones 1989). Sridhar (1996) 
replicated, as closely as possible, Jones©s model using U.S. data from the 1987 Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) established at the University of Michigan. Sridhar©s results generally 
accord with Jones©s: she found that for every 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate, there was a 10 cent decrease in the reservation wage. This is the first clear U.S. evidence of 
an inverse relationship between the local unemployment rate and the reservation wage of the 
unemployed.
11. These estimates are from Bartik (1991b, p. 61). As our work and that of others show (see, 
for example, Papke 1995), this number varies considerably across sectors.
12. Diamond and Spence (1983) are referring to the evaluation of British regional policy. In 
fact, many of the instruments, goals, outcomes, and problems of British and European "regional 
policy" are reflected in U.S. "economic development policy." Both have focused on promoting job 
growth within subnational regions. Very often, grants, municipal loans, and labor subsidies have 
been used to encourage relocation (or "inward investment," to use the British euphemism) of 
firms from other regions. In this book, where appropriate, we treat regional policy and economic 
development policy as essentially equivalent and make use of the regional policy literature.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some important differences between "economic 
development policy" and "regional policy." Regional policy is generally financed and directed by 
central government; for instance, Regional Selective Assistance (a major British subsidy provided
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during the 1980s) was funded and managed by the London-based Department of Trade and Indus 
try. Economic development policy in the United States is directed by, and very often financed by, 
state and local government. As a result, central control of regional competition, and thus restric 
tions on that competition, are clear with most regional policy instruments, but less so with eco 
nomic development policy.
13. This fact poses considerable problems for the administration of policy incentives as well 
as for research on policy effectiveness (Peters 1993).
14. For recent reviews of the survey literature, see Calzonetti and Walker (1991), Eisinger 
(1988), and Blair and Premus (1987).
15. Bartik (1991b) has also provided a recent review of this literature and finds that it is gener 
ally supportive of the concept that incentives influence the locational behavior of firms.
16. Recent exceptions include Goss (1994), Goss and Phillips (1994), and Spiegel and de 
Bartolome (forthcoming), all of whom looked at the impact of economic development agency 
spending in their models. As indicated in the text, the relationship between infrastructure and 
growth has been studied in some detail. See Singletary et al. (1995) for recent evidence from the 
infrastructure literature. There is also a limited amount of work that considers other incentives. 
See Loh (1995) for a very useful recent study of jobs-targeted development incentives. Marlin
(1990), for instance, has looked at the relationship between the issue of IDBs and gross state 
product. Krmenec (1990) has investigated the relationship between IDBs and employment 
growth.
17. Effective tax rates are usually calculated by dividing regional gross tax receipts (from all 
taxes or from particular taxes such as corporate income taxes) by some base, usually employment 
or population.
18. This refers to a comparison of the results in Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) to those in 
McGuire and Wasylenko (1987), Carroll and Wasylenko (1990), and Carroll and Wasylenko
(1991).
19. This literature is covered comprehensively in Chapter 3. For two recent implementations 
of this method by the scholar most closely associated with the method, see J. Papke (1995, 1996).
20. This would mean to endogenously incorporate economic development incentives into the 
financial statements of the firm.
21. A review of this literature is provided in Chapter 3.
22. Until now, hypothetical firm simulations have not included modeling of non-tax incentives 
such as grants, loans, and loan guarantees (although there has been one very limited attempt). 
Moreover, the hypothetical firm simulations have suffered from problems of spatial and sectoral 
scale. These are discussed more fully in Chapter 3.
23. Discussions of business climate surveys certainly bear this out; see Eisinger (1988) and 
Skoro(1988).
24. See also Hanson (1985), Sharp (1986), Swanstrom (1985), and Young and Mason (1983).
25. Hanson (1993) presents the most sophisticated attempt at including variables for policy 
competition between states.
26. Also, the directories on which incentive counts are based are sometimes seriously unreli 
able.
2 An Overview of Method
In this book, we investigate the variation in the provision of eco 
nomic development incentives (as measured by the standing offer) 
across the 24 largest manufacturing states in the nation and a random 
sample of 112 cities within those states. We measure the magnitude of 
tax differences and the value of the standing incentive offer and its 
components in each state and city. We then relate the value of the busi 
ness incentive package available in a state or city to various indicators 
of economic distress for that state or locality. This study focuses on 
the year 1992.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the research method 
employed to accomplish these tasks: how we selected the incentive pro 
grams to include in the analysis, which taxes we modeled, how we 
chose states and cities, and how we developed a hypothetical firm model 
to measure the effects of taxes and the value of incentive programs. We 
have included here only those details essential to an understanding of 
our study and to interpretation of the results; a more technical and com 
plete discussion of methodology follows in Chapter 3.
WHAT ARE COMPETITIVE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES?
Since this is a study of state and local government competition for 
jobs, we focus our analysis on competitive incentives over which state 
and local governments have some direct control. But what is a compet 
itive economic development incentive? One could argue that nearly 
everything that state and local governments do has at least an indirect 
effect on economic activity. Infrastructure, which provides services 
used directly by businesses, obviously supports production in the pri 
vate sector, while certain taxes directly reduce business profits. Fur 
thermore, a whole range of services to households arguably increases 
the productivity of local labor or facilitates the assembling of a labor 
force, and so has indirect (though often incidental) effects on economic
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development. Moreover, lawmakers feel compelled to package spend 
ing whether on basic education, higher education, infrastructure, or 
the arts on the merits of its ability to improve the state or local cli 
mate for growth. Political leaders in Oregon went so far as to campaign 
for a sales tax on the basis of its economic development purpose: a 
sales tax would allow a reduction in corporate and some personal taxes 
and thus improve the state©s development prospects (Hovey 1986, pp. 
90-91).
Nonetheless, it is useful to identify a subset of state and local poli 
cies with an explicit economic development objective, programs that 
would in all likelihood not exist but for the public concern with pro 
moting job creation and economic growth. Since this research is con 
cerned with the effects of intergovernmental competition for jobs and 
capital, it is this set of overtly development-focused programs that is of 
interest.
As we are dealing only with competitive incentives, we exclude 
"new wave" or "demand side" programs, which are aimed at stimulat 
ing entrepreneurship, subsidizing research and development, promot 
ing technology transfer or the commercialization of university 
research, providing venture capital, stimulating exports, or facilitating 
the incubation of new small businesses. Such programs tend not to be 
used as relocation incentives for mobile firms; instead, they are usually 
designed to stimulate the generation of new indigenous technologies or 
new indigenous firms or to open new markets.
We also exclude those incentives, almost all of which are federally 
financed, that are offered in a standard format across most localities in 
the nation, such as industrial revenue bond (IRB) financing and federal 
programs that operate outside the control of state and local government 
or that focus on rural areas. The latter incentives include, for example, 
most Small Business Administration programs, all Department of 
Agriculture programs, and all Bureau of Indian Affairs programs.
We distinguish between tax and non-tax incentives. 1 The majority of 
tax subsidies are provided automatically. That is, if a firm meets certain 
criteria specified in the tax code and makes an investment of the speci 
fied sort (a new industrial building, for example) or hires some cate 
gory of worker, then the firm will receive the incentive. The 
government unit provides the incentive in an all-or-nothing fashion; it 
is not possible to focus the incentive program on only those firms that
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"need" (however this is construed) the subsidy to survive or to enable 
them to relocate. (The exception is local property tax abatements; for 
the most part, the cities in our sample offered standard abatement terms 
for all industrial investments, but in many instances there was some 
discretion exercised.) Non-tax incentives are usually discretionary; 
they tend to be negotiated between governmental units and prospective 
firms. Firms that meet program requirements do not automatically 
receive a subsidy but must compete with other prospective firms for 
incentives. In this case, the incentive program might be thought of as 
an investment vehicle for public funds: program managers should 
invest only in those projects where the expected rate of return (broadly 
conceived to include returns on certain social goals) is sufficient.
The distinction between tax and non-tax programs is important in 
building the simulation model and in interpreting the results. Within 
clearly definable limits, we know that a firm of a designated asset and 
employment size in a particular sector making a specific new invest 
ment will receive a certain level of tax incentives (negotiated abate 
ments being an exception). However, we can only determine the most 
likely non-tax award. It should be noted that there is evidence from 
regional incentive programs in Great Britain that firms are more likely 
to take into account automatic rather than discretionary incentives 
when making locational decisions, presumably because automatic 
incentives are certain and can be incorporated early into the firm©s 
planning process (Swales 1989). 2
TAXES AND TAX INCENTIVES
One can make a distinction between the effects of competition on 
overall spending or tax levels and the effects of competition on the cre 
ation of particular programs (or tax laws) with an explicit development 
purpose. This research focuses on economic development tax expendi 
tures, credits or exemptions that represent departures from the normal 
tax base and that are aimed at stimulating private investment. Three 
kinds of incentives fall clearly into this category: investment and job 
creation credits against the corporate income or franchise tax, sales tax 
exemptions provided only to firms locating in enterprise zones, and
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property tax abatements for new business investment. The investment 
and jobs tax credits, the sales tax exemptions, and, in many cases, the 
property tax abatements differ in one significant respect from the other 
competitive incentives discussed: they are entitlements, provided auto 
matically to any firm meeting the qualifications in the law.
In the area of tax policy, it is more difficult to draw the line between 
explicit economic development tax laws and general tax policy 
changes adopted with an eye to their economic development implica 
tions. John Shannon has argued that the competition for jobs has led 
states to become concerned with their overall business tax climate and 
that they have taken steps to avoid having any of the tax "sore thumbs" 
that are thought to be trouble signs to potential investors. Shannon 
identifies the six most often cited "sore thumbs" as 1) a high overall tax 
burden, 2) a heavy and progressive individual income tax, 3) business 
taxes (corporate income tax, workers© compensation tax, or unemploy 
ment insurance tax) that are clearly out of line with those of other 
states, 4) heavy property taxes on business realty (land and buildings), 
5) any property tax on business personal property (machinery or inven 
tories), and 6) a sales tax on a substantial share of business purchases 
(such as machinery or fuels and utilities). He then asserts that "the 
more ©sore thumbs© a jurisdiction exhibits, the greater the likelihood 
that its policymakers will resort to a wide variety of temporary pain 
killers business tax concessions as the most expedient way to deal 
with these competitive problems" (Shannon 1991, p. 118).
If Shannon©s observation is accurate, then it could be quite mislead 
ing to measure only the three clear economic development tax incen 
tives identified at the beginning of this section. It could be that the 
states that do not provide such incentives, or do so at a very low level, 
are precisely the ones that have responded to competitive pressures by 
adopting more general tax policies favorable to business and thus see 
no need for the explicit investment incentives. Furthermore, economic 
development concerns have undoubtedly played a significant role in 
the past 20 years in the decisions by many states to exempt business 
inventories from the property tax; to exempt machinery and equipment 
purchases, fuels, and utilities from the sales tax; to exempt or preferen 
tially assess machinery for purposes of the property tax; and to keep 
down or reduce business tax rates as well as the top individual tax rate.
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To avoid seriously biasing our study against states that have chosen a 
particular approach to keeping the business tax climate competitive, we 
will simulate the overall burden of state and local taxes having an initial 
impact on business: the corporate income tax, 3 the property tax on busi 
ness realty and personal property, and the sales tax on major business 
purchases (machinery and equipment, and fuel and electricity). The 
analysis includes federal corporation income taxes as well. There is 
another significant advantage to modeling the federal and state income 
taxes: the results will then automatically measure the value to the firm 
of the after-tax effects of all state and local incentive programs. To the 
extent that a local grant program or property tax reduction reduces the 
firm©s deductible costs, the firm©s state and federal taxable income will 
increase and its total state and federal income tax bill will rise, dimin 
ishing the net value of the incentive program. Unless income taxes are 
fully modeled, the value of incentives will be overstated.
Corporate Income Tax
Modeling the complete corporate income tax codes in each state 
would require a large investment of time involving a host of relatively 
insignificant differences in law. Papke and Papke (1984) argue that the 
major differences are due to rates; deductibility of income taxes paid to 
other states, the federal government, or one©s own state; deductibility 
of property taxes; rules for apportionment of income; depreciation 
methods; and rules for carrying net operating losses (NOL) backward 
or forward. Studies using the hypothetical firm method generally 
account for all of these corporate income tax features except for the 
NOL carryforward rules. Studies looking at average taxes paid in one 
year sometimes model firms with losses, but since they do not consider 
tax burdens in other years, they do not model the NOL carryforward. 
On the other hand, multiyear models do not include firms with losses 
because of the logical and practical difficulties in doing so; thus, the 
NOL provisions, even if modeled, would never apply.4
Variations among the selected 24 states with respect to the key fea 
tures of the income tax are shown later in this book (see Table 4.2). To 
the Papke list might be added the following: 1) the availability of gen 
eral credits for other taxes paid, such as sales or property taxes; 2) the 
treatment of nonbusiness income (how it is allocated, whether it is sub-
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ject to apportionment); 3) whether the property factor in the apportion 
ment formula is measured by acquisition cost or book value; 4) 
whether the sales factor includes nonbusiness receipts; and 5) the avail 
ability of investment tax credits or jobs tax credits. All of these features 
are included in our model.
There seems to be agreement that there is little point in modeling the 
very minor differences in the measurement of the payroll factor or in 
modeling the differences in the treatment of subcategories of nonbusi 
ness income, such as rents, royalties, interest on federal bonds, interest 
on state and local bonds, dividends from subsidiaries, and capital 
gains. We would argue that since the focus of the research is on the 
location of facilities for the generation of sales of products business 
income the treatment of such items is not relevant. There is a practi 
cal argument as well: data at this level of detail are not generally avail 
able, and the simulation of the myriad differences in state law would 
greatly complicate model building. There are two simplifying assump 
tions that can then be made: 1) the hypothetical firms have no nonbusi 
ness income or 2) the hypothetical firms have aggregate nonbusiness 
income as given by the statistical data sources, but it is entirely in the 
form of interest on corporate bonds, which is treated uniformly by the 
states. The latter approach allows one to model rules for the allocation 
or apportionment of nonbusiness income without getting into the 
details of what counts as nonbusiness income and what does not. Also 
generally ignored (by creating firms that have no such income or asset 
category) are the treatment of foreign business income, foreign non- 
business income, foreign tax credits, extraordinary items such as write 
offs for plant closures, goodwill, and recapture of federal investment 
tax credits, or the adding back of federal job incentive credits.
The Sales Tax
Most studies consider only the sales tax on purchases of fuel and 
electricity and of machinery and equipment. These are the two major 
categories of expenditure by manufacturers that are sometimes taxed 
and sometimes exempted by the states. The exemptions are most often 
targeted exclusively at manufacturing machinery and at fuel and elec 
tricity used directly in the manufacturing process, which suggests that
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at least part of the motivation for the exemption was an economic 
development one.
Hunt (1985) estimated expenditures on other business purchases 
that are subject to sales tax (at least in some states): office equipment, 
furniture, nonmanufacturing supplies, building materials for repair and 
for new construction, and pollution abatement equipment. Of the total 
expenditures on these items plus fuel and electricity and manufacturing 
machinery, the latter two categories represented 74 percent, averaged 
across Hunt©s seven manufacturing industries. Thus the studies that 
model sales taxes only on fuel and electricity and on machinery and 
equipment are omitting about 26 percent of the total sales tax. Pollu 
tion abatement equipment represented just 2 percent of the total; even 
though some states tax it and some exempt it, the omission of sales tax 
ation of pollution equipment from a model can have only a trivial 
effect on overall state tax differentials. Office equipment, furniture and 
fixtures, and office supplies are almost universally subject to the full 
sales tax rate; failure to include such expenses in the model thus cre 
ates differences only because of variations in tax rates. Our model 
includes expenditures on machinery and equipment, furniture and fix 
tures, computers, and fuel and electricity; it does not include expendi 
ture detail for office supplies, construction materials, or pollution 
control equipment, so the results do not reflect the minor differences 
caused by state variation in taxing these latter items.
We have chosen not to separately identify, in the results, the effects 
of state sales tax treatment of purchases of various kinds of machinery 
and equipment or purchases of fuel and electricity. Each state©s sales 
tax is part of the model; to the extent that the state applies the sales tax 
fully to purchases of manufacturing machinery, computers, furniture 
and fixtures, transportation equipment, or other personal property, that 
will be reflected in a higher acquisition cost for those assets and hence 
larger depreciation deductions and larger financing requirements. To 
the extent that the state taxes or exempts purchases of electricity or 
fuel, or exempts the portion used directly in the manufacturing process, 
the firm©s operating costs will be more or less each year. 5 Some would 
argue that sales tax exemptions for personal property or utilities used 
by manufacturers are not tax expenditures, but are better viewed as 
attempts to make the actual tax base conform to the ideal: a tax on final 
consumption, not on intermediate goods. For practical modeling rea-
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sons as well, sales tax effects are not separately identified in the results 
but are included in the measure of the state©s overall "base" tax system.
The Property Tax
There are three aspects of the property tax system that are modeled. 
First, state policy will generally determine whether local property taxes 
apply to business inventories and to personal property in general, 
whether categories of personal property such as manufacturing 
machinery and equipment are exempt, and whether different classes of 
property must be assessed at different ratios to market value. States 
also generally establish rules or guidelines for local assessors in deter 
mining the market value of personal property; typically, the state will 
publish depreciation schedules by industry and/or type of property. 
These state guidelines are used by the model to value personal prop 
erty; book value is assumed for real property, using straight-line depre 
ciation over the life of the building.
Second, local policy will determine the effective general tax rate on 
business realty and personalty. Third, local policy will determine 
whether certain new investments in realty or machinery and equipment 
are fully or partly exempt from property taxes and for how many years, 
within state-defined limits on such local abatements. The effects of the 
first two are part of the local "base" tax system; the effects of abate 
ments are identified separately as an explicit local economic develop 
ment incentive.
Our list of tax features that are modeled, and the implied list of fea 
tures that are not, can be further justified by considering evidence of 
what firms think of as state policy incentives, or what state develop 
ment officials consider relevant when comparing the competitive posi 
tions of states. The Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and 
Development in the United States, compiled by the National Associa 
tion of State Development Agencies (1991), includes the specific eco 
nomic development tax expenditures that have been cited and also 
includes information on overall business taxes: the corporate income 
tax, the sales tax on machinery and equipment and fuel and utilities, 
and the property tax on machinery and equipment and inventories. It 
has, in other words, all of Shannon©s "sore thumbs" except for individ 
ual income taxes. The lists of incentives published annually in the fore-
Industrial Incentives 39
most two U.S. location periodicals, Area Development and Site 
Selection and Industrial Development, are very similar. It should be 
noted that none of these directories of incentives includes any broader 
measures of financing policy, general job training or education expen 
ditures, or infrastructure spending.
NON-TAX INCENTIVES
Hypothetical firm models have not included non-tax incentives since 
these are mostly negotiated, whereas tax incentives are usually auto 
matic and applied uniformly. Thus, in order to simulate the impact of 
non-tax incentives on investment, the model must be able to generate a 
set of incentives that a plant would likely receive from a state or city 
and then apply those incentives to an investment. This is a very differ 
ent sort of problem than is found in modeling tax systems. There are 
four major steps involved in integrating discretionary non-tax incen 
tives into a hypothetical firm model:
  Develop an "administrative history" for each incentive program, 
such as incentive dollars awarded per jobs created or incentive 
dollars awarded per associated total investment. These ratios can 
then be utilized to develop likely amounts that a firm would 
receive from a particular incentive program.
  Apply the various explicit program rules. Common rules include 
a maximum amount a firm may receive from an incentive pro 
gram or a stipulated minimum equity contribution.
  Assemble the best package of incentives available from a unit of 
government. The model should be able to mirror the way in 
which economic development officials assemble their incentives 
into competitive packages.
  Calculate the present value of a firm©s return on investment with 
out any discretionary incentives and then again with a particular 
package of discretionary incentives. The difference between these 
two amounts measures the after-tax worth of a state©s or city©s 
discretionary incentives to a firm.
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Competitive non-tax incentive programs fall into three broad cate 
gories: general-purpose capital-financing programs, employment train 
ing subsidies, and infrastructure subsidies. We now focus on each of 
these in turn.
General-Purpose Financing Programs
State or local programs providing grants, loans, loan guarantees, or 
loan subsidies directly or indirectly (through linked-deposit programs) 
to private businesses in order to finance working capital or the acquisi 
tion of land, plant, or equipment are competitive development incen 
tives. The principal or sole purpose of these programs is the attraction 
of business capital and the creation of jobs. Essentially all of these pro 
grams aim to lower the costs of doing business by reducing the cost of 
capital. Usually the funds are provided by the government or by a 
quasi-public authority. One could argue that there are other state poli 
cies that can improve the terms of business financing and hence foster 
development. State banking regulatory policies, for example, may well 
have been reformed in recent years partly in an effort to stimulate the 
flow of capital to business investment generally. This study focuses on 
the more narrowly defined set of programs providing direct public 
financing (or financing subsidies) to particular businesses. 6
Customized Job Training and Wage Subsidies
State and local job training programs (often run through community 
colleges) that are customized to the training needs of particular firms 
opening new facilities or expanding operations fall within our defini 
tion of a non-tax incentive. This category includes programs whereby 
the state pays a portion of the "training wages" for new employees who 
are trained on the job by the firm, as well as programs providing train 
ing per se. Through these programs, the state subsidizes firms© labor 
costs. Job training programs are usually grants to the firm, but they 
may also take the form of loans or loan guarantees.
Training programs meant for general skill development and educa 
tional purposes, such as those available to laid-off and unemployed 
workers, are excluded from our model. We consider customized train 
ing programs only those that specifically provide for the training (or
Industrial Incentives 41
subsidy) of workers at a particular firm. Many such customized pro 
grams provide for on-the-job training. Here, the recipient firm, not an 
outside educational institution, is paid to train workers for the positions 
being created or retained. There is some evidence that on-the-job train 
ing often serves as a wage subsidy: funds for on-the-job training con 
tinue longer than the individual worker is being trained in the plant, 
often much longer. Public funds thus effectively reduce the costs of hir 
ing a worker; they serve to subsidize wages. Since so many state and 
local training programs that fit our research criteria allow on-the-job 
training, we decided not to distinguish between job training programs 
and wage subsidy programs.
Vocational education, or education in general, is a traditional func 
tion of state and local government that predates the competition for 
jobs and that would continue to be supported even in the absence of a 
competitive environment. One could argue that the support for educa 
tion would be different were it not for competition. Perhaps more funds 
have been directed in recent years to education in general and to voca 
tional training in particular because of the concern with economic 
growth. There is, in fact, anecdotal evidence to support this. The south 
ern states, for example, have raised taxes to bring their educational sys 
tems nearer to the national standard, in recognition that their economic 
future is at stake (Shannon 1991). However, it is impossible to identify 
the magnitude of public expenditure on education and training that is 
attributable to competition, or to make any presumption about its value 
to a particular business, or even to be sure that the net effects on educa 
tion funding of expenditure and tax competition in particular states 
have been positive.
Our model does not include any of the federal training programs, 
such as Jobs Training Partnership Act (JTPA) funds, Job Opportunities 
and Basic Skills (JOBS) training, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), 
or the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC). These are programs that are 
available reasonably uniformly across the states. We model only state 
and locally financed and directed training and subsidy programs. 
Unfortunately, the situation is complicated by the fact that many state 
training programs are organized in concert with JTPA and other federal 
funds. Where this is the case, we model (insofar as it is possible) only 
the state-capitalized portion of training.
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Infrastructure Subsidies
State-funded infrastructure improvements, tied to new investment 
by a particular firm that is relocating or expanding operations, and part 
of a program whose primary purpose is job creation, clearly fall within 
the definition of a competitive economic development incentive. Most 
states operate at least one infrastructure grant, loan, or loan guarantee. 
In almost all instances, the instrument is in the form of a direct grant, 
usually for the building of a section of an access road or a bridge to the 
new plant. In many cases, the responsible local unit of government 
applies, on behalf of the firm, to the state Department of Transportation 
(DOT). Usually, the state DOT, not the state economic development 
agency, runs the infrastructure program. Many bigger cities have simi 
lar programs, but these will often allow expenditures for other site 
assembly expenses.
It is common for states and cities to use federal Community Devel 
opment Block Grant (CDBG) funds for infrastructure provision, and 
many states and cities advertise the CDBG as an infrastructure incen 
tive. We exclude CDBG-based infrastructure subsidies, since the 
CDBG is essentially a national program with a reasonably standard set 
of rules applying across all states.
Some cities reported to us that, although they did not have a separate 
set-aside fund dedicated to providing infrastructure to new and expand 
ing firms, they often used general revenues for this purpose, but on an 
ad hoc basis. For example, if a road to a plant needed to be upgraded, 
then a portion of city street maintenance funds would be used for this 
purpose. In a few instances, state road programs were also ad hoc. Illi 
nois, as an illustration, no longer has a dedicated pot of money to be 
used for building access roads; 7 nevertheless, general road funds may 
be used for economic development purposes.
Our research covers only state and local infrastructure grants, loans, 
and loan guarantees that existed in 1992 as dedicated, separate incen 
tives. We found it impossible to assemble the data necessary to model 
ad hoc infrastructure incentives, or, for that matter, any ad hoc incen 
tives. Modeling incentives from general revenues would have required 
a massive historical data collection effort. It is our experience that such 
data do not exist for the most part; where they do exist, they are not 
compiled, and time constraints on city officials make it unlikely that
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they would provide the information. Moreover, the statistical modeling 
of ad hoc incentives would likely introduce a significant new source of 
error into our more general simulation of state and local incentives.
From the point of view of our major research questions, the omis 
sion of ad hoc incentives is not a major limitation. We aim at measur 
ing the explicit economic development incentive effort of state and 
local governments. Over and above the complex empirical issues of 
data collection and modeling involved in measuring non-explicit pro 
grams, we do not believe there is a good theoretical case for including 
incentives that may exist only for a single firm©s investment. Moreover, 
to the extent that incentives do influence a firm©s locational and invest 
ment decisions, explicit incentives will be of much greater importance 
than implied ad hoc incentives. 8
As with job training programs, ambiguity arises in defining incen 
tives when one considers the whole range of infrastructure spending by 
state and local governments, most of which provides transportation or 
utility-type services used directly by the private sector. It may be that 
the level of infrastructure spending as a whole is greater than it would 
have been in the absence of state and local competition for jobs. Again, 
the magnitude of this effect is very difficult to ascertain; furthermore, 
much of the infrastructure spending in the past two decades has had 
primarily a health or environmental purpose. We focus on the portion 
of infrastructure spending providing special benefits to particular firms 
and with funding coming from a special program with an economic 
development purpose.
Other Incentive Programs Not Included
Inevitably, some programs were not included in the model. In many 
cases, this was because the program was too small or its use was too 
infrequent. However, many programs were deliberately ignored: in 
particular, those funded by the federal government in such a way that 
there is little local control of spending.
The federal government has a long and complex relationship with 
local economic development efforts. The contours of this relationship 
were solidified during the Depression and Roosevelt©s New Deal and 
greatly expanded after World War II. In essence, the federal govern 
ment would pay for programs for example, Urban Renewal, Urban
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Development Action Grants, CDBGs, or the interest exemption for 
industrial revenue bonds but the money or benefits would be dis 
persed by state and local governments. To the extent that these pro 
grams have been used as major instruments of state and local economic 
development policy, the federal government has been subsidizing and 
encouraging locational competition in the United States.
Currently, CDBGs are commonly used for economic development 
purposes, in particular, for local infrastructure development. Over the 
past decade, they have also capitalized local economic development 
revolving loan funds (RLFs). In addition, many other federal programs 
may be used for economic development purposes: federal funding for 
highways and road improvements, the Federal Aviation Authority©s 
subsidization of the building and upgrading of commercial airports, the 
Economic Development Administration (EDA) Title IX program also 
capitalizing RLFs, and the JTPA funds for technical training and skills 
enhancement. There are numerous additional programs that target rural 
areas, distressed areas, small firms, and disadvantaged population 
groups through, respectively, Farmers Home Administration business 
loans, various Small Business Administration capital programs, and 
Minority Business Administration and Bureau of Indian Affairs loan, 
loan guarantee, subcontracting, and business education programs.
All such programs serve to reduce the costs of doing business. Other 
things being equal, the use of any of these programs might confer sig 
nificant economic development advantages on a locality. However, 
with one exception, our study does not take into account any of these 
federal programs affecting local economic development potential. The 
focus of our study is on the use of resources by states and localities to 
enhance their position in the competition for investment and jobs. We 
exclude IRBs, for example, because they require no local commitment 
of resources and because their availability is nearly universal, so that 
their use confers no competitive advantage. 9 For similar reasons, most 
of the other federal programs previously cited are excluded. We do, 
however, include RLFs capitalized with federal funds, usually with the 
state©s CDBG allocation or with a locality©s CDBG entitlement. Even 
though the funds are federal, RLFs are not a uniformly available pro 
gram. The states and localities have considerable discretion in use of 
the funds, so that the decision to capitalize an RLF means that those 
CDBG monies are not available for other purposes, such as housing
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rehabilitation or infrastructure improvements. In that sense, the 
resources do represent a state or local commitment, and variation in 
their use can result in a pattern of competitive advantage.
Finally, there are a number of other quasi-governmental organiza 
tions that are often involved in the building of a particular incentive 
package offer. These include local power companies, chambers of 
commerce, bankers and real estate developers, small business invest 
ment companies (SBICs), and even community development corpora 
tions. Particularly in smaller communities or with smaller investments 
in larger communities, all or some of these groups may help package 
local incentives or even offer their own incentives, such as RLFs, so 
that a local deal may "happen." No attempt to quantify this involve 
ment in the state and local economic development effort exists. On the 
basis of our experience with economic development officials, we 
believe the involvement is widespread and that it may be effective in 
influencing the location decisions of firms, at least compared to many 
other state and local incentives. Nevertheless, we do not include quasi- 
governmental incentives in our model. In the first instance, they do not 
indicate anything of the state or municipal government©s commitment 
to economic development activity, and it is this commitment that is the 
focus of our study. In the second, it is plausible to argue that the 
involvement of quasi-governmental organizations is based on self- 
interest (increasing local demand for energy, enhancing commercial 
real estate values, expanding the local market for financial services) in 
a way in which the involvement of state and city government is not. 
The presumed link between the level of local distress and the intensity 
of the incentive offer is thus much less clear with quasi-governmental 
organizations.
THE HYPOTHETICAL FIRM METHOD: AN INTRODUCTION
Our method for measuring the value of each locality©s standing offer 
is based on the process by which firms make investment decisions. 
According to traditional location theory, a particular firm in a specified 
industry, with given production technology and needs for various kinds 
of assets, labor, and other inputs, will evaluate alternative sites for new
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investment on the basis of the profitability of the marginal investment 
in each location under consideration. Our measure of this effect is the 
present value of the increase in a firm©s after-tax cash flow over a 20- 
year period it could expect to derive from an investment in a new plant 
in a particular state and city, given that state and city©s tax and incen 
tive regime.
The present study uses the hypothetical firm method to measure the 
value of competitive incentives to typical manufacturing firms. The 
implementation of this method in what we call the Tax and Incentive 
Model (TAIM) begins with the construction of financial statements for 
firms representative of various industries and firm sizes. TAIM then 
measures the net returns to each firm, after state, local, and federal 
taxes, on a new plant investment. For the state-level analysis, the new 
plant is located in one of 24 states, the 24 that account for the most 
manufacturing employment in the United States (Map 2.1). (Together, 
the 24 states accounted for about 86 percent of total manufacturing 
employment in 1990.) In the city-level analysis, the plant is located in 
one of 112 cities of 10,000 population or more (also shown in Map 
2.1), randomly selected within these 24 states. The model then mea 
sures the increase in return on investment that occurs as a result of the 
state or local "standing offer": the set of tax incentives, infrastructure 
incentives, job training programs, and general loan and grant programs 
available to new businesses. The value of this incentive package to the 
firm is subsequently compared to the unemployment rate or rate of job 
growth in the state or city.
Thus, the value to the firm of a locality©s incentive package is the 
amount the package adds to the profitability of a new investment in that 
locality. The effect of the standing offer on a firm©s return on invest 
ment depends on the characteristics of the firm. We constructed 16 
hypothetical firms, having the characteristics of a typical large and a 
typical small firm in each of 8 manufacturing industries. Sectoral dif 
ferentiation is necessary because the responsiveness to taxes and incen 
tives is not uniform across industries due to differences in the relative 
importance of certain kinds of assets or differences in the ratios of jobs 
to assets. In general, we chose sectors that are growing and that are, at 
least potentially, geographically mobile. New plant construction was 
assumed for each firm, with plant sizes based on employment and asset 
data for typical large and small manufacturing establishments.
Map 2.1 Geographic Dispersion of States and Cities Included in the Analysis
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Balance sheets and income statements were developed for each firm 
based on published data from annual reports, federal tax statistics, and 
the Census of Manufactures. In each case, we specified a new manu 
facturing facility (including total plant, equipment, and working capital 
needed, employment, sales, etc.); the balance sheet and income state 
ment for the new plant mirrored the attributes of the parent firm. (The 
characteristics of the firms are shown in Table 3.1.)
For each of the 16 firms, two alternative location assumptions were 
made: 1) that the firm initially has operations only in the state in ques 
tion and expands at the same site; and 2) that the firm is initially a mul- 
tistate corporation with facilities spread throughout the 24 states in our 
sample and then builds a new plant in a particular state among the 24. 10 
In all cases, the firm is assumed to sell in a national market, and its 
sales are distributed among the states in proportion to population.
This analytical approach is a variation of the hypothetical firm 
method, which has appeared infrequently in literature on the effect of 
business incentives. The hypothetical firm method has been employed 
primarily to study differences in state tax systems. 11 Because of its data 
requirements and computational complexity, most hypothetical firm 
work has been done by, or for, state governments. To our knowledge, 
we are the first to use this approach to measure comprehensively the 
effects of non-tax incentives, such as state grants, loans, and loan guar 
antees. We have also made a number of significant refinements to the 
best practice of the method; these are described in detail in Chapter 3.
The model begins by simulating the firm©s costs, revenues, and 
changes in its balance sheet over a 20-year period, producing a stream 
of annual cash flows. The simulations are performed twice: the first 
with the firm operating in a "steady state" for 20 years with no new 
investment and with constant sales and operating costs, and the second 
with the firm constructing the new plant in one of the states or cities in 
our study. The incremental cash flow attributable to the operations of 
the new plant is the measure of project returns. We take the present 
value of this incremental cash flow as our single summary measure of 
the firm©s return on its new plant investment.
Differences in project returns across states and cities reflect differ 
ences in the state and local tax structure and incentive package. Simu 
lations were performed with and without the various categories of 
incentives included in the analysis. The first run included only the
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basic tax structure: state (and local) corporate income and net worth 
taxes, state (and local) sales taxes on machinery and equipment and on 
fuel and electricity, and state (and local) property taxes on real and per 
sonal business property. A second run added tax incentives: state cor 
porate income tax credits for investment or job creation, and local 
property tax abatements. Subsequent runs added non-tax incentives 
such as loans, grants, and loan guarantees. The difference between 
returns with tax incentives and returns with only basic taxes measures 
the value to the firm of the tax incentives offered. The difference 
between project returns with all incentives included and returns with 
just tax incentives measures the after-tax value of the entire non-tax 
incentive package.
EXTENSIONS TO THE HYPOTHETICAL FIRM METHOD TO 
INCLUDE NON-TAX INCENTIVES
The modeling of non-tax incentives involves some important modi 
fications. As indicated earlier, states have laws and administrative rules 
that govern the way in which non-tax incentives are dispersed. In order 
to be eligible for an incentive, a firm must meet certain criteria. More 
over, the amount of non-tax incentives provided to a firm will depend 
both on the sort of investment the firm intends to make and on negotia 
tions between program officials and the firm. We call the historical out 
come of these negotiations the program©s "administrative history."
Once TAIM has created the operating ratios and balance sheets for a 
new investment (as described in the previous section), this information 
must then be made available to a rule-based system (or "expert system" 
or "knowledge base") that determines the non-tax incentives for which 
the investment is eligible and calculates a likely amount for each incen 
tive based on historical ratios for that type of offering. Each state and 
local program has its own expert system that attempts to model both 
the explicit administrative rules and the administrative history of each 
program. An example of an explicit administrative rule would be "Pro 
gram X will award no more than $2,000 in grants per job created or 
retained." An example of a portion of administrative history would be 
"In most instances, program Y imposes a rate on loans 2 percentage
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points below the private rate for that asset class." However, most states 
and cities offer a menu of non-tax incentives. Thus states and cities 
have rules (or at least precedent) about the ways in which incentive 
packages may be assembled. As a result, for each state and city there 
must be another expert system to control the assembly individual 
incentives into incentive packages.
Once the incentive package has been established, the non-tax sec 
tion of TAIM distributes incentives to appropriate asset categories 
(land, plant, machinery, infrastructure, working capital). Finally, for 
incentives in the form of loans, loan guarantees, and linked deposits, 
future interest and principal payments must be generated in accordance 
with program rules. The firm©s income and tax statements are then 
recalculated by the hypothetical firm section of TAIM using new data 
on public financing.
SELECTION OF THE STATE AND CITY SAMPLES
Using the 1990 Annual Survey of Manufactures (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1992a), we identified the 24 states with the greatest manufac 
turing employment. 12 The 24 states chosen accounted for 86 percent of 
all manufacturing jobs in the United States. The study was limited to 
these states; this reduced the task of state-level data collection by about 
50 percent (compared with a study of all 50 states) while losing little in 
generality, since we included the vast majority of states that can be 
considered serious players in the game for more industrial employ 
ment. A list of the states, with population and employment data, can be 
found in Appendix A, Table A. 1.
We then used a geographic information systems (GIS) database 
based on the 1990 Census to identify all cities and places in these 24 
states with a population of over 10,000 and with some manufacturing 
presence. We excluded locations that were not either incorporated 
places with active government units or consolidated cities. This 
resulted in a set of 1,960 cities. We stratified this set of cities by popu 
lation size in order to avoid drawing mostly small cities into the sam 
ple. We also established a threshold ratio of manufacturing 
employment to population; cities below this threshold were excluded
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from the sample on the grounds that they represented purely residential 
communities, which were not in the competition for manufacturing 
jobs.
Four population classes were created: 10,000-24,999, 25,000- 
99,999, 100,000-499,999, and 500,000 or more. We included in our 
sample all 21 cities with a population of 500,000 or more. We listed the 
cities within each of the other three size classes randomly; the sample 
of cities in those classes was then drawn by proceeding down the list, 
excluding any that fell below the manufacturing employment thresh 
old, until we had a sufficient number of cities of that size. The number 
of cities in each size class in our original sample and the number for 
which complete data were obtained are shown in Table 2.1. The final 
city sample (with state and city characteristics) is listed in Appendix 
Table A.2.
Data on state taxes and tax incentives were obtained largely from the 
Commerce Clearing House Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide 
and from copies of corporate income tax forms and instructions for 
each state. State non-tax programs were initially identified from pub 
lished sources, including the Directory of Incentives, published by the 
National Association of State Development Agencies (1991), and 1992 
incentive checklists published in Site Selection and Area Development, 
and brochures published by state departments of economic develop 
ment. 13 Appropriate state agencies were then contacted by letter and by 
phone, with numerous follow-up calls, mailed survey forms, and let 
ters, to verify the existence of the incentive programs during 1992 and
Table 2.1 Sample of Cities
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to secure details on program eligibility, operation, and performance. 
Local property tax rates and property tax abatement schedules and 
information on the details of local non-tax incentive programs were 
obtained from community chambers of commerce, development agen 
cies, and city and county officials, with a similar combination of tele 
phone and mail surveys and follow-up inquiries. State sources were 
sometimes helpful in providing the details on enterprise zone incen 
tives and local property tax rates throughout the state.
NOTES
1. This is similar to Kieschnick©s (1981) distinction between automatic and discretionary 
incentives.
2. Haug©s (1984) work on incentives in the Scottish electronics industry seems to agree with 
this. We know of no direct comparison of automatic and discretionary economic development 
incentives in the United States.
3. Since some states integrate a net worth tax with the income tax, we also consider all state 
taxes based on assets, net worth, stockholders© equity, or similar measures, and any investment or 
jobs credits associated with such taxes.
4. If one is modeling a firm over a long period of time, obviously it makes no sense for the 
firm to continue in business losing money every year. To incorporate losses in some years but 
profits in others would be possible, but it is difficult to do so in a nonarbitrary fashion, it would 
complicate the calculations enormously, and the number of possible scenarios would multiply.
5. Other features of the sales tax are not included in the model, such as the taxation of con 
struction materials or of repair parts or services. Data on expenditures for such items by industry 
are not available, to our knowledge. Almost all states exempt purchases of raw materials or inter 
mediate goods actually incorporated into the final product, so the absence of sales taxation of 
these items is not a competitive issue.
6. The choice was also subject to certain program size constraints. For state incentives, grant 
programs had to have awarded $100,000 in funds during fiscal year 1992, loan and loan guarantee 
programs had to have awarded at least $500,000. For city incentives, programs had to have 
awarded at least $100,000, and program rules should have allowed individual awards of $50,000 
or more. The size constraints were used to exclude small, seldom-used programs and programs 
aimed only at microbusinesses.
7. Previously, Illinois did have such an incentive as part of the broader package of funds 
available through the Build Illinois program.
8. As far as we are aware, there has been no academic work done on this issue.
9. The existence of federally imposed state-by-state caps on the annual volume of private 
activity bonds, of which IRBs are one variety, may limit this universality to a degree, but this 
would be difficult to assess by state.
10. We do not specify particular locations in these states but represent them by assuming that 
the firm is initially situated entirely in a mythical "median state," which has a state and local tax 
system representing the median of our 24 states.
11. See, for example, Papke and Papke (1986), L. Papke (1987, 1991), Hunt (1985), Hunt and 
O©Leary (1989), and Laughlin (1993). Earlier work is discussed in Kieschnick (1981). A complete 
discussion of this literature is provided in Chapter 3.
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12. There is one minor exception: we substituted the 25th state (Iowa) for the 24th state (Mis 
sissippi) due to the ease of data collection in the former and severe difficulties in obtaining data in 
the early stages of the project for the latter. Iowa accounted for 1.22 percent of the jobs, Missis 
sippi 1.24 percent.
13. Bradshaw, Nishikawa, and Blakely (1992) was useful for some states.

3 The Hypothetical Firm 
Method Extended
The Tax and Incentive Model (TAIM) described briefly in Chapter 2 
is an extension of what has been called the hypothetical firm (or repre 
sentative firm) method, previously used primarily in studies comparing 
tax burdens across states or cities. We developed a model of the state 
and local tax systems in the 24 states and 112 cities in our study and 
extended the model to incorporate tax incentives and a range of non 
tax incentive programs as well. This chapter describes our implementa 
tion of the hypothetical firm method in detail. We critique alternative 
methods of measuring incentive competition, describe criticisms of the 
hypothetical firm method, explain how we dealt with the problems 
identified, and spell out the assumptions and procedures built into the 
model. We also specify how non-tax incentive programs such as job 
training subsidies and loan guarantees are incorporated into the model. 
This chapter is intended for those interested in the technical method 
ological issues; those who are primarily interested in the results of the 
study can safely skip to Chapter 4.
The majority of previous studies of interstate differences in business 
taxation have relied upon aggregate summary measures, such as state 
wide taxes on business per capita, per $1,000 of personal income, or 
per $100 of estimated business profits. A handful of studies have used 
the hypothetical firm approach, in which financial statements for an 
average manufacturing corporation are constructed and the firm©s tax 
burdens in a number of different states are then calculated. Most stud 
ies of either kind have not included tax incentives. Discretionary pro 
grams such as capital grants, low-interest loans, loan guarantees, or 
subsidized job training have generally been measured simply by 
counting the programs.
There are serious problems with the summary measures of tax bur 
den and with the counting of programs or measurement of total pro 
gram expenditure. The best yardstick for measuring tax effects, as well 
as the whole range of financial incentives, is the hypothetical firm 
approach. While this approach is not without problems, most of these
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can be resolved or minimized. To understand the advantages of the 
hypothetical firm method, it is useful to review the major alternatives. 
We will then describe the implementation of the hypothetical firm 




Researchers attempting to assess the effects of state and local taxes 
on business investment have generally relied upon some aggregate 
measure of state tax levels, such as the total state (or state and local) 
taxes per capita or per $1,000 of personal income or the effective busi 
ness tax rates, defined as total state business tax collections divided by 
business income or business assets (see Bartik 1991b, for a compre 
hensive review of such studies). Many have confined the measure to 
taxes with an initial impact on business, on the grounds that personal 
taxes have a more tenuous relationship to location decisions. Business 
taxes would generally include the corporate income tax, local property 
taxes on commercial and industrial real estate and personal property 
(inventories and machinery and equipment), and perhaps sales taxes on 
inputs purchased by businesses (primarily machinery and equipment, 
and fuel and electricity); workers© compensation taxes and unemploy 
ment insurance taxes have rarely been included.
There are serious problems with such measures. First, the level of 
aggregation is excessive; if the research question focuses on invest 
ment decisions by firms in certain sectors (usually manufacturing), one 
needs to assess at the very least the average state tax burden on those 
kinds of firms. Aggregate measures reflect state differences in the taxa 
tion of all business sectors including such diverse enterprises as 
insurance companies, banks, restaurants, electric utilities, hospitals, 
construction companies, janitorial services, and railroads and will 
not indicate even the average actual burden for any particular industry. 
State statistics on corporate income tax and sales tax receipts are rarely
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broken out by industrial sector, and property tax collections can be sep 
arated at best into industrial and commercial categories.
Second, aggregate measures show average, not marginal, tax bur 
dens. The industrial location decision, if it is affected by taxes at all, is 
affected by the change in a firm©s tax burden as a result of a change in 
investment i.e., the effective marginal tax rate on new investment. 
Few location decisions entail the uprooting of an entire corporation 
from one place to another. Marginal tax rates can be significantly 
altered by such factors as accelerated depreciation, investment tax 
credits, and temporary property tax abatements. States and localities 
concerned with the incentive effects of taxes have probably focused 
their attention more on measures to reduce the marginal rates on new 
investment rather than on reductions in the overall average rate of tax. 
L. Papke (1987) compared taxes in 20 states using two alternative mea 
sures: Wheaton©s (1983) average effective tax rate for manufacturing in 
general, and the marginal tax rate on new investment for particular 
manufacturing industries. The Spearman rank-order correlation 
between the two indices was only 0.29.
Program Counting
Studies attempting to explain the pattern of incentive adoption  
why some places offer more than others have generally relied on pro 
gram counting. A variety of problems render this measure almost 
meaningless. In a survey of state and local economic development offi 
cials in 24 states, the authors have found 1) programs on the books, and 
in the incentive directories, that were never funded; 2) states that con 
solidated several programs into one program without changing the 
actual incentives available, and vice versa; 3) states with several pro 
grams providing essentially the same thing, such as loans, but in 
slightly different circumstances; 4) similar sounding programs of very 
dissimilar magnitude because of differences in program constraints or 
ceilings; 5) multiple programs in one state providing less of value to a 
business, taken altogether, than a single large program in another state; 
and 6) multiple programs that were independent and additive in one 
state, but mutually exclusive in another. While program counting may 
be appropriate when researching how programs of a particular type are 
adopted (innovation diffusion studies, for example), the number of
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incentive programs offered is clearly useless as a proxy for the actual 
value of the incentive package to a potential new business.
Program or Tax Expenditures
One is tempted to use total state expenditures on economic develop 
ment programs or tax incentives as a comprehensive measure of the 
state©s generosity. Such expenditures would best be expressed as a 
rate probably expenditures per $1,000 of new business investment  
in order to make comparisons among states of widely varying size and 
level of business activity. The denominator should be the total volume 
of investment potentially eligible for those incentives included in the 
numerator. However, the aggregation problem here is just as severe as 
with the summary measures of business tax burden, particularly when 
the numerator includes a variety of programs with differing eligibility 
criteria. The rate calculated may bear little relation to the actual incen 
tive value to firms in any particular industry.
Another problem with this approach is that expenditure data are dif 
ficult to assemble in a consistent fashion. It is very hard to determine, 
from state budgets, the actual outlay on any particular incentive pro 
gram, exclusive of administrative costs. Data on tax incentives are 
available only for those states that regularly conduct tax expenditure 
studies. 1 The expenditure approach also precludes consideration of the 
state©s overall tax system or of the incentive value net of taxes.
THE HYPOTHETICAL FIRM METHOD
The hypothetical firm method can be designed to avoid all of the 
preceding problems: it can be highly disaggregated, it can model mar 
ginal rather than average effects, it measures the actual value of incen 
tives or taxes to the firm (instead of simply the existence of a program), 
and it does not rely on the availability of state tax expenditure studies 
or detailed program budgets. It can be used to measure overall tax bur 
dens, the value of particular tax incentives, and, with some modifica 
tion, the effects of any economic development programs that provide 
direct financial benefits to the firm.
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The method works as follows. A model of a hypothetical firm is 
constructed. The core of the model is an income statement and a bal 
ance sheet representative of an average firm in an industry. The finan 
cial statements are based on published data such as the Census of 
Manufactures or Internal Revenue Service (IRS) corporate income tax 
return summaries. The tax liabilities of the firm, to the federal govern 
ment and to any states in which it is taxable, are calculated as a "sub 
routine" to the financial statements by applying the appropriate tax 
laws to the firm, given its individual asset composition and profit level. 
One can then observe how a particular tax regime changes the firm©s 
net income or cash flow.
In a comparative tax burden study, that might be the end of the story. 
For purposes of analyzing economic development incentives, however, 
the next step would be to model the opening of a new plant in state X; 
appropriate changes would be made to the firm©s asset and liability 
accounts and to its income statement. One could then simulate all of 
the tax incentives and economic development programs offered by 
state X for which the firm would qualify. For example, below-market 
interest rates on public loans used to finance the new plant would 
reduce annual interest expense, while subsidized job training would 
reduce first-year labor costs. The interaction between incentives and 
the state and federal income taxes is automatically taken into account. 
The hypothetical firm model thus becomes the yardstick for compari 
sons among states (or localities); it measures the after-tax value to the 
firm of all the economic development programs and taxes that one 
chooses to include in the model, taken in combination.
This approach is not new. It has been used primarily to study differ 
ences in state tax systems; in most cases, the studies were commis 
sioned by a particular state. Among the earliest of such studies were 
those conducted by Williams (1967), the Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue (1973), and Price, Waterhouse & Co. for the State of Missouri 
in 1978. More recently, state tax comparisons have been undertaken by 
Papke and Papke (1984) 2 for Indiana, Hunt (1985) for Michigan, 
Brooks et al. (1986) for Massachusetts, Laughlin (1993) for Indiana, 
Brooks (1993) for Massachusetts, and KPMG Peat Marwick for New 
York (1994). The Wisconsin study has been updated several times, 
most recently in 1990 and 1995. A few econometric studies of the 
influence of taxes on business investment have used the hypothetical
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firm approach to measure tax burdens: Steinnes (1984), L. Papke 
(1987, 1991), and Tannenwald and Kendrick (1995). We believe our 
model to be the first to include comprehensive simulation of non-tax 
incentives.
The use of hypothetical corporations to measure the relative size of 
tax and non-tax incentives is not without problems. Kieschnick (1981, 
pp. 38-41) has identified a number of these issues, three of which are 
of particular theoretical importance: 1) the burden of taxes is assumed 
to rest entirely with the corporation, while theories of tax incidence tell 
us that significant shifting may occur; 2) the focus on tax effects 
ignores the expenditure or benefit side of state and local government; 
and 3) the use of hypothetical firms assumes that the firm operates in 
all locations using the same relative proportions of factors such as 
labor and machinery, but a firm may, for example, use a more labor- 
intensive technology in a low-wage state. With regard to issue 3, it is 
conceivable that a firm will not only change its location as a result of 
tax and other incentives, but will also change its asset composition, 
using relatively less of the factors that are more heavily taxed in a par 
ticular place.
These criticisms apply with equal force to alternative methods, but it 
is worthwhile to consider whether they in fact indicate serious prob 
lems. Insofar as the issue of tax incidence is concerned, the entities 
modeled are usually intended to represent multilocational firms selling 
in national or international markets under reasonably competitive con 
ditions (the hypothetical firm method is difficult to adapt to modeling 
new entrepreneurial firms, although Brooks et al. [1986] attempted to 
do so). As such, multilocation firms will have very limited ability to 
pass tax burdens forward to consumers (which would render taxes 
irrelevant to the location decision). With regard to the argument that 
they may pass taxes back onto immobile factors, land and labor, the 
response is, indeed, they may. That, in fact, is precisely the point of 
studies of relative tax burden. The ability to pass taxes backward does 
not imply that the firm bears no burden, so that taxes are irrelevant to 
the location decision, but quite the opposite: it is by inducing firms to 
change location that the taxes are passed back to local immobile fac 
tors. If taxes in high-tax states are borne by labor, it is because firms 
avoid locating there, creating surplus labor and driving down wages.
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As for the expenditure issue, the purpose of the hypothetical firm 
method is limited: it is to model the effects of taxes and of incentive 
programs that raise or lower the costs of doing business. There is noth 
ing in the method itself that prevents incorporating estimates of the 
effects of state expenditure (for example, on highways) on firm costs. It 
is simply that such estimates are extremely difficult to make and there 
fore are usually omitted from the analysis; as a result, one must use the 
model©s outcomes in full knowledge of what they portray and what 
they do not. In an econometric model of business investment or loca 
tion, the tax estimates from a hypothetical firm approach could be used 
as the tax variable in the equation; other variables could be included as 
proxies for service levels, as in fact some studies have done (for exam 
ple, L. Papke 1987, 1991; Tannenwald and Kendrick 1995).
The factor proportions problem appears to be the most serious one. 
All tax or incentive studies that we are aware of have assumed constant 
proportions across localities that is, proportions that do not vary even 
though some locations may substantially reduce the cost of capital, 
while others reduce primarily the cost of labor. The changing of factor 
proportions in response to variations in factor prices or incentives 
would require current, industry-specific empirical estimates of factor 
price elasticities and presents formidable problems for modeling.
It is not possible to say whether the constant proportions assumption 
produces results that overstate or understate tax differences. For exam 
ple, suppose states A and B impose identical property taxes on capital 
(plant and equipment). State A is a low-wage state, while state B is a 
high-wage state, so that the firm choosing to locate in state B would 
employ a higher proportion of capital (and lower proportion of the 
high-cost labor) than if it located in state A and therefore would pay 
higher property taxes in B. By forcing constant proportions of capital 
and labor, the model fails to capture this tax difference. On the other 
hand, suppose factor costs were identical in the two states, but that 
state B imposes a much higher property tax rate. The firm choosing B 
could reduce this tax burden by substituting labor for capital. In this 
case, the use of constant proportions results in overstating the differ 
ence in tax burdens between A and B.
However, factor price differences appear to be most important to 
location decisions only at the first spatial decision stage: the choice of a 
broad region or of a state in which to locate (McMillan 1965; Kie-
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schnick 1981; Schmenner 1982; Wardrep 1985). Taxes and incentives 
are generally thought to be influential at the next level in the location 
decision process, i.e., the choice of a particular site within the region. 
Factor prices will probably vary less within a region or labor market 
than across regions.
As for the second part of the problem, is there reason to believe that 
tax-induced changes in factor proportions are significant in magnitude? 
This is a problem for interpretation of the results of hypothetical firm 
studies only if 1) there is significant variation among the states in the 
size of capital and labor incentives, and 2) the firm©s behavioral 
response to this differential would be so substantial that the actual 
value of the incentive package would be significantly affected. Among 
the 24 states in this study, incentives are for the most part directed at 
capital rather than labor. Only 3 of the 24 offer a jobs tax credit that is 
generally available (as opposed to a credit only for firms located in 
enterprise zones or the like). In these three states (Missouri, Iowa, and 
South Carolina), the jobs credit reduces total wage costs over the first 
10 years of a new investment by less than 1 percent. This is hardly 
enough to induce a noticeable shift towards more labor-intensive pro 
duction techniques.
Four states offer a statewide investment tax credit, ranging from 0.5 
percent to 1.0 percent of the investment in plant and equipment; again, 
this is hardly enough to induce firms to alter factor proportions. New 
York has a very substantial combined tax credit related both to invest 
ment and jobs created; for a large firm, the credit (which extends over 
several years) could be worth about 8 percent of the firm©s investment. 
However, the incentive is tied to both capital and labor, so the effect on 
factor proportions is probably nil. A state loan program that reduced 
the interest rate on machinery and equipment loans by 1 percentage 
point would, over a 20-year period, produce savings (in present value 
terms) equal to at most about 1 percent of the investment in property, 
plant, and equipment. Our investigation of incentives in these states, 
then, leads us to conclude that the factor proportions effects of tax and 
other incentives are probably small or even non-existent.
A similar problem of modeling behavioral responses arises with 
respect to the firm©s assumed method of financing new investment. 
Taxes can affect the firm©s optimal capital structure, the proportions of 
debt and equity. Development incentives in the form of below-market-
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rate loans or loan guarantees lower the relative price of debt financing 
and may lead the firm to employ more debt and less equity. Grants rep 
resent free equity and may be used to reduce borrowing rather than 
simply to substitute for other forms of equity (issuing additional 
shares). Nonetheless, all of the studies assume constant proportions of 
debt and equity financing across states (although this may be allowed 
to vary across industries).
The additional problems identified by Kieschnick (1981) and others 
are not inherent in the hypothetical firm method but are simply limita 
tions of some of the studies employing that approach. In the next sev 
eral sections of this chapter, we address these and further problems, in 
the context of the crucial decisions and assumptions that we made in 
developing a satisfactory hypothetical firm model to measure tax and 
incentive differences.
WHICH INDUSTRIES AND FIRM SIZES?
There is substantial variation across industries on a number of 
dimensions that can significantly affect the firm©s tax liability and the 
value of incentives. Industries also differ in the importance of the role 
they play in the interstate competition for jobs. For these reasons, it is 
not very satisfactory to construct only one or two firms to represent the 
entire manufacturing sector, as in some of the early studies (e.g., Price, 
Waterhouse & Co., 1978). The questions are how many industries, at 
what level of disaggregation, and which particular ones?
We constructed financial statements typical of firms in selected 
industries with the commercial Compustat database, which is widely 
used in business research. It is a micro database (each observation 
being a single firm) of corporations, with detailed annual financial 
data. Our selection process began with an examination of the employ 
ment growth between 1980 and 1990 of each of the 125 three-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) manufacturing industries. 
From the fastest-growing 32 such industries (those which added at 
least 9,000 jobs), we eliminated a few (guided missiles, aircraft, meat 
products, plywood) on the grounds that their plant location choices 
were too constrained. The Compustat database did not contain a large
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enough sample of firms from each of the remaining industries to pro 
duce reliable averages for financial ratios in every case; as a result, 
some three-digit industries among this group of 32 were combined, 
and others had to be omitted. Industries were also eliminated if the 
average firm in that industry in the Compustat database had negative 
earnings in 1992. Since we simulated firms in a "steady state" over a 
20-year period, we needed an average positive rate of return for that 
industry. It would not make sense to simulate a firm remaining in oper 
ation for 20 years while losing money every year. In the end, we settled 
on 8 industries (encompassing 12 of the high-growth three-digit indus 
tries), which exhibit a high degree of variability on most of the preced 
ing dimensions.
The three-digit SIC code level, which contains 125 manufacturing 
industries, is probably the most appropriate level of aggregation. Use 
of two-digit industries would yield greater coverage or 
representativeness3 but would conceal substantial variability within the 
industry. Four-digit industries are more homogeneous, but there are 
many hundreds of such classifications, making summarization of 
results very difficult. The three-digit level represents a compromise. 
The three recent state studies that examine average tax burdens for a 
single-location firm for a single year use two-digit industries (Hunt 
1985; Wisconsin Department of Revenue 1990; Laughlin 1993). The 
recent studies applying the more sophisticated approach marginal tax 
rates for multilocation firms over a period of years use firms defined 
at the two- or three-digit level (the various Papke studies and Brooks 
1993). All of the studies reviewed focus exclusively on manufacturing 
with the exception of Hunt (1985), in which one business services firm 
is included, and KPMG Peat Marwick (1994), which includes three 
nonmanufacturing sectors: communications, depository institutions, 
and security and commodity brokers.
In narrowing the selection to a manageable number of firms, we 
tried to create a set of industries that exhibits substantial variation in 
the characteristics that affect tax liability and eligibility for incentives. 
The most important of these characteristics are 1) asset composition, 
since states vary in terms of the types of assets included in the sales 
and property tax bases and since incentive programs are targeted at cer 
tain classes of assets; 2) capital intensity, which affects the relative 
importance of investment and employment incentives; 3) the ratio of
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sales to total assets, which affects the relative importance of income 
and property taxes; 4) the average wage, which can alter the value of 
employment incentives; 5) the importance of energy costs, which may 
or may not be subject to sales tax; 6) the average employment or asset 
size of a firm or establishment, which may be a factor is program eligi 
bility; and 7) profitability, which affects the relative importance of 
income and property taxes.
The variability on these dimensions for the firms in our study is 
shown in Table 3.1. The 16 firms represent 8 industries, with a small 
and a large firm in each industry. The financial characteristics are based 
on aggregations of firm-level data in the commercial Compustat data 
base for 1992. As Hunt (1985, p. 20) has pointed out, "the industry 
identification of these firms should not be over-emphasized." Looking 
at Table 3.1, one could think of study results for firm number 14 as a 
measure of the tax and incentive differences relevant to the location of 
a typical auto plant. It is probably preferable, however, to think of the 
results as applying to the typical large, capital-intensive, low-profit 
firm, regardless of industry, for it is those kinds of features, by and 
large, that will account for the differences in taxes and incentives.
Variation in firm size is at least as important as variation in industry. 
This is because tax codes and incentive programs are rife with discon 
tinuous functions, such as eligibility criteria requiring a minimum 
amount of new investment, a minimum number of new jobs, or a mini 
mum percentage increase in employment or assets; annual ceilings on 
tax credits; and requirements that taxes be calculated two ways with 
the firm paying whichever is larger, or whichever is smaller. One rea 
son for simulating many firms of widely varying characteristics and 
sizes is to be able to illustrate the effects of these various thresholds 
and ceilings. If the firms are chosen at the two-digit level, and with 
only one average firm size, it is likely that these effects will be con 
cealed. The average firm may always or never qualify for a particular 
incentive, for example, so to use that firm to represent all potential 
firms results in overstating or understating the importance of that 
incentive. There are also ceilings on the dollar amount of certain incen 
tives, with the result that the relative value to large firms is much 
smaller than to small firms.
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Firm total assets ($ millions)
New plant assets ($ millions)
New plant employees
PP&E (net): % of total assets
M&E(gr):%ofPP&E(gr)
PP&E per employee ($)
Average annual wage ($)
Energy expense: % of COGS
LT debt/(equity + LT debt), %
Operating margin (EBIT/sales), %
Sales/assets
Earning power (EBIT/assets), %
































































































SOURCES: All data except wages and energy costs are based on averages for firms in that SIC 
group and asset size class from the Compustat database for 1992. Wages and energy costs are 
from the 1987 Census of Manufactures (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990), which shows average 
wage by SIC code but not by firm asset size within SIC grouping. 
DEFINITIONS:
PP&E (net) = property, plant and equipment, net of depreciation.
M&E (gr) = machinery and equipment, gross (at acquisition cost).
PP&E (gr) = property, plant and equipment, gross (at acquisition cost).
LT debt = long-term debt.
COGS = cost of goods sold.
Operating margin = net operating income (earnings before interest and taxes [EBIT]) divided
by net sales. 
Sales/assets = net sales divided by assets (current assets plus net property, plant, and equi-
ment).
Earning power = product of above two ratios, or earnings before interest and taxes divided by 
assets. This is the best measure of the return to be expected on new plant investment, 
because it excludes extraordinary items and income from investments, both of which are 
included in the firm©s return on equity. 







































































































































































Firm (and plant) size is sufficiently important that it should be an 
additional dimension, or the hypothetical firms should vary substan 
tially in size across industries. This is not always done, however. Papke 
and Papke (1984) modeled three asset sizes for each industry $25- 
$49 million, $50-$99 million, and $100-$249 million and assumed 
the same percentage of expansion for all firms. Brooks (1993) assumed 
that all firms had $100 million in assets and expanded by 10 percent. In 
the Wisconsin and Indiana studies, the six firms varied in size but were 
all small, with assets ranging from $9 million to $18 million. Hunt 
(1985) used eight firms ranging in asset size from $1 million to $759 
million, in the only study that varied size substantially and that used 
sizes appropriate to the industry.
These assumptions can be compared to the asset sizes for the 16 
firms in Table 3.1. The total asset size of the large firm in each industry 
is approximately the 75th percentile in the distribution of firms by total 
assets in that industry. The small firm represents approximately the
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25th percentile; that is, 25 percent of the firms in that industry have 
lower total assets. These distributions come from the Internal Revenue 
Service Corporation Source Book 1990. The substantial industry varia 
tion in firm size is apparent; a firm that is large for the plastics industry, 
for example, would be quite small in the automobile sector. The total 
asset sizes represented at the 75th percentile are also much larger, in 
many cases, than the sizes assumed in previous studies; in six of the 
eight industries, the typical large firm has in excess of $1 billion in 
assets. Of the 16 firms, 12 have assets greater than the largest asset 
class assumed by Papke and Papke (1984) and greater than the $100 
million assumed by Brooks (1993).
Previous studies that modeled an expansion decision, rather than the 
average tax burden on a static, single-location firm, had to assume an 
asset size for the new establishment as well (the six Papke studies and 
Brooks 1993). All assumed that the new establishment assets were a 
certain percentage of the firm©s total assets before expansion, a per 
centage that did not vary by industry. This turns out to be an important 
assumption, in part because the size of a new plant relative to the total 
firm can affect the value of certain tax incentives. This is because cor 
porate tax credits are usually not refundable and so cannot exceed tax 
liability. In some states, the ceiling is the firm©s total corporate income 
tax liability in that state, while in other states the ceiling is the income 
tax liability attributed to the new plant only.
Plant or establishment sizes typical of an industry can be con 
structed in a fashion similar to the firm size distributions, using estab 
lishment data from the 1987 Census of Manufactures. These data show 
distributions of establishments by employment size. For each of the 
eight industries, we estimated the establishment employment size at 
the 25th and 75th percentiles. Using industry average ratios of assets to 
employment, we then inferred establishment total asset size. We 
assumed that large firms build large plants, and small firms build small 
plants. This seems to be a reasonably harmless assumption, but one we 
cannot confirm empirically. Again, substantial industry variability is 
exhibited, both in terms of typical small or large plant sizes (varying 
from $5 million to $600 million) and in the ratio of plant size to firm 
size (which varies from about 3 percent to 50 percent). We assumed, as 
has been done with all previous "marginal investment" studies, that the 
operating characteristics of the parent firm are mirrored in the new
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plant: the same ratio of sales to assets, the same asset composition, 
average wage, and assets per employee.
The critical importance of industry, firm size, and plant size assump 
tions is illustrated in Table 3.2. The 24 states in our study were ranked 
according to net returns on investment in a new plant in that state by an 
out-of-state firm, after state and local taxes and tax incentives. (Local 
taxes were computed for a representative city in each state; a more 
complete discussion of these results is deferred to chapter 4.) We show 
the rankings for eight of these states and for five of the hypothetical 
firms. States A and D were consistently near the top of the rankings 
regardless of firm, while states B and C were consistently near the bot 
tom of the rankings. (This was true for all 16 firms, not just for the five 
illustrated in Table 3.2.) On the other hand, states W, X, Y, and Z 
changed rank drastically depending on the firm, from near the top to 
near the bottom of the 24 states.
Table 3.2 How Firm Characteristics Affect Rankings of Investment 


































































NOTE: See Chapter 4 for an explanation of the representative city modeling. Rank is based on the 
firm©s return on investment in a new plant in a representative city in each state after state, local, 
and federal income, sales, and property taxes and after state and local tax incentives, including 
enterprise zone incentives. Highest return among the 24 states is ranked 1. In this and subsequent 
tables, "Furniture" is short for "furniture and fixtures," "Soaps" for "soaps, cleaners, and toilet 
ries," "Plastics" for "miscellaneous plastic products," and "Autos" for "motor vehicles and parts." 
a. Plant size in millions.
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The hypothetical firm method leads to a set of interstate compari 
sons: for each hypothetical firm, one can rank the states according to 
the after-tax return on investment in a new plant of the assumed size in 
that firm©s industry. Is it possible then to construct a single summary 
measure, to compute ah overall average tax rate or incentive package 
value for a state or an average ranking over all firms? Probably not. If a 
limited number of firms have been selected, then they are unlikely to 
be representative of all manufacturing firms (or all footloose ones), and 
certainly not in equal proportions. There is no way around this prob 
lem, short of conducting a massive number of simulations based on a 
stratified sample of the actual universe of corporations (itself impossi 
ble due to the absence of a comprehensive micro database) and weight 
ing each firm.4
FIRM, PLANT, AND HEADQUARTERS LOCATION
Some studies using the hypothetical firm approach to compare state 
business tax burdens treat each firm as if it consisted of a single plant, 
or at least a single location. This may make sense for comparative tax 
studies, but it is not appropriate for the measurement of development 
incentives, which are provided for new investment. An entity with the 
financial characteristics and asset size of the average mature firm in the 
industry cannot be treated as if it were a brand new establishment. The 
sensible approach is to assume an ongoing profitable business that 
invests in a new branch plant.
The question immediately arises, does it matter where the parent 
firm and the new plant are located? Suppose one is examining 24 sites, 
one in each of our 24 states. If one assumes that the parent firm, before 
building the new plant, has facilities at only one location but allows the 
new plant to be at another, then there are 24 times 24 or 576 possible 
combinations of firm and plant location: the parent firm in each of the 
24 states, paired with each of the 24 possible locations for the new 
plant. In reality, of course, things are much more complicated than this, 
with existing firms already having facilities in many states rather than 
in just one.
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All of this matters, of course, because tax burdens can differ dramat 
ically depending on where a firm©s sales, property, and payroll are 
located; these factors determine what proportion of income is taxed in 
each state. States vary significantly in how they apportion and tax 
income of multistate firms. How does one render the simulation pro 
cess manageable while doing justice to the importance of location of 
multiplant firms? The problem becomes quite intractable if one 
includes multiple localities within each state so as to capture actual 
local tax and incentive policies.
Our solution was to simplify the computations and the interpretation 
of results by modeling an additional hypothetical state intended to rep 
resent all of the other locations for the initial parent firm. This mythical 
state was given a tax system with rates, tax base, and other features 
representing the median among the 24 actual states in the study. The 
median sales tax rate among these states is 5 percent (21 of the 24 
states have rates between 4 percent and 6 percent), and the median 
sales tax base would fully exempt manufacturing machinery and equip 
ment (19 of 24 states) and fuel and utilities used directly in manufac 
turing (15 of the 24 states). The median corporate income tax would 
follow federal depreciation rules, allow no deductions for federal or 
state income taxes, apportion income on the basis of a three-factor for 
mula with double-weighted sales, would not require the throwback of 
sales to states in which the firm has no tax nexus, and would apply a 
flat rate of 7 percent (only 3 of the 24 have a progressive rate structure) 
with no credits. We did not need to model investment incentives in the 
median state (such as jobs credits or property tax abatement) because 
the new plant would always be located in one of the 24 actual states or 
112 actual cities. For the city level analysis, we assumed a "median 
city" location for the parent firm in the median state, with a property 
tax rate of 2.4 percent and a local sales tax of 1 percent.
By constructing the mythical median state, we can produce a single 
ranking of the 24 states for each hypothetical firm. In each instance, the 
parent firm is located and taxed in the median state, while the new 
plant is located in each of the 24 actual states in turn, generating tax 
liabilities in that state as well. The firm©s return on the new plant 
becomes the measure of competitiveness for new investment by out-of- 
state firms. (For comparisons of the return on investment in an expan-
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sion within the home state by a firm that is currently located solely in 
that home state, the median state is not necessary.)
Is the median-state simplification valid? The median-state approach 
provides one ranking of the 24 states for each firm. Generating the 576 
pairwise comparisons, on the other hand, would yield 24 rankings, one 
for each initial firm location, which could then be averaged for some 
overall assessment of competitiveness. Whether the median-state rank 
ing would diverge significantly from the average of the 24 separate 
rankings is difficult to say. However, if most firms in fact already have 
facilities in many states, the median-state method may be a satisfactory 
approximation. Simple pairwise comparisons will illuminate and 
emphasize state differences that may not be particularly relevant, if 
those differences tend to be swamped by the average policy in other 
states.
The importance of looking at differences in headquarters assump 
tions is illustrated in Table 3.3. The 112 cities in our study were ranked 
by returns on new investment in each city after federal, state, and local 
taxes, and after economic development incentives, under two sets of 
assumptions: 1) the investing firm is initially located out of state 
(entirely in the mythical median state) or 2) the firm is initially located 
entirely.within the state in question and remains a single-location firm. 
For places with certain kinds of tax systems, the location assumption is 
clearly critical, while for others it makes little difference. 5 Some loca 
tions clearly favor multistate firms, others clearly favor domestic sin 
gle-location firms, and still others sometimes favor one, sometimes the 
other. Certain cities maintain a similar ranking regardless of location 
assumption, but the general rule is for rankings to differ substantially.
HOW ARE THE FIRM©S SALES DISTRIBUTED 
AMONG STATES?
Assumptions regarding the destination of the hypothetical firm©s 
sales are critical because of the way in which states apportion business 
income for purposes of taxation. Most states use a three-factor appor 
tionment formula, where the three factors are payroll, property, and 
sales. The payroll factor, for example, is the ratio of the firm©s payroll
Table 3.3 Selected Cities Ranked by Returns on Investment for Multistate and Single-Location Firms
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NOTE: Among the eight cities in this table, there are no two cities in the same state. Cities are ranked according to returns on new plant investment after 
federal, state, and local taxes and after state and local economic development incentives. The highest return among the 112 cities is ranked 1.
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located within the state to the firm©s payroll everywhere. The sales fac 
tor is the ratio of the firm©s sales with a destination within the state to 
the firm©s sales everywhere. A weighted average of the three factors 
produces the apportionment factor; when multiplied by the firm©s tax 
able income derived from operations everywhere, the result is income 
taxable by the state in question. The weight applied to the sales factor 
varies from 33 percent in a number of states (i.e., equal weight given to 
the three factors) to 50 percent in many states (double-weighted sales) 
and 100 percent in a few states (single-factor apportionment).
The sales factor is complicated by throwback rules. In several states, 
shipments from facilities in that state to states in which the firm has no 
tax nexus, or to the federal government, are thrown back to that state, 
i.e., counted as part of the numerator in the sales factor. Sales destined 
for a state where the firm is taxable (and where those sales will be 
reflected in that state©s apportionment formula) are never thrown back.
In constructing a hypothetical firm simulation, arbitrary assump 
tions must be made with respect to the proportion of firm sales destined 
for 1) the state in which the new plant is located, 2) the state(s) in 
which the original firm is located, 3) other states in which the firm is 
taxable, and 4) other states where the firm has no tax nexus. These 
assumptions significantly affect the apparent relative competitiveness 
of states. If a large share of sales is assumed to go to category 4, states 
such as Wisconsin and Massachusetts that require throwback of all 
such sales and that double-weight sales in the apportionment formula 
are at a disadvantage. On the other hand, assuming all sales are to 
states where the firm is taxable increases the firm©s tax liability to those 
states; this, in turn, puts a premium on the deductibility of other states© 
income taxes (allowed in only a few states) and eliminates throwback 
effects entirely.
The design of the model may constrain the sales assumptions that 
one can make. If the model permits each firm to be located and taxed in 
only one or two states, as most models do, one must assume that sales 
are quite unevenly distributed (with all or most sales going to just those 
one or two states) or one must assume that most sales are to the other 
48 or 49 states and that the firm has no tax nexus (not even a sales 
office) in any of those states. 6 The first assumption is not consistent 
with the supposition that one is modeling relatively footloose firms 
competing in national markets. The second assumption is unrealistic.
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Tannenwald and Kendrick (1995) report that throwback sales are in 
fact insignificant for most Massachusetts manufacturers; they assert 
that firms tend to have a tax nexus (even if it is only a sales office) in 
states where they do substantial business. Data from Wisconsin corpo 
rate income tax returns indicate that, among apportioning corporations, 
about 16 percent of total sales are thrown back in the aggregate. 7
The creation of a median state to represent all other states in which 
the firm has facilities provides a solution to the sales allocation 
dilemma. This mythical state can be given a population representing a 
large share of the total U.S. population, and sales can then be allocated 
between the particular actual state, the mythical median state, and the 
remaining (non-taxing) states in proportion to population. This has the 
effect of attributing only a small share of sales to non-taxing states (we 
assume 20 percent) without forcing the remainder to occur in the actual 
state; most of the remainder will be destined instead for the median 
state, where the firm is taxed. This should provide more accurate com 
parisons of throwback versus nonthrowback states, as well as of states 
allowing the deduction for other state©s income taxes versus states that 
do not. It is also consistent with the national markets assumption; the 
actual state is allocated sales only in proportion to its share of national 
population.
INTERSTATE OR INTERLOCAL COMPETITION?
Since location choices are made among actual sites, with particular 
local taxes and incentives, studies of location competition should take 
local public policies into account. This raises the question of how local 
tax variables are to be included in an analysis of interstate competition. 
Two approaches have been used: 1) a statewide average property tax 
rate is employed, generally without consideration of any abatements, 
or 2) particular localities are modeled rather than the state as a whole, 
so the actual tax regime in that community governs the local tax com 
ponent. The first approach raises questions of accuracy, while the sec 
ond brings up questions of representativeness. We apply both 
approaches in this study; a discussion of the estimates of average prop 
erty tax rates is contained in the notes to Appendix Table A.3.
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A similar, but more difficult, question arises with respect to state- 
provided tax incentives. Of the many states that offer investment or 
jobs tax credits, only a few do so on a uniform basis throughout the 
state. The others offer the credits only in specified areas such as enter 
prise zones or counties with above-average unemployment rates or 
offer the credits on more favorable terms in such places. The targeted 
areas may be limited to a small number of neighborhood enterprise 
zones, or they may include a majority of the counties in the state. If one 
is comparing state tax regimes, how is geographic variation in such 
incentives to be incorporated? There are four alternatives: 1) include 
only incentives available generally throughout the state; 2) model the 
most generous incentive package the state offers, regardless of how 
limited the availability in geographic terms; 3) attempt to calculate an 
average over the entire state, taking into account the prevalence or cov 
erage of the targeted incentives; or 4) calculate an average for some 
arbitrary subset of locations, such as the three largest cities. The best 
approach is probably the first. States can then be compared on the basis 
of their lowest offer (or highest effective tax rate), which will also be 
the typical offer, unless targeted incentives are quite widespread.
The concept of a statewide average incentive offer, or property tax 
rate, is problematic. 8 How are the different locations with different tax 
and incentive rates to be weighted in the computation of the average  
by their shares of land area, population, industrial property value, man 
ufacturing employment, number of unemployed, manufacturing value 
added, or tax collections, to mention some of the possibilities? How 
are we to know whether any of these will reflect the future distribution 
of plant locations within the state? Narrowly targeted incentives are 
best studied not by looking at states as the unit of analysis but by look 
ing at localities.
Complicating matters further, however, is variation in taxes and 
incentives within a particular city. This can occur for two reasons: the 
city includes multiple taxing jurisdictions (such as school districts or 
improvement districts that have issued bonds for local infrastructure), 
or the city contains an enterprise zone with special state and local 
incentives. In the first case, we have obtained the local tax rate for the 
area of the city most likely to be the site for new industry; if this cannot 
be determined, we have computed a citywide average tax rate. Sub 
stantial variation in rates within cities occurs only in a few states.
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As for the treatment of enterprise zones, we have chosen to use the 
tax rates and incentives that prevail within the zone to represent the 
entire city for purposes of computing the tax on income from new 
investment. In some cases, the zone is the whole county, so this 
approach is strictly correct. In other instances, the decision is equiva 
lent to assuming that the majority of new industrial expansion in a city 
with an enterprise zone will occur within that zone. This is justified to 
the extent that the zone location compared with nonzone locations 
would bring with it similar costs for labor (the labor market presum 
ably being broader than the city in most cases) and for transportation 
and utilities, but would provide significant additional tax benefits.
For multistate firms, the initial production facilities are located 
entirely in a single median city (with a median local tax system) in the 
median state. The new plant is located in a particular city in the sample 
state (except for the state-level analyses, where local taxes and incen 
tives are not included). If the city contains an enterprise zone, we 
assume that the new plant is located in that zone.
For single-state firms, the location assumption possibilities become 
more complex. For simplicity, we assume that the new plant represents 
an expansion of an existing facility at the same site. Thus, if a city has 
an enterprise zone, the existing firm©s production facilities as well as 
the new plant are located in that zone. The alternative would have been 
to model an existing firm at some hypothetical average city in the state, 
with only the new plant being located in the sample city (and in the 
enterprise zone, if any). This assumption makes a difference only in a 
state that provides investment or jobs tax credits that can be applied 
solely to the tax attributable to facilities within enterprise zones 
(whether new facilities or not). In most cases, such credits can be 
applied against the firm©s total state tax liability from all facilities 
wherever located, or only to the firm©s state tax liability attributable to 
the new plant, so the assumption regarding the location of the existing 
firm has no bearing.
In many instances, jobs tax credits are available only for certain cat 
egories of employees rather than for all those employed at the new 
plant. Most often, the criteria relate to the employee©s location of resi 
dence and previous employment status. Appendix Table B.3 shows our 
assumptions regarding the percentage of new plant employees residing 
within the city as a whole and within the enterprise zone itself, and the
78 The Hypothetical Firm Method Extended
percentage who were unemployed at the time of hiring or who were 
unemployed at least 90 days prior to hiring. Since some states apply 
both criteria, we also show how these two assumptions combine.
MEASURING EFFECTS OVER TIME
Kieschnick criticized the hypothetical firm method for ignoring the 
life cycle of firms. The method is indeed limited in this regard; it is not 
practicable to simulate in a nonarbitrary fashion a new firm over the 
first 20 years of its life cycle. The method is thus not suitable for mea 
suring tax effects on new businesses or incentive programs aimed at 
stimulating entrepreneurship or new business formation.
A multiyear analysis is nonetheless essential. Taxes and incentives 
affect the profitability of new investment not just in the initial invest 
ment year, but for many years thereafter. Credits sometimes must be 
used in the first year but in other instances can be carried forward for 
up to 20 years. Property tax abatements often provide the largest bene 
fit the first year but frequently continue at some level for 10 years or 
more. Favorable loan terms are felt over the life of the loan. It is very 
difficult to accurately capture these effects over time with a one-year 
analysis that includes, for example, the present value of future property 
tax abatements. Such an approach ignores the interaction year by year 
between incentives and state and federal taxes. Furthermore, location 
decisions are surely made on the basis of a longer time horizon. A 20- 
year span is probably sufficient to capture all of the significant differ 
ences in state policy, although some studies have carried the analysis to 
60 years (Papke and Papke 1986; Brooks et al. 1986; Brooks 1993).
When the hypothetical firm method is used to analyze the competi 
tive effects of taxes or incentives, the question being posed, implicitly, 
is this: For a given firm contemplating an investment in a new plant of 
a specified size, which location for that new plant produces the greatest 
profit? The answer is found by simulating the firm©s revenues and costs 
over some time period, producing a stream of annual cash flow figures. 
If two simulations are performed with and without the new plant  
then the difference measures project returns: the increase in the firm©s 
cash flow attributable to the investment in the new plant.
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How is this flow of project returns over time to be reduced to a sin 
gle measure of profitability? There are two logical contenders: the net 
present value (NPV) of project returns and the internal rate of return 
(IRR) on the investment in the new plant. In capital budgeting terms, 
the decision is between a set of mutually exclusive projects of equal 
size: the same investment is contemplated in each location, but only 
one location will be selected. By which measure should these projects 
(each one representing a state or site) be ranked?
The capital budgeting literature has generally come down in favor of 
the NPV as the best criterion for ranking projects (see for example, 
Stevens 1979 or Brigham 1985) because of three problems with the 
IRR. First, the IRR can produce the wrong rankings when there are dif 
ferences in project size, although that is not an issue here. Second, the 
IRR method can produce multiple solutions whenever there is a non- 
normal income stream (one containing a negative flow in at least one 
future year); such streams can readily exist with the hypothetical firm 
method if substantial replacement investment occurs within the time 
horizon. Since machinery and equipment is the major asset category, 
generally with an economic life of less than 20 years, substantial 
replacement investment will have to be modeled. The third problem is 
the reinvestment rate assumption. The IRR calculation is based on the 
implicit assumption that project returns will be reinvested at the 
project©s IRR. For example, the firm choosing a $10 million plant in 
state A will reinvest the returns from that plant in a series of similar 
projects in the same state, each producing the same rate of return. This 
further requires the assumption that similar investments are available 
each year in small increments, so that all net income can be immedi 
ately reinvested. The NPV rule, on the other hand, is based on the 
assumption that project returns will be reinvested at the firm©s discount 
rate, which should be equal to the firm©s cost of capital. The returns 
from project A, in other words, substitute for retained earnings, debt, 
and new shares of stock in the financing of other firm projects, saving 
the business the cost of raising capital. The NPV assumption is more 
defensible than the IRR reinvestment assumption.
The AFTAX model, employed by J. and L. Papke and in the Massa 
chusetts study (Brooks 1993), uses the IRR as the measure of project 
profitability and differences in after-tax rates of return as measures of 
the tax implications of one location versus another. They argue that this
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avoids making an arbitrary assumption regarding the discount rate. Use 
of the IRR, however, requires an arbitrary assumption itself regarding 
the reinvestment of project returns. Furthermore, there is something to 
be said for the heuristic value of results expressed in NPV terms. Pub 
lic discussion of the competitive effects of taxes and incentives is 
invariably carried on in relation to the dollar value to the firm of a par 
ticular incentive or package, and NPV provides a way of expressing the 
value of a tax program or incentive in just those terms: How much it is 
worth to a firm in today©s dollars to receive certain benefits over the 
next 20 years?
We conclude that the competitive effects of taxes and incentives are 
best analyzed by simulating capital budgeting decisions by hypotheti 
cal firms. The textbook solution to a capital budgeting problem begins 
with an estimate of the stream of cash flows produced by the planned 
project. It is the incremental cash flow that is relevant: the difference 
between cash flows with the project and cash flows without the project. 
Cash flows are measured by net income after taxes, with noncash 
expenses added back (depreciation deductions and deferred taxes). The 
result is the annual incremental cash flow from operations. The acqui 
sition cost of new property and plant and equipment and the additional 
net working capital required by the project are deducted from the first- 
year cash flow. The cost of replacement equipment is deducted in the 
appropriate years. The project is assumed to have a finite life; salvage 
value (assumed equal to book value) becomes an additional source of 
cash at the end of the project, as does the return of net working capital. 
Finally, debt financing flows are added, with the proceeds of bond 
issues being a source of cash and the repayment of principal a use of 
cash. The end result is the stream of net cash flows available to equity 
investors. This stream is discounted at the firm©s assumed cost of 
equity to arrive at the NPV of project cash flows. A detailed description 
of the operation of the model and of the assumptions employed is con 
tained in Appendix B.
Almost all hypothetical firm studies have assumed zero inflation; 
that is, the financial projections are in real terms. At first glance, this 
assumption seems harmless. A firm©s cost of capital will reflect infla 
tion premiums incorporated into current nominal interest rates and 
required rates of return on equity. Suppose the inflation premium were 
5 percent. If all project revenues and costs were inflated at 5 percent
Industrial Incentives 81
per year over 20 years, and the resulting cash flow discounted at the 
current nominal cost of capital, the result would be the same as if one 
had discounted real (uninflated) cash flows at the real discount rate. In 
the absence of good reasons to assume different rates of inflation for 
each project component, or different rates for each year, one may as 
well leave the analysis in real terms. This would be true enough if it 
were not for taxes; deductions are allowed for depreciation and interest 
expenses, and these expenses will not rise each year with inflation 
(although they will jump up as assets are replaced at inflated cost). The 
higher the inflation rate, the longer the replacement period, and the 
larger the replacement cost relative to income, the greater the will be 
divergence between tax calculations based on nominal flows and those 
based on uninflated flows.
The zero inflation assumption could bias comparisons across states 
to the extent that depreciation rules or the timing of incentives differ. 
Almost all states allow federal Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (MACRS) depreciation, with California and New Jersey being 
among the notable exceptions that require a less accelerated form of 
depreciation. By ignoring inflation we disregard the lesser real value of 
the depreciation rules of California and New Jersey as compared to 
those of other states. Similarly, consider state A, which provides incen 
tives up front in the form of grants, and state B, which provides incen 
tives spread over 10 years in the form of below-market rate loans. 
Inflation has no effect on the value of A©s grants but reduces the real 
value of B©s annual interest cost reductions unless the interest subsidy 
is increased during periods of high inflation.
How substantial is the bias produced by assuming no inflation? 
Brooks et al. (1986) tested the effects of a 5 percent inflation rate over 
the entire 60-year period of their analysis, which calculated after-tax 
rates of return on new investment at 16 sites in 11 states. Ten of the 
states allowed federal Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) 
depreciation at that time; one (New York) required pre-ACRS deprecia 
tion, resulting in quite different allowances in the first few years. The 
analysis also provided a test of the significance of incentive timing dif 
ferences: investment tax credits (ITCs) were offered at various rates by 
4 of the 11 states. (Unlike other tax features that apply uniformly from 
year to year, an ITC usually provides all its benefits in the year an asset 
is acquired.) Despite these differences among states, the researchers
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found that "the actual rankings of the sixteen sites are virtually identi 
cal to those calculated assuming zero inflation" (p. 65).
DISAGGREGATING THE RESULTS
The basic result produced by the simulation model is the present 
value of net income over 20 years attributable to investment in a new 
plant at a particular location, given the taxes and the package of incen 
tives available at that location. The overall value of the incentive pack 
age represents the maximum benefits obtainable by a firm if it were 
able to take advantage of all of the programs available in the state, 
given the state©s income and sales tax structure. In order to identify 
how different components of the tax and non-tax program package 
contribute to the total incentive value, we also calculate the value of 
components of that package. This is done by performing the simula 
tions in six ways. For state-level comparisons, with state taxes and 
incentives only, the simulations are as follows:
  Level 1 = present value of net cash flow attributable to investment 
in the new plant over 20 years, taking into account the state©s 
basic tax system (including corporate income taxes and sales 
taxes on machinery and equipment and on fuels and utilities, but 
not including economic development incentive credits).
  Level 2 = level 1 plus the effects of state economic development 
entitlements (income tax investment and jobs credits).
  Level 3 = level 2 plus the effects of state infrastructure subsidy 
programs.
  Level 4 = level 2 plus the effects of state job training and wage 
subsidy programs.
  Level 5 = level 2 plus the effects of state general purpose financ 
ing programs (grants, loans, and loan guarantees).
  Level 6 = level 2 plus the effects of all state incentive programs 
included separately in levels 3 through 5.
The increment in net income attributable to the state©s economic 
development entitlements (income tax investment and jobs credits),
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compared with net income under the state©s basic tax system, is calcu 
lated in level 2. This represents the value of the tax credits to the firm. 
Levels 3 through 5 are not additive; each assumes the existence of the 
state©s tax system, including development credits, but no other non-tax 
programs. This is because there are overall constraints on the use of 
incentives, as well as individual program constraints. An infrastructure 
program might award a firm $500,000, for example, and a general cap 
ital grant might award it $300,000 to be applied to infrastructure, if 
each program operated independently. However, if the firm©s total 
infrastructure needs are only $600,000, it will receive only $600,000 in 
total from the two programs, not $800,000. Thus, amounts from levels 
3, 4, and 5 cannot be added together to arrive at the total (level 6), nor 
is there a nonarbitrary way of disaggregating the level-6 total to iden 
tify the contribution that each type of program made. In the preceding 
example, how would one decide how much of the $600,000 for infra 
structure came from a specific infrastructure program and how much 
from the general grant program? The purpose of simulation levels 3, 4, 
and 5, then, is simply to allow comparisons among states for different 
kinds of programs.
Localities are compared in similar fashion. Local sales, corporate 
income, and property taxes are included in the calculation of project 
income at level 1, including the effects of deductibility of local prop 
erty taxes from state and federal income taxes. Local property tax 
abatements for new investment are added in level 2, as are state or local 
tax incentives automatically available in enterprise zones or similar, 
targeted areas (where applicable). Level 2 project income minus level 1 
project income now measures the value to the firm of the combined 
state and local tax incentive package. Discretionary locally funded 
loan, grant, or job training programs are included in levels 3 through 5, 
as with the state analyses. Level 6 net income minus level 1 net income 
then produces the value of the combined state and local incentive pack 
age for that locality.
SIMULATING THE WORTH OF NON-TAX INCENTIVES
Hypothetical firm models have not included non-tax state and local 
incentives such as grants, loans, loan guarantees and subsidies, and
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linked deposits. In order to model discretionary incentives, a hypothet 
ical firm model must be able to generate a set of incentives that a firm 
would likely receive from a state or city and then apply those incen 
tives to an investment. As we noted in Chapter 2, this is a very different 
sort of problem from that of modeling tax systems. Discretionary 
incentives are negotiated; tax incentives are automatic and applied uni 
formly. There are four major steps involved in integrating discretionary 
incentives into a hypothetical firm model.
The first step is to develop historical "administrative" ratios for all 
non-tax incentives offered by each state or city. The most important 
ratios are incentive dollars awarded per jobs created or retained and 
incentive dollars awarded per associated total investment, although 
others are also used in TAIM. These ratios can then be employed to 
develop likely amounts that a firm would receive from a particular 
incentive program. Once incentive amounts have been generated, the 
various program rules must then be applied (step 2). Common rules 
include a maximum amount a firm may receive from an incentive pro 
gram, from all incentive programs (in other words, a stipulated limit on 
total government-sponsored funding of a project), a minimum equity 
contribution, or a stipulated minimum number of jobs created. Most 
incentive programs have further rules governing the way in which an 
incentive may be spent (on land, plant, infrastructure, machinery, or 
working capital); whether it is extended only to firms headquartered in 
the state; whether it is offered only to small firms; and whether it is 
available, or available on more favorable terms, only in targeted 
regions of the state. Essentially, an expert system must be built so that 
these and other rules can be applied to the incentive amount generated 
in the first step. For example, if an incentive program requires an 
equity stake equal to or greater than the incentive amount awarded, the 
expert system should be able to vary the amount awarded in step 1 so 
that this program rule is not broken.
Next, since states and cities usually offer multiple incentives, the 
expert system should be able to assemble the best package of incen 
tives available from a unit of government (step 3). In other words, it 
should not only be able to apply the administrative rules guiding the 
delivery of a particular program, but it should be able to mirror the way 
in which economic development officials assemble their incentives into 
competitive packages. Here the expert system must be able to apply the
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explicit and implicit rules that govern how packages are assembled (for 
example, a state may have more than one general capital grant program 
but may nevertheless require that a firm be awarded funds from only 
one of these), and within these rules it should be able to create an opti 
mum package (the one that maximizes after-tax returns) for the firm 
being simulated.
In order to simplify modeling, awarded discretionary incentives can 
be divided into two broad classes: grants (including capital, training, 
and infrastructure grants, tax increment financing bonds, and other 
instruments providing cash payments to the firm or the equivalent of 
such cash payments) and loans (any discretionary debt instrument). 
Grants and loans can then be applied to the appropriate (and allowable) 
asset classes. Again, the application of incentives to the various asset 
classes should be such that returns on investment are maximized and 
naturally should not result in a situation where any incentive program 
rules are broken. In the case of debt instruments, payback schedules 
including appropriate rates, fees, and terms for each asset class need to 
be developed and applied to the firm©s balance sheets.
The present value of a firm©s return on investment may be calculated 
without any discretionary incentives and then again with a particular 
package of discretionary incentives (step 4). The difference between 
these two amounts provides the measure of the after-tax worth of a 
state©s or city©s discretionary or non-tax incentives to a firm.
Our simulations always assume that an incentive, be it general-use, 
training-based, or for infrastructure, is used to replace private invest 
ment expenditures the firm would otherwise have made, provided such 
a replacement does not result in any breach of the administrative rules 
governing the award of the incentive. Thus, an infrastructure grant of 
$0.5 million replaces $0.5 million in equity expenditures the firm 
would have made on infrastructure. Similarly, a $0.5 million loan or 
loan guarantee replaces $0.5 million of private debt the firm would 
have otherwise raised. However, if the $0.5 million grant results in the 
firm reducing its equity stake below that allowed by program adminis 
trative rules, then the incentive award is decreased to the point where 
the rules are no longer broken.9 The worth of a grant, then, is the extent 
to which its use raises the firm©s rate of return on investment. The 
worth of a public loan or loan guarantee is the extent to which the more 
favorable rates, terms, or fees of the public loan or loan guarantee, rel-
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ative to a private loan, raise the rate of return on a firm©s investment. 10 
Assumptions concerning the impact of discretionary incentives on the 
size of the investment amount and on factor proportions are consistent 
with the assumptions previously described for the tax part of the hypo 
thetical firm model. In other words, the firm chooses a standard, fixed 
plant and technology and a capital financing plan before selecting a 
location and before knowing the terms of any public component of that 
financing.
Practically, TAIM assigns state and local discretionary incentives to 
each firm modeled and then replaces private debt and equity expendi 
tures with these amounts. Incentives are assigned using a series of 
expert systems that, in the first place, model both the "administrative 
rules" and the "administrative history" of each non-tax program and in 
the second, model the way in which incentives are combined to create 
"incentive packages." TAIM then recalculates a firm©s income and tax 
statements using the new data on public financing. The general method 
is summarized in Figure 3.1. The remainder of this chapter is concerned 
with the major assumptions involved in implementing this method. A 
computational description of the method is found in Appendix C.
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Our measurement of infrastructure incentives is based on five broa 
principles.
Principle 1: In our model, the amount a firm receives from an 
infrastructure incentive program (or from a package of such 
incentives) is never more than the firm©s simulated expenditure on 
infrastructure for its new plant.
Principle 2: We treat all infrastructure and all related incen 
tives as homogeneous.
Thus, for example, we do not distinguish between incentives 
providing funds for roads and incentives providing funds for sew 
erage mains. All infrastructure programs are treated as if they 
could apply to any and all categories of infrastructure expendi 
ture. The reason for this is that there are no reliable data on the 
ways in which firms make detailed expenditures on different cate 
gories of infrastructure. In theory, this assumption could lead to 
significant errors. As an illustration, imagine a state-level infra 
structure grant program that provides funds for road building and 
improvement. Suppose that our model simulated that a firm 
would be spending $10 million on infrastructure for its new plant 
and that the firm would be eligible for $1 million from a road 
fund program. It is quite conceivable that, while the firm might 
have a total infrastructure expenditure of $10 million, it might 
spend only $0.25 million on roads. If this were the case, our 
model would award the firm $0.75 million too much.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way around this problem since, 
as we indicated earlier, there are no data providing sufficient 
detail for better modeling of infrastructure expenditure catego 
ries. How big a concern is this? Given the lack of data, it is 
impossible to provide a definitive answer; nevertheless, we are 
inclined to believe that the problem is minor. In practice, most 
infrastructure incentives are very small relative to the amount 
being invested in a new plant©s infrastructure. Thus, the probabil 
ity is reasonably small that our model will, because of the homo 
geneity assumption, award too much.
Principle 3: We assume that the use of an infrastructure incen 
tive does not result in any substitution.
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Consider the following example. A firm is about to invest in a 
new plant and believes it will have to upgrade the roadway con 
necting it to the city©s existing street system. The firm would pre 
fer a four-lane connection but for cost reasons decides to build a 
two-lane roadway. However, the provision of a state road incen 
tive reduces the cost of road building just enough that the firm 
decides now to build the preferred four-lane roadway.
We discussed the more general version of this problem earlier 
in this chapter. There we were concerned that, while economic 
theory suggests capital subsidies result in the substitution of capi 
tal for labor, our model assumes the elasticity of substitution is 
zero. The model assumes that a firm employs a technology with 
fixed factor proportions and so does not respond to changes in 
relative input costs. We reiterate our justification for this assump 
tion here, but now in the context of non-tax incentives.
First, no hypothetical firm model has comprehensively simu 
lated the substitution effects of incentives because of the practical 
data and technical difficulties presented by such a research 
project. Although there have been empirical estimations of pro 
duction functions showing the elasticity of factor proportions 
with respect to relative factor prices, there has been no work on 
the impact of incentives on factor proportions. In the much more 
specific infrastructure case at hand, there is absolutely no litera 
ture to guide our simulation of the situation. In fact, in order to 
accomplish such modeling within a hypothetical firm framework, 
an enormous amount of detailed data would be required on the 
various infrastructure-related and other costs experienced by the 
firm and on the amount by which incentives could reasonably be 
expected to reduce these costs. This information is unavailable. 
Modeling without such data is likely to introduce further error 
into our simulations.
Second, our research purpose is not to model investment deci 
sions across space but to measure the standing offer. The standing 
offer is a standardized assessment of the worth of an incentive to 
a typical firm in a particular sector. The investment (and the com 
position of investment) of the firm is a given within the model (by 
the size and structure of typical plants within a sector), not as an 
outcome of the model. In other words, we measure the worth of
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various state and city incentive packages for identical amounts 
and compositions of investment. Thus, we ignore substitution.
Principle 4: We assume publicly funded infrastructure is no 
more expensive to produce than privately funded infrastructure.
It is possible that infrastructure supplied through incentives is 
more costly than infrastructure supplied without incentives. For 
example, many road programs have rules specifying maintenance 
and public usage, both of which are likely to increase the long- 
term costs of infrastructure provision and maintenance. If this is 
the case, then each dollar of public incentive money will only 
replace some fraction of each private dollar of investment in 
infrastructure. In situations such as this, our simulation will over 
estimate the financial worth of an incentive to a firm. We return to 
this issue later in this chapter.
Principle 5: As we indicated in the discussion of substitution, 
we assume that the provision of a public subsidy does not change 
the size of the firm©s investment. In theory, the profit-maximizing 
firm will add capital up to the point where the expected marginal 
income equals the marginal cost. Suppose that a firm receives a 
$1 million infrastructure grant (for simplicity©s sake, assume also 
that the incentive may only be used on capital improvements). 
The opportunity costs of adding that $1 million of infrastructure 
will drop to zero; so, all other things being equal, the firm will 
add $1 million to its capital investment (provided that this does 
not result in the rate of return becoming negative). Incentives, 
inasmuch as they lower the cost of investment, encourage more 
investment. The reason we do not model the impact of incentives 
on the investment decision is that we are measuring the standing 
offer for a typical investment; we are not modeling the optimal 
investment. 11
Wage Subsidy and Worker Training Incentives
The problems with modeling wage subsidy programs and worker 
training programs are much the same as those with infrastructure. It is 
unclear whether public funds replace private training expenditure on a 
one-for-one basis, or whether public training is less cost-effective than 
private training. It is also true that most public funds have associated
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conditions, which may mean that the cost of providing training is more 
expensive using public funds. For example, the program may require 
that workers be trained at designated community colleges, which may 
be less efficient at providing training than a private firm. Moreover, 
training funds, insofar as they function as a subsidy for labor, may pro 
mote some substitution. Generally, such monies may encourage firms 
to train workers more than they otherwise would have. Since there are 
no useful data on these issues, we have ignored them in the model. The 
worth of training and wage subsidies is measured in the same way as 
that of infrastructure subsidies. A public grant, loan, loan guarantee, or 
loan subsidy is valued as the amount by which its use raises a firm©s 
20-year after-tax cash flow.
General-Use Grants, Loans, Loan Guarantees, and Related 
Debt Instruments
General-use grants, loans, loan guarantees, and related instruments 
(such as linked-deposits and interest subsidies) may be applied to a 
wider list of asset classes than infrastructure or training incentives. 
Most often, general-use incentives may be used for all asset classes. 
The most frequent exception to this pattern is the limitation that public 
funds should not be used for working capital. Presumably, the funds 
applying this restriction do so with the goal of protecting the security 
of public investment. There are also a few funds that exclude other 
asset classes: plant and land, machinery, or infrastructure.
On the whole, we treat public grants as replacements for the private 
equity stake in an investment and public debt instruments as replace 
ments for private-sector debt, provided that such replacements do not 
result in breaching program administrative rules. Some of the problems 
associated with the directed programs that have been discussed should 
not be as apparent with general-use incentives. In particular, while it is 
always the case that general-use incentives have rules governing the 
ways public monies may be spent, they usually do not have rules gov 
erning the mechanisms of spending. Unlike training programs, which 
often specify in great detail how training should be provided, or infra 
structure programs, which specify how roads are to be built and main 
tained, general-use programs tend not to prescribe a particular
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spending mechanism. As a result, the efficiency problems are likely to 
be less obvious (although some may still exist).
However, as indicated earlier, the substitution problem remains. 
General-use grants, loans, and loan guarantees tend to cheapen the cost 
of capital and, thus, from a theoretical and possibly practical perspec 
tive, are likely to result in the substitution of capital for labor. We also 
ignore the impact of general-use subsidies on the size of the invest 
ment. A further problem pertains to the structure of public debt. Very 
often the public general-use debt instruments of a firm are subordi 
nated. The result is that private debt is more secure and thus presum 
ably costs less (at least in the case of smaller firms). We collected 
information on subordination but found no reasonable way to model 
reductions in private debt interest rates. TAIM thus ignores the rate 
effect that the subordination of public debt may have. On the whole, 
the worth of general-use grants, loans, loan guarantees and related debt 
instruments is treated the same as that of infrastructure and training 
subsidies: their worth is the increment they provide to firm income.
Generating Incentive Amounts and Incentive Terms
As simulated by our model, the amount a firm may receive from a 
particular incentive program is determined by applying the explicit 
rules of the program and by multiplying the average fiscal year (FY) 
1992 incentive amount per job or per dollar of total investment by the 
number of new jobs or dollars of investment by the hypothetical firm. 12 
The incentive ratios are based on data provided by state or local offi 
cials. From a practical standpoint, all of the rules applied by program 
officials (rules deriving from the state code or city ordnance, general- 
use departmental rules, specific program guidelines, and the informal 
input of program administrators) could not be simulated. This would 
have required creating a detailed "expert system" or "knowledge base" 
for each program in each city and state. Setting up such "expert sys 
tems" would have necessitated an enormous amount of historical infor 
mation on each incentive. Program administrators, in our experience, 
would be unwilling to provide such detailed material, for the rather 
simple reason that most work with severe time and labor constraints.
We developed simplified "expert systems" for each state program. 
Here we applied a streamlined set of rules for every program:
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  The maximum amount available from a program;
  The maximum amount per job created or retained, and per dollar 
of investment;
  Leverage ratios required and equity contribution required;
  Limitations on the size of a given program©s contribution to a 
project and on a project©s particular asset expenditures;
  Restrictions on the size of all public financing of a project;
  Other basic limitations to firms of a particular size (however 
size is construed), to firms in particular sectors, and to firms head 
quartered in and out of state;
  Any other limiting rule that seemed crucial to the operation of the 
program.
The actual amount of the incentive simulated for a firm was deter 
mined by applying the preceding rules to the average of the historical 
ratios of public funds per job created or retained and public funds per 
dollar of investment size. In some cases, the size of an incentive award 
is based on a schedule, which we used to generate the actual incentive 
amount. Where a schedule-based program had to meet some other 
administrative criteria of the type that have been described, those crite 
ria were applied to the award.
City programs could not be modeled in this way. The data we have 
on city grant, loan, and loan guarantee programs are not detailed 
enough to permit the creation of even the limited "expert systems" that 
have been discussed. Instead, we applied the historical ratios of public 
funds per job created or retained and public funds per dollar of invest 
ment size and then applied the relevant size limits (such as maximum 
incentive amount or maximum amount per job), finally adding the city 
incentives to the state incentives.
Many states and a few cities have incentive programs with some 
substantive overlap. For example, Ohio has two general-use capital 
programs, one of which is directed towards smaller firms. In fact, this 
pattern a state having different programs for different sizes of firm  
is reasonably common. However, in many cases, it is possible that a 
particular investment project may be eligible to receive incentives from 
more than one state incentive program of the same type. Based on our
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discussions with state officials, in cases such as these, states would be 
inclined to offer only a single discretionary incentive. Thus, the model 
must not only simulate a likely amount from each incentive program, it 
must also be able to create a package of likely incentives.
For general-use incentives, the following rules have been applied. If 
two programs in a state have a broadly similar purpose, they are treated 
as mutually exclusive. If a state offers more than one incentive in a 
broad category, our model simulates the amount for which a firm is eli 
gible from each of these incentives and then chooses one for the firm. 
The one chosen is always that which, within the program rules, is 
worth more to the firm. This is interpreted to mean the one that most 
reduces the costs of debt to the firm. Practically, the present value of 
the flow of interest and principal payments on each public sector loan 
is compared to such payments on a private sector loan (these compari 
sons are made within individual asset classes and then summed over all 
asset classes). 13 TAIM is programmed to choose the public sector loan 
maximizing that difference between public and private loans. 14 In a few 
cases, this method results in large swings in the debt structure of the 
firm. As an illustration, very generous incentive loan programs with 
terms considerably shorter than those available for the same asset class 
in the private sector result in the firm retiring too much debt too early 
(the firm accepts a large and generous loan and pays it off quickly). 
The outcome is a sudden decline in debt at the end of the term of the 
public loan. This can result in a generous public loan actually lowering 
project returns. 15 To solve this problem, TAIM has an algorithm that 
refinances excessive early principal payments using the private debt 
market, thus maintaining a reasonably constant debt structure.
These same rules have been applied to the city incentive simulation. 
However, state and city incentives were treated as additive. If a state 
and a city within that state each has a separately capitalized general- 
use grant, and a firm is eligible for both, then the firm will receive both. 
The exception to the latter rule is that some city Community Develop 
ment Block Grant (CDBG)-capitalized revolving loan funds effectively 
replace similar state-level CDBG loan programs and have been treated 
accordingly. 16
Where there was more than one incentive within a particular cate 
gory, but where each incentive program in such a category was aimed 
at a different substantive purpose, then the various incentives have been
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treated as inclusive or additive. For example, within the category of 
infrastructure incentives, a state may have a fund to provide roads and 
a fund to aid site assembly. Both of these programs will be included in 
the final package because they are aimed at achieving specific but non- 
overlapping goals. Pennsylvania has a very complex set of non-tax 
incentives. Within the broad category of general-use incentives, it has a 
loan program directed at subsidizing the purchase of machinery and 
another directed at the purchase of land. On top of these, it has a num 
ber of other general-use programs for a wide range of asset expendi 
tures. In this case, the machinery-directed fund and the land-directed 
fund were treated as additive, but the programs whose activities over 
lapped are treated as exclusive. A firm may only receive incentives 
from one of these. We believe the application of this rule simplifies our 
comparison of non-tax incentives across states and agrees with the way 
that states and cities package incentives to firms.
There is one important complication to this scheme. Tax increment 
financing instruments (TIFs) pose special problems. TIFs are discre 
tionary instruments financed out of future increments to property taxes 
(and sometimes payroll taxes). 17 Essentially, property taxes on real 
improvements are used to retire notes issued for those improvements. 
TIFs and property tax abatements work at cross purposes; because an 
abatement relieves the property owner of the need to pay taxes on 
improvements, it also removes the mechanism to retire TIP debt (at 
least for a period of several years), thus making such debt financially 
difficult, if not impossible. However, one can imagine a situation where 
the optimal financial solution for a firm would be TIP debt raised on a 
portion of property improvements, with taxes on the remaining 
improvements subject to abatement. This would be most likely in situ 
ations where the firm would prefer TIFs over abatements and could not 
(for one reason or another) make full use of TIP funds raised on all 
property improvements. Since this sort of situation is extremely 
unusual and would severely complicate our model, we treat property 
tax abatements and TIFs as mutually exclusive. Abatements are on the 
whole more generous than TIFs, so our model only assigns TIFs if 
abatements are not available in a community (the exception being pay 
roll tax-retired training TIFs). Since the TIF is, in effect, a lump-sum 
payment made to the firm, which the firm does not pay back (essen 
tially the city, county, school, and other districts pay it back for the firm
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out of diverted property taxes), we treat TIFs as grants. As is true for 
grants, the TIP is used to replace private equity investment and is 
applied to allowed asset classes.
Distributing Incentives across Asset Classes
Once TAIM has generated an incentive package from a state or city, it 
distributes the package to the appropriate asset classes. As indicated, 
infrastructure incentives are always applied to infrastructure, and wage 
subsidy and worker training incentives are always applied to working 
capital. In all instances, the distribution of these directed incentives 
occurs before the distribution of general-use incentives. In the case of 
general-use incentives, three broad principles apply: 1) funds are dis 
tributed only to those asset classes allowed under program rules; 2) the 
funds distributed to an asset class may be no greater than the expendi 
ture the firm would have made on that asset class had the incentives not 
been available; and 3) insofar as this is possible under program rules, 
general-use funds are distributed first to plant and land, then to infra 
structure, then to machinery, and finally to working capital. The reason 
for this order is quite simple. Public money is used, wherever possible, 
on assets that do not depreciate, or that depreciate more slowly, allow 
ing private money to be spent on assets which depreciate more quickly. 
Because longer-lived assets are generally financed with longer-term 
debt, and because in normal times interest rates are higher the longer 
the term, this rule has the effect of substituting low-cost public money 
for the most costly private funds first. This arrangement maximizes the 
after-tax income impact of an incentive.
Awarding Grants, Loans, and Loan Guarantees
In the case of grants (and TIFs), once the various awards have been 
distributed to land and plant, infrastructure, machinery, and finally 
working capital, the model assumes that the recipient firm is able to 
make full use of all funds going to each asset class in the initial year of 
establishing the new plant. TAIM assumes that public grants are first 
used to replace private equity. In the case of loans, the situation is more 
complex. TAIM assumes that public debt is first used to replace private 
debt. The full loan award must be distributed across appropriate asset
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classes. Once this has been done, loan repayment schedules must be 
developed. This requires that appropriate interest rates, terms, and fees 
be applied to the loan for each asset class. A few programs had sched 
ules that specified rates, terms, and fees by asset class or by size of the 
loan. Indeed, in a very few cases, the marginal interest rate increased 
by the size of the total loan amount. For those state programs that did 
not specify a schedule or a term and rate specific to individual asset 
classes, we use the lowest reported interest rate in FY 1992 and longest 
reported term (and where applicable, lowest fees) available in FY 
1992, and we apply these to loans made to all asset classes. Thus, if a 
firm were eligible for a $1 million loan from a program that in 1992 
had a low rate of 7 percent and a term of 10 years, and if $700,000 of 
that $1 million went to plant and land and $100,000 went to each of 
infrastructure, machinery and working capital, the 7 percent rate and 
10-year term would be applied to each of these four amounts. One 
result is that, in highly unusual situations, public loans may still be out 
standing on assets that no longer have value. As an illustration, most 
categories of machinery have a book value of zero after 10 years.
The only reasonable alterative to this method of applying the best 
rate and term to the entire loan is to restrict the term on a public loan 
for a particular asset class to no longer than the term available on a pri 
vate sector loan for that class (or to the private sector term plus some 
chosen time period meant to account for the relative generosity of pub 
lic loans). This latter strategy is highly arbitrary and is too restrictive. 
Our method seldom causes mistakes: most programs fund such a small 
proportion of the total investment that almost all public funds are 
applied to asset categories with the full 20-year life.
For our purposes, loan guarantee programs only serve to reduce risk 
on private sector loans by guaranteeing to a financial institution that a 
firm©s loan will be repaid. Guarantees thus tend to have the effect of 
reducing interest rates on private sector loans. Our model treats a loan 
guarantee program as a public loan incentive; in other words, the 
model replaces a firm©s private sector loan with a public sector loan at 
the now lower interest rate. Obviously, the loans secured by public 
guarantees are always private sector loans. However, from the point of 
view of the recipient firm, the guaranteed private sector loan functions 
as a public loan. Most guarantee programs keep records of the impact 
of the public guarantee in reducing interest rates. These reductions are
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then applied to our data on average rates for private loans. If a guaran 
tee resulted in an average rate reduction of 1.5 percent, and if our his 
torical data on private loans to finance working capital showed that the 
average rate for a loan of that size was 12 percent over three years, then 
a rate of 10.5 percent on a 3-year term to the loan would be applied by 
our model. Thus, one important difference between our treatment of 
public loans and guaranteed loans is that for the guarantee we always 
maintain the usual private sector term for that type of firm and that 
asset class, unless a different term is explicitly specified by the guaran 
tee program. It is common for states to charge extra fees on loan guar 
antees (the fees usually help capitalize the guarantee fund). In our 
model, these fees are added to the interest payment for the first year, 
except where fees are explicitly multiyear. The private interest rate and 
loan term assumptions are described in Appendix B, Table B.2. In 
those cases where program officials were unaware of the impact of the 
guarantee on rates, we applied a standard rate reduction of 2 percent. 
This figure was near the middle of the range of the interest rate reduc 
tions reported in our surveys.
A very few states provide a "loan subsidy" incentive. Although this 
instrument is related to the loan guarantee, it operates in a different 
manner. For example, in Michigan, one program makes interest pay 
ments, for a limited period of time, on private sector loans negotiated 
by a firm. Effectively, the firm receives two subsidies. On the one hand, 
it receives a series of small grants the interest paid by the state. On 
the other, because there is an implied guarantee that the state will make 
the required payments, the private sector interest rate is likely to be 
reduced. Our model treats "loan subsidies" as public loans but 
decreases the loan repayment schedule appropriately (the annual inter 
est payment being reduced by the amount of the annual subsidy). Inter 
est rates are reduced by the standard 2 percent used in loan guarantee 
programs with terms usual for specific assets classes in the private sec 
tor.
"Linked-deposit" programs also closely resemble loan guarantees. 
States or cities keep funds in specific financial institutions on the 
understanding that the institutions will make below-market rate loans 
to qualified firms. Thus, the "linked deposit" reduces the interest rate 
charged to the firm. We treat linked deposits as loan guarantees: private 
sector terms and fees are retained, and interest rates are decreased by
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an appropriate amount. The linked deposit loan is treated as though it 
were a public sector loan.
Adding State and City Incentives
For the complete simulation of a state and local tax and incentive 
regime, we first calculate a firm©s local (and in a few cases, state) prop 
erty taxes, then state non-tax incentives, then city non-tax incentives 
and TIFs, and finally add other local taxes, state taxes, and state and 
local tax incentives. One result is that if a state and a city within a state 
both offer a similar type of incentive, the state©s incentive will be 
applied to the firm first. To illustrate, if a state and city both have a gen 
eral-use loan program, the firm will have the state program applied to it 
first. This method is employed in order to simplify some of the more 
complex computational issues associated with the design of the model. 
This method would only miscalculate the best potential package avail 
able from a state and city in that state where the city and state loan pro 
grams were both large enough to cover most of the debt requirements 
of the firm and where the rate and term of the city loan were more 
favorable than the rate and term of the state loan. 18 In the state and local 
loan programs covered in this research, these conditions are never both 
true.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS I: THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF INCENTIVES ALTERS 
THEIR WORTH
There is tremendous variability in the way a given category of 
incentive is implemented at the state or local level. Insofar as the par 
ticular financial arrangements allowed by a certain discretionary incen 
tive are clear and explicit, their impact on business operating costs may 
be calculated. Our general method for these calculations was presented 
above. However, before progressing any further, we need to discuss 
some of the broader empirical issues that the variability in program 
administration poses for modeling the worth of non-tax business incen 
tives to private firms. We focus on a single crucial issue that clearly
Industrial Incentives 99
illustrates the impact of program administration on incentive worth: 
clawbacks.
Non-tax incentive programs usually come with a range of financial 
and nonfinancial rules and regulations. Commonly imposed nonfinan- 
cial performance requirements include the following:
  The recipient firm will create or retain a specified number of jobs.
  The jobs created will pay above some stated level, such as 75 per 
cent of the county median manufacturing wage.
  The jobs created will not result in job cutbacks elsewhere in the 
state or city.
These performance requirements often have associated sanctions to 
encourage compliance from recipient firms. Such sanctions might 
include the cancellation of a subsidy agreement or the recovery of all 
or part of the incentive costs (Ledebur and Woodward 1990). These 
sorts of sanctions are generically referred to as program clawbacks. In 
most cases, the clawback operates in the following manner: a firm is 
given an incentive for relocation or expansion on the written under 
standing that it will either create or retain a certain number of jobs or 
make some compensating payment to the state. Not only do many 
major incentive programs impose clawbacks on recipient firms, they 
administer the clawbacks in quite different ways. We will discuss only 
two issues here: 1) defining performance and 2) monitoring perfor 
mance.
Although much loved by politicians, job "creation" and "retention" 
are notoriously ambiguous concepts. The theoretical issue lies in the 
"counterfactual" problem faced by all attempts to measure the effec 
tiveness of policy. Should all and any jobs created by a firm be counted 
as new jobs, or only those jobs that would not exist "but for" policy 
intervention? 19 How do we know what jobs would not exist "but for" 
policy? A similar set of issues arises over the meaning of job retention. 
There is also a range of more practical difficulties relating to job cre 
ation and retention. For full-time equivalents, how long need a job exist 
to count as new or retained? How long should a firm be given to create 
a specified job level, and, once that level has been achieved, how long 
need it last? Should a low-paying job count as much as a high-paying 
one? Programs that have job creation and retention requirements must
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attempt to answer these definitional questions. Peters (1993) found that 
major Midwestern loan and grant programs gave quite varied answers 
to these questions. In one incentive program, recipient firms were 
given two years to create jobs, in another program, three. Some pro 
grams required that the jobs, once created, should continue to exist for 
the life of the loan, while other programs left the period undefined.
Moreover, the actual monitoring of firm employment performance 
varied, with rigorous evaluation by field officers in some programs but 
not in others. Also, not all incentive programs reflected a willingness to 
impose clawback penalties on underperforming firms. In some cases, 
program directors felt the rigorous application of clawback penalties 
was rendered impossible by the need to maintain an understanding atti 
tude towards the risks of business. One program director reported that 
he was concerned about the impact of rigorous enforcement on the 
state©s perceived business climate.
It is clear that the day-to-day administration of incentives, particu 
larly discretionary non-tax incentives, has direct financial conse 
quences for a firm. Consider this example. 20 A firm, in the final round 
of its location search, is evaluating two industrial sites in two states. 
Site A offers a direct cash grant of $1 million from the first state©s 
incentive program X; site B also offers a direct cash grant (of similar 
magnitude) from the second state©s program Y. Each program has a 
stipulated maximum job/cost ratio of at least one new job for each 
$10,000 of incentives received. Thus, both incentives require the cre 
ation of 100 jobs. Both X and Y define job creation in the same way 
and have similar clawback requirements. However, Y©s clawback 
regime is much more rigorously enforced, having a historical record of 
imposing clawback penalties in a higher proportion of cases than does 
X. From the point of view of the firm, the two incentive programs offer 
identical initial financial benefits and require identical performance. 
However, in the medium to longer term, accepting an incentive from Y 
is a much more risky proposition than accepting an incentive from X. 
If the firm does not meet its job creation performance requirements, the 
probability is that an incentive from Y will offer less financial benefit 
than an incentive from X.
This example could be made much more involved. Suppose that 
while X is less rigorous in imposing clawbacks, its definition of job 
creation is much stricter than Y©s: X allows one year for job creation, Y
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two. A more difficult question then is, how the firm reacts to the admin 
istrative complexities that are part and parcel of many, if not most, non 
tax incentive offers. Theoretically, the firm could put a price on the risk 
associated with the more rigorous clawback regime, using well-known 
financial techniques. The costs associated with earlier rather than later 
job creation could also be calculated, but in reality it is unlikely that 
they ever are. The calculations would rely on too many unknowns 
(both about the future economic climate and the behavior of program 
administrators) to be of much practical use in making location deci 
sions.
Although we have no scholarly evidence, we have yet to hear from 
program directors that potential firms were interested in their clawback 
rates. Certainly the survey-based location literature, contradictory as it 
is on the issue of whether incentives in general influence location deci 
sions, is completely silent on how executives deal with more practical 
incentive matters, such as the specifics of job creation and clawback 
requirements, in their investment behavior. 21 Our model also ignores 
these issues. It should nevertheless be clear that the real value of an 
incentive, particularly a discretionary incentive, is mediated by the way 
the incentive is administered. 22 Firms may or may not deal with these 
issues in a quantitatively sophisticated way. Our models assume (and 
we believe) that they do not. On the other hand, it is quite possible that 
even if firms do not evaluate quantitatively the risks and associated 
potential costs of a particular administrative regime, investment and 
location decisions may still be influenced by the regime. For instance, 
rigorous clawback enforcement might be associated with a stormy 
local business climate and thus raise doubts about the real worth of an 
incentive package to a firm. In summary, business incentives have a 
range of associated administrative rules and conditions that have 
potential financial consequences for recipient firms. Whether firms 
take these rules and conditions into account when making location 
decisions, is unknown. TAIM ignores them.
This raises a much more general point. Colgan (1995) in a recent 
review of the impact of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) on state and local business incentives, indicates that the agree 
ment stipulates that incentives should be measured in a manner not too 
different from ours, except that we focus on the after-tax impact on 
cash flow, not on the before-tax comparison to sales. This latter point
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aside, the two methods are concerned essentially with differences in 
the cost of debt (and equity) between public and private financing. 
These differences are the basis for the calculation of the subsidy 
amount. However, a number of European negotiators to GATT claimed 
that this sort of measurement of public loans and loan guarantees fun 
damentally overstates their worth. Their argument was complex but is 
directly related to the issues surrounding clawbacks (and the worth of 
incentives) that we have discussed. Essentially, the Europeans argued 
that public loans and loan guarantees do cheapen the cost of debt for a 
firm, but that the administrative conditions associated with public loans 
(such as job creation and minimum wages) also impose significant and 
simultaneous costs on the firm. On the whole, the size of the debt sub 
sidy is likely to be close to these performance costs. If this is the case, 
firms should on the whole be indifferent to public or private debt. For 
clarity, we will call this the "subsidy indifference" argument.
If the subsidy indifference argument is correct, then the method we 
have used to measure the worth of subsidies is entirely mistaken. 
Indeed, if firms are essentially indifferent to public or private debt, then 
the simulation of discretionary incentives is probably unnecessary. The 
only job for public policy is to make sure that the subsidies given are as 
close as possible in worth to the conditions applied.
However, the subsidy indifference argument is not correct. First, the 
argument did not prevail in the latest GATT agreement; rather, the 
method we have described did. Moreover, we know of no American 
city or state that has explicitly maintained that the conditions it 
imposes on subsidies are equal to, or even related to, the explicit finan 
cial worth of the subsidy. In fact, states and cities specifically advertise 
their incentives as reducing the costs of doing business. Also, busi 
nesses seek out incentives (Owen 1990), implying that firms are not 
indifferent to their use. It seems wholly inconceivable to us that states 
and localities are duping businesses into receiving debt instruments 
that only look as though they provide some public subsidy but actually 
impose costs equal to that subsidy, and that the businesses have failed 
to catch on. Nevertheless, we believe that public subsidies have condi 
tions that probably do impose some costs on the firm. On balance, 
given that businesses actively search for subsidies, we assume that the 
costs are a small proportion of the subsidy itself. We know of no 
research that has looked at this issue in any empirical detail, and thus
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our model entirely discounts the costs implied by subsidy conditions. 
We believe that while our model probably overstates the worth of 
incentives, the overstatement is slight and applies across all states.
LIMITATION OF THE ANALYSIS II: COMPLETENESS 
OF THE NON-TAX PORTION OF TAIM
One central concern in a hypothetical firm simulation as large and 
complex as this is that something will have been omitted. In the case of 
taxes this is, of course, most unlikely. The tax code is part of local, 
state, and federal law. The concern is really about the completeness of 
and soundness of information on non-tax incentives. Unfortunately, a 
casual perusal of the most complete directories of state incentives 
(those published in Area Development, Site Selection, and by the 
National Association of State Development Agencies [NASDA]) 
shows discrepancies. Partly, this is a matter of the definition of an eco 
nomic development incentive; partly this is due to difficulty in getting 
the correct information. It should be emphasized that none of these 
publications provides the detailed financial data necessary for our sim 
ulation: their discrepancies are over such "brute" facts as whether a 
program actually exists or not. Thus, our data, being much more 
detailed, may actually exaggerate this problem. Given the time, care, 
and effort we put into the collection of data, we believe that this is not 
the case; nevertheless, it would be foolhardy to claim complete accu 
racy even at the state level.
At the city level, the situation is much worse. There exist no reason 
ably reliable directories to guide the gathering of information. More 
over, many cities do not have a single department or agency that 
coordinates economic development. One result is that it is much less 
clear at the city level that our information is complete. However, there 
is a positive mitigating factor at the local level. It appears that the big 
gest and most important incentives that cities provide are abatements; 
we believe that our information on abatements is quite reliable, more 
so than our information on city grants, loans, and loan guarantees. On 
the whole, we found it difficult and time-consuming to obtain data on 
city grants, loans, and loan guarantees.
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Still, some incentive programs are missing. Most federally and pri 
vately capitalized programs have been excluded, and mall and very 
infrequently used city and state programs have been ignored. 23 We have 
also left out what we call ad hoc programs those not part of a state©s 
or city©s standard standing offer, but made with a particular investment 
in mind. Our justification for these exclusions is provided in Chapter 2. 
In addition, we have ignored some programs that could not be modeled 
without introducing significant bias into our results. City infrastructure 
programs have been left out, not because these are unimportant, but 
because modeling them would distort our results. Only a few cities 
have properly established economic development infrastructure set- 
asides. Nevertheless, almost all cities in our sample reported that they 
would provide some sort of help with infrastructure to a new invest 
ment. This assistance would not come from an established program but 
from a range of other ad hoc sources, such as general revenues and 
works department resources. At this stage, we do not believe it is feasi 
ble to model this type of help. Ignoring such aid while continuing to 
model formally established city infrastructure programs would inap 
propriately privilege the standing offer of some cities. As a result, we 
decided to disregard all local infrastructure programs. Similar prob 
lems arose with "payment in lieu of property taxes" incentives; these 
too, were ignored.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS III: TARGETING 
GEOGRAPHY
Many states and some cities have developed very complex targeting 
geographies for their various programs. Sometimes, small geographic 
regions in a state will be chosen for incentives (enterprise zones are an 
example); sometimes the value of an incentive available throughout the 
state will be increased in specified areas. There is tremendous variation 
in the areas targeted. In Washington, one incentive program is directed 
at almost the entire state but Seattle. In some Pennsylvania programs, 
counties are used as the targeting unit, while in Georgia individual cen 
sus tracts (about 4,000 people each) are targeted. Moreover, states 
often have levels of targeting. A state may have a loan program that
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provides up to $1 million to a firm, at the prime rate plus 2 percentage 
points throughout the state, at prime in targeted areas, and at prime 
minus 2 percentage points in the most targeted areas. There is one fur 
ther, very important complication in targeting geography. In Iowa, as in 
many other states, the terms of the state©s major capital incentive pro 
gram, the Community Economic Betterment Account (CEBA), do not 
necessarily change in targeted areas, but the likelihood of a firm receiv 
ing a loan is increased if the firm locates in a high-unemployment 
county. TAIM takes into account broad state targeting and targeting 
within enterprise and similar zones. At this stage TAIM does not cover 
any fine-grained state targeting (to the tract level, for example), nor 
does it take into account award probabilities such as those associated 
with the CEBA program in Iowa. 24
CONCLUSIONS
The hypothetical firm method, properly implemented, provides the 
best measures of the burden of business taxes or the value of invest 
ment incentives across different sites. Most of the criticisms of the 
method are either misplaced or can be nullified by the appropriate use 
of assumptions and model structure. Studies measuring the average tax 
burden on a single-location firm for one year do not provide useful 
indicators of competitiveness either for purposes of making state pol 
icy or for purposes of conducting econometric analyses of the effects 
of or determinants of state policy. While the few recent studies assess 
ing the marginal tax effects rates of return on new investment by 
multilocation firms do provide correct measures for the most part, 
they have not always dealt satisfactorily with the sales destination 
problem. Constructing a "median state" provides a simple way of mod 
eling the destination of sales, with shares to taxing and non-taxing 
states that reflect actual sales patterns of manufacturing firms.
Aggregation remains an unresolved problem. Results of previous 
hypothetical firm studies, confirmed here, demonstrate convincingly 
that comparisons of sites are firm-specific, or at least vary substantially 
across industries. The value of incentive packages varies significantly 
by the characteristics of the firms modeled, so that it becomes crucial
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to model a variety of firms, to model firm and plant sizes that are rele 
vant, and to avoid aggregating results inappropriately.
Modeling the tax system and incentive programs for many states 
and cities requires making numerous assumptions. We have discussed 
the major critical assumptions regarding the hypothetical firm method 
and the special and thorny problems peculiar to the modeling of discre 
tionary incentives. A more detailed discussion of the operation of 
TAIM and the assumptions that underlie it is contained in Appendixes 
B and C.
NOTES
1. According to Ladd (1995), 17 states produce fairly comprehensive tax expenditure studies 
on a regular basis, and another 13 produce partial or intermittent studies.
2. A more recent study by J. Papke using the AFTAX model (so named because it measures 
the after-tax rate of return) is Papke (1995).
3. Researchers in Wisconsin, for example, by modeling six firms at the two-digit level, were 
able to say that the six industries represented in the study accounted for 60 percent of manufactur 
ing employment in the state (Wisconsin Department of Revenue 1990). On the other hand, in the 
Massachusetts study (Brooks 1993), the five three-digit industries represented 20 percent of the 
state©s manufacturing employment.
4. One can, of course, average a state©s ranking across the different firms, recognizing that 
such an average ranking does not actually represent the competitive position of the state for an 
average manufacturing firm.
5. For example, Alabama©s tax system favors domestic (Alabama-headquartered) over for 
eign (out-of-state) corporations in two ways: 1) the percentage of federal income taxes deductible 
is equal to income from Alabama operations divided by total firm income, which is 100 percent 
for our single-state firm headquartered in Alabama, but a small fraction for most multistate firms; 
and 2) domestic corporations are allowed a credit for income taxes paid to other states. Other fac 
tors that favor single-state or multi-location firms include the weight given to sales in apportion 
ment, throwback sales, and the ability of single-state firms to fully utilize income tax credits 
(against a much higher state tax liability since most income is apportioned to that state), whereas 
multistate firms get the same credit (since it is based on the same plant investment or new jobs) 
but can apply it only against the small share of income apportioned to that state, the rest being 
apportioned to the taxing states.
6. The early AFTAX model described by Papke and Papke (1984) handled initial locations in 
up to three different states. The Wisconsin, Indiana, and Michigan studies assumed a single loca 
tion for the firm.
7. Telephone conversation, Peter Fisher with Joe Malloy of the Wisconsin Department of 
Revenue, 1993.
8. If one divides state total property taxes paid on industrial property by state total assessed 
value of industrial property, the result is an average tax rate weighted by tax collections and indus 
trial property value. A simple average of tax rates, on the other hand, weights the largest city and 
the smallest rural community equally.
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9. This is accomplished by integrating a "knowledge base" (i.e., a set of computer-coded 
rules) with the financial model of each incentive and each package of incentives. The technical 
details of this are discussed in Peters and Fisher (1995).
10. However, we do not look at a related issue the extent to which loan guarantees encour 
age "additional" or "additive" investment.
11. There are other reasons for not modeling the impact of incentives on investment decisions. 
First, we acknowledge that with most big investments, the state and city incentive package will be 
"negotiated" and an incentive "deal" will be struck; however, there is evidence that the investment 
decision of the firm will be influenced by incentives the firm believes, prior to the deal being 
struck, it will receive, or at least has a good chance of receiving (Owen 1990). The point is not 
that the firm fixes its capital plans before it seeks public funds, although it may, but that the firm 
will take into account "likely" subsidies when developing its original capital plans. Our own prac 
tical knowledge of how deals are struck supports this idea: the firm brings an investment plan to 
economic development officials, and based on that plan, the officials provide a package of incen 
tives. From a theoretical standpoint this means that a firm will not always maximize its profits, 
since, in order to do so, the firm should continue adding to its capital stock until the marginal effi 
ciency of investment equals the interest rate, adjusted for taxes and subsidies. In practice, this 
requirement may never be met. Work on the site selection process suggests that, because of data 
complexity, and thus cost, location decisions are made sequentially at various spatial scales. A 
firm will first choose a broad geographic region, then possibly a state within the region, a metro 
politan area, and finally a site (see Blair and Premus 1987). Since lowest tax regions do not neces 
sarily have the lowest tax industrial sites (and similar arguments can be made concerning inputs), 
firms may not end up maximizing their profits. This is well understood in the location literature. 
"A feasibility analysis must normally show that the proposed plan will earn a high enough [not 
maximum] rate of return to justify construction costs" (Blair and Premus 1987, p. 75).
The British literature on the impact of incentives on investment decisions, although somewhat 
dated, appears to support the argument made in the previous paragraph. Most of the British litera 
ture concerns the way investment decisions were influenced by Regional Development Grants 
(RDGs; entirely automatic regional subsidies available to all firms meeting certain basic require 
ments equivalent to tax incentives in the United States) and Regional Selective Assistance 
(RSH; negotiated discretionary regional grants equivalent to discretionary incentives in the 
United States). Most of the evidence suggests that the automatic subsidy was more likely than the 
discretionary subsidy to be incorporated into the investment decision, precisely because the 
former was automatic and the amount of the subsidy was given by a simple formula; "the discre 
tionary element of aid generates uncertainty which reduces the effectiveness of the grant. . . The 
main reason for the non-inclusion of [the discretionary] RSA [as opposed to the automatic RDG] 
was uncertainty over both whether an award would be made and also the size of the award" 
(Swales 1989). For a review of this literature, see Begg and McDowall (1987); see also Alien et al. 
(1986). There have been contrary findings (McGreevy and Thomson 1983).
We interpret these findings as supporting two of our claims. First, discretionary incentives are 
probably less likely to affect investment decisions than are taxes and tax incentives. Second, ad 
hoc or special discretionary incentives of the sort discussed earlier in this chapter will probably 
have much less influence over the industrial location or the investment decision than will ordinary 
discretionary incentives.
12. Where fiscal year 1992 was not available, we used calendar year 1992. For those states 
with biennial budgets, we divided the data by two.
13. This same method is used with linked-deposits and loan guarantees.
14. TAIM does not optimize the choice of loan program on the basis of after-tax cash flow, but 
on the basis of direct loan costs to the firm. See Rasmussen, Bendick, and Ledebur (1984) for jus-
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tification. We adopt this method for practical reasons. Optimizing on the basis of increments to 
project returns would slow TAIM considerably. In almost all cases, optimizing on direct loan costs 
rather than on increments to project returns has no impact on our results.
15. The reason for this is that such loans cause changes to the debt structure and thus to the 
income and tax structure of the firm. TAIM optimizes incentive program choice on the basis of 
loan costs, not after-tax income. Even if TAIM optimized awards on the basis of income, the debt- 
structure problem would remain, although it would probably be less visible. The text describes 
our solution to this problem.
16. City-level CDBG-capitalized revolving loan funds (RLFs) are usually available in so- 
called "entitlement" cities, meaning that they have direct access to federal CDBG funds. State- 
level CDBG-capitalized RLFs are directed towards "non-entitlement" cities and are not available 
in "entitlement" cities. There are, however, non-entitlement cities that have used CDBG funds 
received through state government to set up local RLFs.
17. Since we are concerned with manufacturing, sales tax TIFs are not included.
18. More precisely, the model would only miscalculate the best package where prior use of the 
"inferior" state debt instrument precluded full use (on any or all asset classes) of the "superior" 
city instrument.
19. Howland (1990) provides a very useful discussion of these issues in a program evaluation 
context.
20. The administrative rules in this illustration are based on rules culled from our sample of 
state programs.
21. Schmenner©s (1982) survey work on locational incentives found that a very large propor 
tion of firms were unaware of incentives for which they were eligible. If this is the case, it is 
unsurprising that there should be even less knowledge of the details of incentive administration. 
The situation in Europe may be somewhat different, with greater awareness of clawback regimes; 
see, for example, Bachtler (1990).
22. This is not a problem for general use programs only: similar problems arise for other types 
of incentives. Many states sponsor customized labor training programs that allow on-the-job train 
ing provided at the plant site. A common problem with on-the-job training is that its supposed 
beneficiaries, the firm©s workers, do not gain much in the way of skills enhancement. In other 
words, the job training scheme acts as a disguised wage subsidy. Some states rigorously enforce 
their job training schemes to ensure that skills are provided to workers, while other states have 
much less stringent enforcement.
23. These are described in Chapter 2, note 6.
24. At this stage, TAIM merely has small databases on broad state targeting. However, it is 
highly impractical to deal with tract and other small-area targeting using this system. Clearly, 
there are thousands of tracts in most states, making the creation and maintenance of traditional 
databases much too labor-intensive. Moreover, in many American states, counties are so small 
that even the management of county-level information poses problems (Iowa, a state of fewer than 
4 million, has 99 counties). An extension to TAIM deals with targeting geography by putting it 
directly into a GIS. TAIM then queries the GIS to discern the level of incentive for which a firm is 
eligible in the substate region.
4 Tax Systems and Incentive 
Programs in States and Cities
Are the variations in economic development incentives across states 
and cities large enough to make a difference? This has been a point of 
contention between critics and supporters of competitive economic 
development policy for many years. Critics have often pointed out that 
the value of tax breaks and incentive programs to firms is diminished 
by the income tax effects and that taxes, in particular, are a very small 
part of business costs. Thus, incentives are unlikely to affect most loca 
tion decisions. Economic development practitioners have generally 
operated under the opposite assumption that every program is effec 
tive for every location decision. The evidence from econometric stud 
ies of tax effects on economic growth, and from previous studies of tax 
differences using the hypothetical firm method, appears to support a 
middle position: differences in rates of return due to taxes are signifi 
cant enough to influence location decisions at the margin and hence to 
affect rates of growth, even if the majority of location decisions are 
unaffected.
Previous empirical studies, however, have not incorporated the full 
range of tax incentives and so have not measured accurately actual 
after-tax rates of return on new investment. Furthermore, non-tax 
incentives have not been incorporated at all. This raises several ques 
tions that can now be addressed by the present study. Do tax and other 
incentives widen or narrow the differences among places in rates of 
return on new investment? Are differences "large" or "small" using 
various standards of comparison? Are non-tax incentives greater in 
value than tax incentives? Are the variations in returns among cities 
due more to the differences in state taxes and programs or to differ 
ences in local taxes and incentives? How important are enterprise 
zones and similar programs in changing the relative positions of cities 
in the competition for jobs? Is there a type of state/local industrial pol 
icy implied by the sectoral differences in rates of return? We explore 
these and other questions in this chapter. We do not address the larger 
issue of whether the tax and incentive variations measured by TAIM
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can explain the variation in state or local rates of growth; this must 
await subsequent research.
We begin by describing the tax systems and tax incentive programs 
in our selected states and cities, and we then explore the implications 
of making arbitrary distinctions between basic features of the tax sys 
tem on the one hand and "tax incentives" on the other. We then con 
sider the importance of states versus cities in establishing the tax 
parameters and incentive programs that affect rates of return. Next, we 
describe the range of non-tax incentive programs available in the states 
and cities in our study. We subsequently present the model results in 
terms of the spatial variation in taxes and incentives, and we investigate 
the issue of incentive size.
VARIATION IN TAXES AND TAX INCENTIVES
There was wide variation in 1992 among the 24 states in our study 
with respect to the relative importance of income, net worth, sales, or 
property taxes, and with respect to the definition of the base of each of 
these taxes and the tax rate to be applied. All 24 states have a local 
property tax that applies at least to business realty and a sales tax that 
applies to some business purchases. All but two have a corporate 
income tax; Michigan instead has a form of value-added tax called the 
single business tax, and Washington taxes businesses based on their 
gross receipts. 1 Both of these taxes are included in our analysis. Four of 
the income-tax states actually have a combined income-net worth tax, 
whereby the firm must calculate a tax liability based on income and a 
tax liability based on net worth, stockholders© equity, intangible prop 
erty, or some other definition of wealth. The firm then pays whichever 
is greater, the income-base tax or the wealth-base tax. Another eight 
states have a separate wealth tax that is always additive with the 
income tax.
Sales Taxes
State sales tax rates vary from 4 percent in five states to a high of 6.5 
percent in Washington and Illinois (see Table 4.1). These taxes apply to
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SOURCE: Commerce Clearing House, State Tax Guide; American Bar Association 1993; Federa 
tion of Tax Administrators, 1991.
NOTE: In all of these states, other items of capital equipment (non-manufacturing machinery, fur 
niture and fixtures, computers) are taxed at the general sales tax rate except that computers are 
exempt in Iowa. In several states, sales tax exemptions beyond those shown here apply in enter 
prise zones; see Table 4.4.
a. Rates are lower than general sales tax rate for the state.
b. In Kentucky, expenses for energy and energy-producing fuels used in manufacturing are 
exempt to the extent that such expenses exceed 3% of the cost of production.
purchases of furniture and fixtures, computers, and other non-manufac 
turing machinery and equipment by manufacturers in all 24 states. 2 
However, manufacturing machinery and equipment have been 
excluded from the sales tax base in all but 5 of the 24 states, and only 6 
states tax electricity and natural gas used by manufacturing firms at the 
full rate. Three tax fuel and electricity at a lower rate, eight exempt the 
portion of fuel and electricity used directly in the manufacturing pro 
cess, 3 and another seven exempt fuel and electricity altogether. The 
exemptions for manufacturing machinery and equipment, as well as 
the exemptions or preferential rates for fuel and electricity used 
directly in manufacturing, could be viewed as tax incentives. They are 
targeted at the manufacturing sector, as are the majority of economic 
development incentives.
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Corporate Income Taxes and Credits
State corporate income taxes are imposed in 22 of the 24 states in 
our study. The remaining two levy a value-added tax (Michigan) or a 
gross receipts tax (Washington) instead. Among the 22 income tax 
states, tax rates range from 4.5 percent in Texas to 12.25 percent in 
Pennsylvania (Table 4.2). These are flat rates applied to all taxable 
income; only 3 of the 24 states have a progressive rate structure, and 
among these 3 the highest top-bracket rate was 12.0 percent in Iowa. 
More significant than rate differences are variations in the definition of 
taxable income and in the credits permitted. In most states, the corpo 
ration©s determination of taxable income starts with federal taxable 
income or with something practically equivalent to it. Federal taxable 
income is net of deductions for federal depreciation, state and local 
taxes on income, and property taxes, as well as other normal business 
expenses. Three of the 24 states then permit deduction of all or part of 
federal income taxes in arriving at state taxable income. Most states 
require the firm to add back in to federal taxable income the deductions 
for state income taxes. However, six states permit the deduction of cor 
porate income taxes paid to other states (which in our model means the 
deduction of median state income taxes), and two states do not require 
the firm to add back their own state income taxes, in effect allowing the 
deduction of their own state income taxes. All but Indiana allow deduc 
tion of property taxes; California and New Jersey require use of depre 
ciation schedules less accelerated than current federal law.
Once the taxable income of the corporation as a whole has been 
determined, the portion of that income taxable in the particular state 
must be calculated, assuming that the firm has operations in other 
states as well. This is done according to the state©s rules for the alloca 
tion and apportionment of income. Generally, nonbusiness income is 
allocated (assigned) entirely to one state or another. Rental income is 
allocated entirely to the state in which the rental property is located, 
while dividends are usually allocated to the headquarters state.
Business income derived from the sale of the manufacturer©s goods 
is apportioned. All but two of the income tax states use a three-factor 
apportionment formula: payroll, property, and sales. Each factor is a 
percentage: the firm©s payroll paid out in the taxing state divided by its 
total payroll everywhere, property located in the state divided by prop-
Table 4.2 State Corporate Income and Net Worth Taxes as of 1992
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SOURCE: Commerce Clearing House, Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide; state corporate income tax forms and instructions. 
NOTE: * indicates an explanation is included in these notes. All states but two have corporate income taxes: MI single-business tax is a value-added tax, 
WA has only a gross receipts tax. Except as noted, all states allowed depreciation on assets acquired in 1992 or later essentially similar to current Federal 
MACRS depreciation, did not allow deduction of their own state income taxes, and did allow a deduction for property taxes. In AL, a percentage (income 
from AL operations divided by total federal income) of federal income taxes are deductible. Apportionment percentages are the weights applied to the 
firm©s in-state share of payroll, property, and sales. MO allows firms to substitute single-factor 100% sales formula. Definitions of payroll vary only slightly 
among the states; property is defined as acquisition cost in most states, but CT, NJ, and NY use book value. Nonbusiness income is included in the sales 
factor only in CA, CT, NJ, and TX. Non-business income is generally allocated entirely to the state where earned; i.e, the location of the property. We 
assume dividends are allocated to headquarters state. However, nonbusiness income is apportioned in CT, MA, MN, and NJ, is not part of tax base in WA, 
and is allocated by a separate formula in NY and TN. Rates in all but six states are flat rates applied to all taxable income; for the three states with a pro 
gressive rate structure (IA, KY, and OH), the rate shown is the top bracket rate. In IL, IN, and OH, the rates shown are a combination of two tax rates (in 
effect, combining a regular and supplemental tax.) In WA, the rate is appllied to gross recepits. General credits are those generally available to any corpo 
ration; credits available only in enterprise zones or the like are described in a later table. AL allows domestic (AL) corporations a credit for income taxes 
paid to other states. NC credit is for 40% of local property taxes on inventory of finished goods. WI allows credit for the sales tax on fuel and electricity 
used directly in manufacturing. Net worth taxes include all taxes on capital, stockholders© equity, or assets; they either operate as a separate tax or are inte 
grated, in which case the firm usually pays whichever is larger, the income tax or the net worth tax.
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erty owned everywhere, and sales destined for that state divided by 
total sales. The apportionment percentage is a weighted average of 
these three factor percentages. Ten states use equal weights; 11 weight 
sales more heavily, including 9 that double-weight sales (so that the 
payroll and property factors are weighted 25 percent each, sales 50 per 
cent). Two states use single-factor apportionment, 100 percent based 
on sales, while another allows this as an option. The popularity of the 
apportionment formulas weighting sales more heavily is undoubtedly 
due to the advantage this provides to the exporting firm. It creates a tax 
incentive to locate a manufacturer©s plant (and hence payroll) in that 
state when the majority of the goods will be sold in national or interna 
tional markets.
Another important feature of the apportionment rules has to do with 
sales to states in which the firm has no tax nexus. Offices for the solici 
tation of sales are generally sufficient to establish a tax nexus that 
makes the firm taxable in that state; production facilities need not be 
located there. Nine of the 24 states require that sales to states in which 
the firm is not subject to state income tax (or to the federal govern 
ment) be "thrown back" to the state in question, raising the sales factor 
and hence taxable income.4
Once taxable income has been determined the sum of nonbusiness 
income allocated to the state and business income apportioned to the 
state tax liability is found by multiplying the flat rate by taxable 
income or by applying a progressive rate table to taxable income. 
Credits may then be deducted to arrive at the final tax liability. We have 
modeled the significant credits generally available to manufacturing 
firms, and the investment or new jobs credits permitted statewide or in 
places such as enterprise zones. Investment credits are usually a fixed 
percentage of the acquisition cost of new property, plant, and equip 
ment, sometimes subject to a minimum amount of new investment or a 
minimum number of associated new jobs. Jobs credits are either a per 
centage of the wages paid to new employees or a fixed dollar amount 
per new job. Only 8 of the 24 states have investment or jobs credits that 
apply statewide.
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Property Taxes
The property tax is primarily a local tax, although 3 of our 24 states 
impose a small state property tax. The states play a significant role by 
defining the property tax base, by sometimes imposing ceilings on 
property tax rates, and by permitting or not permitting localities to pro 
vide abatements of local property taxes on new industrial property. The 
wide variation among states in the size of a manufacturer©s local prop 
erty tax bill, compared to its state income and sales tax expense, is also 
directly related to variation in the division of responsibilities between 
the state and local governments for funding certain kinds of programs, 
particularly the state share of education, health, and welfare programs.
Of the 24 states, 6 exclude all personal property from the property 
tax base; at the other extreme, 2 tax all classes of personal property 
fully (at the same assessment ratio as real property). The remaining 16 
exempt some portion of personal property or require that it be assessed 
at a lower rate than real (Table 4.3). For these states that do tax per 
sonal property, exemptions for manufacturer©s inventories or for manu 
facturing machinery and equipment could be viewed as tax 
expenditures or development incentives. Twelve of the 16 exempt 
inventories, and the other 4 tax only a portion of inventories or assess 
them at a lower percentage. Of the 18 states that tax personal property, 
however, only 2 (Kentucky and Wisconsin) exempt manufacturing 
machinery and equipment; another 4 tax this category at a lower rate 
than real property (Iowa, Ohio, and Tennessee) or provide a temporary 
exemption (Connecticut). Seven of the 18 personal property states 
exempt transportation equipment. Virginia is an oddity in that manu 
facturing machinery and equipment and transportation equipment are 
taxed, while other kinds of personal property are exempt.
Targeted Tax Incentives
Geographically targeted tax incentives have become nearly univer 
sal; 20 of the 24 states have enabling legislation for the creation of 
enterprise zones or development zones (generally areas smaller than a 
city, created at the option of the city), and 3 states have designated 
selected counties as distressed areas eligible for state development 
incentives (Table 4.4). Eligibility as an enterprise zone or distressed
Industrial Incentives 119
area is usually determined primarily on the basis of the local unem 
ployment rate and some measure of income or poverty.
Of the 22 states with enterprise zone laws and/or distressed coun 
ties, 21 provide state income tax incentives and 7 offer sales tax incen 
tives to firms locating in the zone or designated county. Ohio is the 
only state that allows enterprise zones but provides no associated state 
incentives, relying solely on local tax abatements to stimulate develop 
ment. Four states provide investment tax credits (ITCs) only in enter 
prise zones; another four have statewide ITCs but provide more 
generous versions in zones. Fourteen states provide new jobs tax cred 
its only in enterprise zones, while two provide more generous versions 
of statewide jobs credits in zones. Three states, in lieu of investment or 
jobs credits, simply exempt all or 50 percent of the income attributable 
to zone operations from state income tax. Four states provide such 
income exemptions in addition to credits. Tax incentives targeted to 
areas of high unemployment are now nearly universal, are usually 
much more generous than the statewide versions, and have all been 
established since 1981 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel 
opment 1992).
BASIC TAX SYSTEMS VERSUS TAX INCENTIVES
Of the various features of the state tax systems described, only those 
with clear and explicit economic development purpose are separated in 
our analysis: the statewide investment and jobs credits and all the 
enterprise zone tax incentives. Other elements, including heavier 
weighting of sales in apportionment formulas and exemption of manu 
facturing machinery or fuel and electricity from the sales tax, are part 
of the state©s "basic tax system." To provide an understanding of the 
relative importance of the major aspects of income, sales, and property 
taxes, some of which may indeed have been liberalized in response to 
state economic development concerns, Table 4.5 illustrates, for 
selected hypothetical firms, the value of each tax feature.
The first step in producing Table 4.5 was to generate after-tax 
returns from a new investment in a fictional high-tax state. This state is 
a "worst case": it has the highest (7.25 percent) combined state/local
Table 4.3 Property Tax Base, Effective Property Tax Rates, and Abatements Offered, by State, 1992
State statutory assessment ratios and exemptions (%)


























































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Prentice-Hall, All States Tax Guide; Commerce Clearing House, State Tax Guide; state statutes; authors© survey data.
NOTE: "M&E" refers to machinery and equipment. "Effective property tax rates" are taxes as a percentage of market value; local rates shown are the low 
est and highest among the cities in our sample. "EZs" refers to enterprise zones or similar distressed areas with tax incentives. "Local var." means that the 
assessment ratio is not mandated by state law; it varies by locality. "NA" means not applicable, either because the state does not have an active enterprise 
zone program or because state law does not permit localities to provide property tax abatements. 
*Asterisked items by state:
Connecticut: Manufacturing M&E is exempt for the first four years after it is acquired.
Georgia: Localities may choose to exempt inventories.
Iowa: Manufacturing M&E and computers are assessed at 30% of acquisition cost.
Indiana: Inventories are valued at 65% of cost, then assessed at 33.3%; inventories of finished goods destined for out of state are exempt; vehicles are 
exempt unless licensed for over 8 tons.
Kentucky: State tax rate shown applies to real property; lower rates apply to manufacturing M&E and inventories of raw materials and goods in pro 
cess, which are exempt from local tax. Inventories of finished goods are subject to local tax.
New Jersey: State tax applied in 1993 to 50% of acquisition cost of personal property (excluding inventories and vehicles) in use as of October 1992 
but was repealed for subsequent years.
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1992; authors© survey data; state enterprise zone reports; Commerce Clearing House, 
Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide; state corporate income tax forms and instructions.
NOTE: Income tax credits are credits against the corporate income and/or net worth tax and are generally either a percentage of the value of enterprise 
zone investment or a jobs credit equal to a percentage of wages or a dollar amount per job. "EZ > S W" means that the credit available in enterprise zones 
is more generous than one available statewide. The "EZ income exemption" column indicates the percentage of taxable income attributable to operations in 
an enterprise zone that is exempt from state income tax. Sales tax preferences are exemptions unless noted as (credit), indicating an income tax credit. 
"M&E" refers to machinery and equipment. "EZs" refers to enterprise zones or similar distressed areas. 
*Asterisked items, by state:
Florida: Jobs credit applies only to employees earning $1,500 per month or less; exemption from sales tax on electricity is available only if the munic 
ipality votes to exempt EZ firms from at least 50 percent of local public service tax.
Kentucky: Energy sales tax exemption only to extent that energy costs exceed 3 percent of production costs.
Michigan: EZ was allowed in only one city; purchases of machinery and equipment for use in an EZ are exempt from sales tax for the first 10 years.
Minnesota: As of 1992, "competitive zones" had been phased out; five small "border city" zones remained in cities bordering the Dakotas; credit is 
allowed for EZ property taxes and interest on EZ facility debt.
Missouri: EZ income exemption is for 10 years.
Texas: Jobs credit is called a refund for sales taxes paid on manufacturing M&E, but the credit is equal to $2,200 per job. We treat the sales tax paid as 
a ceiling on the jobs credit.
Virginia: All purchases are exempt from sales tax for the first 5 years that the firm is located in an EZ.
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NOTE: This table shows the percentage reduction in state and local taxes (i.e., the present value over 20 years of taxes attributable to a new plant) as a 
result of adopting each modification to a baseline tax system. The plant is located in a hypothetical city and state (population 6 million) where the baseline 
tax system includes a 6.0 percent state plus 1.25 percent local sales tax rate that applies to machinery and equipment and to fuel and utilities; pre-1981 
depreciation; no deductions for federal or state income taxes; equal-weighted three-factor apportionment with throwback of sales from non-taxing states; 
and a flat 10 percent income tax rate. The 3 percent property tax rate applies to all real and per sonal property and employs a very slow depreciation sched 
ule for the valuation of personal property. This represents the "worst" features of the 24 state tax systems and is approximately California©s state tax system 
(with the addition of a sales tax on fuel and electricity), plus Alabama©s property tax system (with the addition of a tax on inventories and a higher tax 
rate). Changes are taken one at a time. The investment tax credit is 2 percent of plant and equipment; the jobs tax credit is $1,000 per new job. Both are 
nonrefundable, one-time credits but can be carried forward 10 years. The typical property tax abatement schedule reduced the following percentages of 
local taxes for years 1 to 10: 100, 100, 100, 90, 75, 60 45, 30, 20, 10. 
*The median tax system is defined by the parameters shown in the last column, 
a. Headings for columns should be read as "Firm #2, furniture industry, plant size = $40 million."
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sales tax rate among our 24 states, with no exemption for manufactur 
ing machinery or fuel and electricity; an income tax law that requires 
pre-1981 depreciation (which is less accelerated than post-1986 rules); 
no deductions for federal or other state income taxes; equal-weighted 
three-factor apportionment with throwback sales; and a flat 10 percent 
tax rate. (This state©s income and sales taxes are identical to Califor 
nia©s with two exceptions: California does exempt fuel and electricity 
from the sales tax, and the income tax rate is only 9.3 percent.) The 
property tax applies to personal property, including inventories and 
manufacturing machinery and equipment; the state guidelines for the 
valuation of personal property are the least favorable among the 24 
states (Alabama©s), applying the slowest depreciation rates; and the tax 
rate is a relatively high 3 percent.
We assume that a multistate firm headquartered in our median state 
builds a new plant in this mythical high-tax state. The project returns 
after paying state and local taxes in this high-tax state are then com 
pared with returns for the identical investment in the same state but 
with all tax rates set to zero. The difference is the baseline state and 
local tax burden on the investment in a new plant.
The model then modifies one feature of the tax system at a time and 
recalculates net project returns and state/local taxes. Table 4.5 shows 
the percentage decrease in state/local taxes that results from each tax 
modification. This allows us to compare the relative value to the firm of 
different conditions, such as a property tax versus a sales tax exemp 
tion. The model also shows the tax reduction resulting from adopting 
the median version of each tax; the median sales tax, for example, is a 
5 percent state plus 1 percent local rate with exemptions for both man 
ufacturing machinery and fuel and electricity. Median taxes are con 
structed by using, for each feature or rate, the median value among our 
24 states, shown in the right-hand column of the table. Results are 
shown for six multistate firms that portray the diversity of characteris 
tics underlying wide variation in tax burdens.
Somewhat surprisingly, the sales tax exemption for manufacturing 
machinery is one of the most valuable incentives, in all six cases of 
more value to the firm than double-weighting sales, and of much more 
importance than the impact of allowing federal depreciation under the 
state corporate income tax. Eliminating the throwback sales rule is 
about half as valuable as double-weighting sales; changing both fea-
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tures of the apportionment rules to the median position saves the firm 
from about 4 percent to 11 percent of its tax burden, except for firm 
number 14. The two rules together are worth more than the sum of the 
individual percentages because the double weighting of sales is more 
advantageous when the factor does not include throwback sales.
Table 4.5 illustrates the importance of property taxes. Changing 
even a relatively obscure feature of the property tax system substitut 
ing the average state guidelines or rules for valuation of personal prop 
erty in order to arrive at full value (before applying assessment ratios) 
for Alabama©s rules turns out to be of more significance for these 
firms than depreciation rules or state income tax deductibility under the 
income tax.
The three most common incentives with explicit economic develop 
ment purposes, and the only tax incentives that we model separately, 
are included in Table 4.5 for comparison with the other tax features 
that are less clearly for economic development and that are part of our 
"basic tax system." The value of the "typical" investment tax credit (2 
percent of plant and equipment) or jobs tax credit ($1,000 per new job) 
is comparable to the benefit from such tax features as a total exemption 
of manufacturing machinery and equipment from the sales tax or liber 
alization of apportionment rules. The typical property tax abatement 
program, on the other hand, is worth much more, about a fifth to a third 
of the firm©s total state/local tax burden.
It is clear from Table 4.5 that a study of state and local incentive 
competition must include a complete modeling of the state and local 
taxes that fall directly on business, as well as of the explicit tax incen 
tives. Two-thirds of the states in our sample have no statewide invest 
ment or jobs tax credits, yet tax policy in these states may very well 
have been driven by economic development concerns over the past two 
decades as much as in the states with incentives. Those concerns may 
have resulted in liberalized sales tax exemptions or apportionment 
rales, or simply in reduced tax rates, rather than in tax credits.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE VERSUS LOCAL TAXES 
AND TAX INCENTIVES
Is variation in taxes and incentives among cities within a state more 
significant than variations across states? There is reason to believe that 
the state is more important than the locality. States play a very impor 
tant role in setting the parameters of local taxation and in providing or 
limiting the use of tax incentives. The level of local property taxation is 
affected strongly by state policy regarding the functional responsibili 
ties of the state versus local governments and by the share of local 
spending on education, mental health, and other programs financed by 
state grants or shared revenues. States also define the property tax base 
and assessment rules; set limits on property tax rates on increases in 
local spending, or on growth in assessments; limit local indebtedness; 
and establish policies on bond approval. In addition, states determine 
what nonproperty taxes are available to local governments (such as 
sales and corporate income taxes) and often set limits on rates for such 
taxes.
Our sample of cities is too small to determine the extent of variation 
in returns across cities within each state. We can, however, examine 
how states vary in terms of the relative importance of state versus local 
taxes and in the relative magnitude of state versus local tax incentives. 
We can also analyze the extent to which low state taxes (or large state 
incentives) compensate for high local taxes (or small local incentives). 
To accomplish these comparisons, we created 24 "representative cit 
ies," one for each state, and gave each city the median or "typical" 
sales tax rate, property tax rate, and property tax abatement schedule 
among the cities in that state in our study.
It is important to note the limitations of this analysis; the median is 
in most states defined by a small group of one to five cities. While the 
city sample was drawn randomly, the sample for any one state (except 
California, Florida, and Texas) is too small to produce a reliable esti 
mate of the state median. For property taxes, this was deemed a serious 
problem. As a result, we relied on other data sources to a large extent in 
determining average property tax rates for each state. The data sources 
and rates are described in Appendix A. There is no alternative data
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source for typical property tax abatement schedules; we were forced to 
use a schedule typical of the cities in our sample.
Table 4.6 summarizes the results of the representative city analyses 
for the 5 multistate firms that best illustrate the important firm differ 
ences among cities and for the average of all 16 firms. Effective state 
tax rates measure the reduction in project returns that results when 
state income, net worth, and sales taxes are introduced into the analy 
sis. Each firm©s project returns in a particular state, after state taxes but 
no local taxes, are compared with project returns if the same firm 
(headquartered in the median state) had built the new plant instead in a 
hypothetical state having no taxes. 5 State tax burdens are measured net 
of the effects of federal deductibility. The effective tax rate is equal to 
the state tax burden (measured as the reduction in the present value of 
project cash flow) divided by the present value of income attributable 
to the new plant before all taxes (federal, state, and local). Similarly, 
the local tax burden is the further reduction in project returns (after 
federal and state taxes) caused by introducing local sales, income, and 
property taxes.
The range of effective tax rates is quite large, both at the state and 
at the local level. As would be expected, the interstate variation in 
combined state/local tax rates is less than the variation in either state 
or local taxes considered separately; states with high state tax rates 
tend to have below-average local tax rates, and vice versa. This is 
reflected in the share of local taxes in the combined state-local tax bur 
den, which varies greatly. (The highest local share would be about 60 
percent instead of 98 percent were it not for one state with very low 
corporate income taxes on multistate firms, due to single-factor appor 
tionment with no throwback sales; this state has by far the lowest 
effective state tax rate, but high property taxes.) The highest combined 
state-local tax rate is generally about three times the lowest rate.
Differences across states are not reduced by tax incentives. One 
might expect that state and local tax incentives are larger in places with 
higher tax rates; that is, the incentives are compensating for high basic 
taxes. This does not appear to be the case; the variation in combined 
state-local effective tax rates is about the same with general (non-enter 
prise zone) tax incentives included as it is with no tax incentives. When 
enterprise zone incentives are added, the variation in tax rates actually 
increases. Enterprise zone incentives are not offsetting higher basic
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Table 4.6 Effective Tax Rates in a Representative City in Each State (as a 
Percentage of New Plant Income before Taxes)
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NOTE: Data refer to multistate firms only. The basic tax rate is the difference between the present 
value of new plant cash flow after all basic taxes and the present value of new plant cash flow in 
the absence of taxes levied by the state and city in which the new plant is located, divided by the 
present value of income attributable to the new plant before all federal, state, and local taxes. The 
state and local tax rate after non-enterprise zone tax incentives is the effective tax rate after invest 
ment and jobs tax credits available statewide and after local property tax abatements available 
city-wide. 
 "Coefficient of variation = standard deviation/mean.
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taxes on average. There are also wide differences in tax rates across 
firms, reflecting differences in profitability, the proportion of assets 
subject to the sales tax or property tax, and other factors.
Effective tax incentive rates can be calculated in a similar fashion by 
dividing the value of the incentive (that is, the present value of the 
increment in cash flow caused by the incentive) by income before 
taxes. Incentive rates could be interpreted as negative tax rates. Table 
4.7 shows the average and highest incentive rate among the 24 repre 
sentative cities and the variation in rates across cities.
Where the state provides enterprise zone tax credits, or allows cities 
to do so, we have given the representative city an enterprise zone. How 
ever, even though enterprise zones are fairly numerous in many states, it 
does not appear that a significant portion of job growth occurs inside 
enterprise zones in more than a few states. We computed annual average 
net employment growth between 1980 and 1990 for each of our 24 
states. From published data on jobs created in enterprise zones by state 
and the number of years such zones existed (U.S. Department of Hous 
ing and Urban Development 1992), we also calculated average annual 
jobs created inside enterprise zones. We were then able to calculate the 
ratio of jobs created in enterprise zones to total state job growth.
The results are suggestive but certainly not definitive. Data are miss 
ing from the HUD study for Indiana and North Carolina, and the accu 
racy of state-reported jobs data is quite doubtful. Illinois, for example, 
reports having produced about 29,000 jobs in enterprise zones per year 
over the first nine years of the program, while total state job growth has 
averaged about 10,000 per year. The two numbers can be reconciled 
only by assuming an average annual net loss of about 19,000 jobs from 
areas of Illinois outside enterprise zones, either to Illinois enterprise 
zones or to other states. Ohio claims that almost 14,000 jobs per year 
have been created in enterprise zones, or about 27 percent of the aver 
age annual job growth in 1980. Apart from Ohio and Illinois, enterprise 
zone jobs appear to account for 4 percent to 9 percent of annual job 
growth in six states: Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, New 
Jersey, and Texas. In the remaining 10 states with data, the percentage 
was about 2 percent or less, including 5 where it was under 0.5 percent. 
These figures compare gross job creation in zones with net job growth 
in the state; the significance of enterprise zones would appear even
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smaller if the numerator were net zone job creation or the denominator 
were gross state job creation.
Arguably, the typical city for a particular state should include an 
enterprise zone only if the majority of likely sites for industrial expan 
sion in that state are located within enterprise zones. This is unlikely to 
be the case in any state. For this reason, Table 4.7 includes a section 
showing tax incentive rates among the 24 cities with all enterprise zone 
incentives eliminated.
There is even wider variation in tax incentive rates, at the state and 
at the local level, than in basic tax rates. Once again, however, the vari 
ation across states is substantially reduced when one combines state 
and local incentives. States where local tax incentives are limited tend 
to offer larger state tax breaks, and vice versa. Interestingly, enterprise 
zone incentives considerably decrease the differences across states. 
The coefficient of variation for state/local tax incentives without enter 
prise zones is about 1.6; this is reduced to about 0.75 with the introduc 
tion of enterprise zone incentives. This suggests that enterprise zone 
incentives are largest in the states with the smallest general tax incen 
tives. Overall, state and local tax incentives represent a substantial por 
tion of the state/local tax burden, averaging abut 23 percent but 
reaching as high as 65 percent in some states for some firms.
NON-TAX INCENTIVE PROGRAMS AND THEIR VALUE 
TO THE FIRM
As we argued in Chapter 1, a common mistake made by both popu 
lar and academic analysts is to assume that the value of an incentive is 
the nominal amount of a subsidy award. This ignores the impact of 
taxes on non-tax awards and also has the effect of counting apples (a 
$1 million grant) with oranges (a $1 million loan). The two central 
aims of TAIM are to model different incentive awards appropriately 
and then to capture the effects of federal, state, and local taxes on the 
private benefits provided by non-tax subsidies.
The impact of taxes on non-tax incentives can be measured in a 
number of ways. The simplest is provided by running the TAIM model, 
but replacing actual state and local non-tax incentives with a standard
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Table 4.7 Effective Tax Incentive Rates in a Representative City in Each 
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Effective rate (%) Coefficient 
Tax incentive Mean Rate of variation


























NOTE: Data refers to multistate firms only. Tax incentive rate is the difference between 
the present value of new plant cash flow after taxes and incentives and the present value 
of new plant cash flow after basic taxes only, divided by the present value of before-tax 
income. In all cases, the minimum value is zero.
incentive scenario across all 112 locations. In this case, the standard 
incentive is a $100,000 grant with no important threshold limits for the 
16 firms under consideration. In effect, each investment is given 
$100,000 in cash. For multistate firms, the cash grant of $100,000 
improves 20-year cash flow by $61,318 on average; for single-location 
firms, the figure is $60,494. In the case of multistate firms the range 
around the mean is small ($1,896), but for single-location firms it is 
roughly 10 times that amount ($18,154). On the whole, multistate 
firms benefit by 60-62 cents per nominal award dollar, single-location 
firms by 58-73 cents. Where does the rest of each award dollar go? 
Indirectly, it is recaptured through federal, state, and local income 
taxes. One obvious result is that a state©s or city©s subsidy to a firm 
effectively transfers tax revenues to other taxing jurisdictions, includ 
ing possibly neighboring or competing states and cities. Thus, non-tax 
incentives produce the paradoxical result of subsidizing both private 
investment and other jurisdictions.
There is minor variation in the worth of incentives across sectors. To 
illustrate, the multistate small furniture and fixtures firm benefits by an 
average increment to returns of $61,407 ($61,106, single-location) 
with a range of $1,625 ($8,888, single-location). In the case of the 
large drugs firm, the benefit average is $61,290 ($60,866, single-loca-
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tion), the range $546 ($8,567, single-location). The relative size of the 
multistate range compared to the single-location firm range remains 
constant and large across sectors. The reason for this is that, under the 
single-location firm assumptions, states are better able to tax the pri 
vate benefits provided by grants, loans, and so on, because firms have 
all plant and employment in-state. Thus, differences among state tax 
regimes show up much more visibly.
Of course, states and cities vary not only in the way their tax 
regimes limit the benefits of non-tax incentives but also considerably in 
the menu of non-tax incentives they offer. Table 4.8 summarizes the 
non-tax state incentives modeled. It is important to emphasize again 
that all the states had many more non-tax incentives than those listed in 
the table. Table 4.8 covers only major programs that made awards to 
more than just a couple of firms in 1992.
Almost all states offer a general customized training incentive, and, 
of the two that do not, Massachusetts has a variety of other training 
plans, including customized programs (all of which were occupation- 
ally or sectorally too specific to meet our inclusion criteria), and South 
Carolina has noncustomized programs. In most cases, training is pro 
vided in the form of a grant or grant equivalent. In Michigan, however, 
the state makes interest payments on training loans. In both Iowa and 
Missouri, one training grant is actually a variety of a tax increment 
financing instrument. In most cases, infrastructure subsidies are pro 
vided not by state departments of economic development but through 
state departments of transportation. Usually subsidies are in the form 
of a grant, and most states offer such programs. Few states offer gen 
eral-use grants; mostly, general-use programs are loans, loan guaran 
tees, linked deposits, or related instruments.
Table 4.8 should not be read as providing an indication of a state©s 
overall development effort. First, the number of programs offered 
within a class of program says nothing of the state©s generosity to busi 
ness. Pennsylvania, as an example, has four quite distinct general-use 
programs, but even when combined they are still less generous than 
some single general-use programs. Second, Table 4.8 makes some 
states look much less generous than they actually are. This is particu 
larly true of Florida, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. In Florida, the 
state disburses funds to regional Community Development Corpora 
tions, which then award subsidies to clients. Since the state has limited
Table 4.8 State Non-Tax Incentive Programs That Were Simulated
General-use
General-use General-use loan Infrastructure Infrastructure Training Training 
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a. Including loan subsidies and linked deposits.
b. The Community Economic Betterment Account (CEBA) and Economic Development Set Aside (EDSA) are both loans convertible to grants.
c. One of these is a job-training tax increment financing instrument (TIP).
d. The Michigan Training Incentive Fund is a loan subsidy program.
e. The Texas capital program covers two related programs.
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control over these funds once they are disbursed, we count them as a 
local program, and they do not appear in Table 4.8. Much the same is 
true in Minnesota, where the state also awards funds to local agencies. 
Third, the terms and administration of programs—even with a single 
program class—vary enormously. Obviously, the benefits of loans and 
other debt instruments are crucially dependent on the rates, terms, and 
fees applied. Moreover, as we argued in Chapter 3, the administration 
of programs by state officials can seriously affect the worth of a sub 
sidy.
At the local level, almost all cities claimed that they would provide 
infrastructure help (including site development) if needed, but in the 
vast majority of cases, no separate infrastructure program had been 
established. Almost no cities offered dedicated, customized industrial 
training incentives. Loans were the most common formally established 
non-tax subsidy at the local level (slightly under a third had such pro 
grams), although a few cities offered grants, convertible loan/grants, 
and loan guarantees. Most often, local general-use programs were cap 
italized through CDBG funds. Numerous cities offered Small Business 
Administration (SBA) financing through local 503/504 investment 
companies; in fact, many displayed such financing prominently in their 
economic development literature. As we indicated earlier, these pro 
grams were not included in our analysis. Although a number of cities 
offered some form of tax increment financing subsidy, in the majority 
of cases these instruments were either reserved for retail development 
or were less generous than the local property tax abatement subsidy. As 
a result, TAIM simulates tax increment financing awards for only 10 
cities in our sample.
Which are more significant, tax incentives or non-tax incentives? For 
all 16 firms modeled, state non-tax incentives are vastly more important 
than state tax incentives. In the most extreme case—the small multistate 
furniture and fixtures firm—97 percent of the entire incentive package 
derives from non-tax incentives. Of the 16 firms modeled, the largest 
contribution of state tax incentives to the entire state incentive package 
is only 18 percent (see the first two columns of Table 4.9). Proportion 
ately, small plants benefit more from state non-tax incentives than do 
large plants. Nevertheless, the limited contribution of state tax incen 
tives to the entire state incentive package is quite startling. This is par 
ticularly so if the state proportions are compared to those of the
Table 4.9 Composition of Incentives (Mean Increment to Cash Flow, %)
All state incentives All state and city incentives All state non-tax incentives
Firm
Small, furniture and fixtures






































































































































NOTE: Numbers in table do not always sum to 100% due to rounding.
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combined state and local incentive package (third and fourth columns 
of Table 4.9), where tax incentives play a much more important role. 
Indeed, for some firms (large drug firms, small instruments firms), 
three-quarters of the entire state/local incentive package derives from 
tax incentives. Of the four cases where the contribution of tax incen 
tives to the entire package is little (a third or less), three involve plants 
that are themselves mostly of very limited size— small furniture and 
fixtures with only 67 employees, small plastics with 53, and small 
industrial machinery with 84. The generosity of local property tax 
abatements, the availability of certain targeted state tax incentives, and 
the absence of large locally funded grant and loan programs accounts 
for the importance of tax incentives at the local level.
At the state level, TAIM is able to distinguish the effects of the three 
classes of non-tax incentives: infrastructure, training, and general-use. 
As one would expect, infrastructure incentives are more important for 
bigger plants, and such incentives never account for more than a third 
of the entire non-tax state and local package. Training incentives are 
much more important than infrastructure incentives; in the majority of 
cases they are the most significant class of non-tax incentives. They 
range from 27 percent of the entire non-tax package, in the case of 
small plastics plants, to 49 percent in the case of large auto plants. 
Mostly, for bigger plants (defined by employment size), training incen 
tives are the leading non-tax incentive. For smaller plants (again 
defined by employment size), general-use incentives are more signifi 
cant. The relative size of the three classes of non-tax incentives is a 
function of the operating ratios associated with the investment in ques 
tion.
THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF TAXES AND INCENTIVES
Are tax and incentive differences substantively important? Are dif 
ferences in taxes and incentives among sites large enough to influence 
business investment and location decisions? As we indicated in the 
introduction, we will not present any econometric or survey evidence 
on this issue. We focus on the direct size of tax and incentive differen 
tials across space. Our approach ignores spatial differentials in other
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factor costs, such as labor, energy, and transportation to markets. More 
over, it ignores spatial differentials in the benefits firms receive from 
state and local government, in other words, differences in what firms 
receive from paying taxes. 6 Table 4.10 provides data on the mean 
return after taxes and all incentives across sites (the average increment 
to cash flow after the firm makes the new investment) and the range of 
returns. All of the data in this table refer to multistate firms. 7 The coef 
ficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) pro 
vides some sense of the dispersion around that mean. That dispersion is 
considerable in a few cases: the small furniture and fixtures plants, the 
small industrial machinery plants, and the large auto/auto parts plant. 
Here, the range of returns is considerably larger than the mean return. 
In the case of the small industrial machinery plants, the mean return is 
$356,586, but the range is over $1.2 million. In these situations it is 
quite possible that taxes and incentives may have a decisive impact on 
investment and location decisions. There are also cases with small 
coefficients of variation and relatively small ranges of returns com 
pared with means: the small and large drug plants, the small and large 
soap plants, the large plastics plant, and the large instruments plant. 
The major reasons for these differences across sectors (and to a lesser 
extent, across firm sizes) are straightforward: 1) varying effective tax 
rates due to, among other things, varying profitability across sectors 
(and sizes) and 2) varying eligibility for tax and non-tax incentives due 
to varying factor mixes and amounts across sectors (and sizes).
Are the differences among returns across the 112 cities in the analy 
sis important? Consider the small furniture and fixtures firm. The mean 
increment to cash flow generated by the new plant investment is actu 
ally negative. However, if the firm decides to invest at one of the best 
standing offer sites, then returns become positive. In the instance of the 
large drug plant, the range is a relatively small fraction of the mean 
return. Nevertheless, the difference in returns between the best and 
worst site is a very significant $58 million on an initial investment of 
$470 million. As far as improvements to the firm's internal rate of 
return, a movement from the worst site to the best site rate represents 
an increase of 5.3 percentage points. 8
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Table 4.10 Project Returns after All Taxes and Incentives for 16 
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NOTE: "Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of range" assumes that each employee in the 
plant works a 40-hour week over a 50-week year, for a 20-year period. The numbers reported are 
the present value equivalents (discounted using the firm-specific discount rates) of the ranges.
In order to make greater intuitive sense of these data, the last column 
of Table 4.10 presents the hourly wage rate equivalent of the range. 
This is calculated by dividing the range by the number of employees at 
the new plant, then taking the annual present value of this number. 9 
Dividing by 2,000—that is, assuming a 40-hour work week over a 50-
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week year—gives the wage equivalent of the range. It measures the 
range in terms of equivalent savings in wages. In the case of the small 
furniture and fixtures plant, the saving is worth 72 cents per hour. In 
other words, the difference between the best and worst sites is equiva 
lent to paying all employees 72 cents an hour less, for each hour 
worked over the 20-year life span of the plant. In most instances, the 
wage equivalent data are in the 60 to 80 cents an hour range. Two cases 
are lower than this and four—small and large drug firms, small soap 
firms, and large plastics firms—higher. We now focus on these four 
plants that have greater spatial differentials.
Figure 4.1 plots project returns after all taxes and incentives for mul- 
tistate small drug firms in the 112 city locations. For most cities, a rank 
position change of a few places makes little substantive difference. The 
cities at the 50th and 51st best locations, for instance, are separated in 
hourly wage equivalent amounts by much less than a penny. In such 
cases, it seems highly unlikely that taxes and incentives are large 
enough to overcome spatial differentials in factor costs such as labor, 
energy, or transportation to markets. The exceptions to this are at the 
extreme ends of the plot. Here, a rank order change of one place some 
times makes a large difference, although seldom by more than 25 cents 
in hourly wage equivalent terms. Figures 4.2 through 4.4 provide simi 
lar plots for large drug, small soap, and large plastics manufacturing 
firms. A pattern similar to that found with small drug firms is discern 
ible. Overall, the difference between the best and worst sites is substan 
tial, but, except at the extremes, small rank position changes do not 
appear to matter much. Although the plots are not shown here, the 
same is true of the other 12 firm types simulated.
This raises a much broader issue: To what extent do taxes and other 
incentives increase (or decrease) a city's overall locational competi 
tiveness? Figures 4.5 through 4.8 plot returns at the top 20 locations 
with standing offers. Returns after basic taxes, after basic taxes and tax 
incentives, and after basic taxes and all incentives are graphed. In the 
case of the small drug plant, both tax and non-tax incentives do alter 
substantially the competitive position of cites. The most competitive 
city (listed as no. 1 in Figure 4.5) has a reasonably competitive basic 
state and local tax position, roughly similar to that of cities 5, 6 and 7 
in the figure. Tax incentives improve no. 1's competitiveness, but not as 
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Figure 4.5 Small Multistate Drug Firms Investing in a $50 Million Plant, Project Returns after Taxes and All 
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Figure 4.6 Large Multistate Drug Firms Investing in a $470 Million Plant, Project Returns after Taxes and AH 
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Figure 4.7 Small Multistate Soap Firms Investing in a $20 Million Plant, Project Returns after Taxes and All 
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ever, no. 5, 6, and 7 provide relatively meager non-tax incentives com 
pared to no. 1. Thus, it is the particular combination of basic tax 
structure and of tax and other incentives that gives city no. 1 its special 
locational competitiveness.
Large plants benefit from non-tax incentives to a much lesser extent 
than do small plants. The reason for this is that most non-tax incentives 
have strict threshold limits (such as a maximum loan size of $0.5 mil 
lion); large businesses come up against these limits much more swiftly 
than small businesses. This is clear in Figure 4.6, the plot for large drug 
firms. While tax incentives clearly improve returns, non-tax incentives 
seldom raise significantly the competitiveness of a city. For small soap 
plants (Figure 4.7), non-tax incentives are important. Both tax and non 
tax incentives do enhance the competitiveness of the top 20 cities. For 
large plastics plants, the situation is more complex. Although the firm 
is categorized as large, non-tax incentives are nevertheless important; 
this is because compared to the large drug plant, the large plastics plant 
is quite small. The new large plastics plant employs 572 workers ver 
sus the drug plant's 2,056. Thus, the "large" plastics plant is really a 
medium-sized firm, and this explains the relative importance of non 
tax incentives to it. On the whole, the results for the other 12 firm types 
(again not presented here) confirm this analysis. Small- and medium- 
sized plants (defined in terms of their absolute size) benefit in terms of 
rank position competitiveness from both tax and non-tax incentives. 
Larger firms benefit more from tax incentives.
A comparison with the least competitive locations is instructive. 
Figure 4.9 plots returns after taxes, tax incentives, and other incentives 
for small soap firms. On the whole, the worst locations have a poor tax 
structure and also provide poor incentives. There are a few exceptions 
to this: in this figure, cities 3, 5, 12, 13, and 17. The exceptions tend to 
provide reasonable tax incentives but not much in the way of non-tax 
incentives. Although we do not present the data here, this pattern tends 
to be generally true for all 16 firm types simulated.
We now examine more closely the impact of incentives on the com 
petitiveness of locations. The focus is again on those sectors that show 
greater spatial variation in project returns: small and large drug, small 
soap, and large plastics firms. With the four plants, the range between 
the best and worst city increases after tax incentives have been added to 
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tax incentives. This is also true for 10 of the other 12 firm types (large 
soap and small plastics firms are the two exceptions). In other words, 
the provision of state and city incentives does not, as some have 
claimed, tend to make up for poor basic tax structure of a state and 
city. 10 Rather, overall incentives actually accentuate rather than amelio 
rate the spatial differentials in returns due to basic state and city tax 
regimes. Incentives increase the differences in project returns between 
the best and worst locations.
However, it is not true that states and cities with poor tax structures 
generally offer poor incentives and that states and cities with good 
basic structures offer good incentives. In order to better understand the 
relationship between taxes, tax incentives, and discretionary incen 
tives, we ran regressions for each industrial sector and firm size (that is, 
for the 16 hypothetical firms). The increment in income due to non-tax 
incentives was the dependent variable; income after taxes and the 
increment in income due to tax incentives were the two independent 
variables. The regressions tested for any linear relationship between 
taxes, tax incentives, and non-tax incentives. In all instances, regres 
sion R values were well below 10 percent, and most often close to 1 
percent. F- and /-scores were almost never significant. These results 
suggest no linear relationship between the three elements of the local 
tax and incentive regime. So, while at the extremes (comparing cities at 
the top and bottom of the range) incentives do tend to magnify the 
competitiveness of local tax systems (as the discussion in the last para 
graph illustrated), overall, the relationship between the generosity of 
incentives offered and the generosity of the basic tax system appears to 
be quite random. Certainly—and this does support the conclusion of 
the previous paragraph—there is no evidence that non-tax incentives 
tend to neutralize high state and local taxes.
The mean (over the 24 states and 112 cities) tax-incentive-derived 
improvement to project returns for the small drug firm is just under 
$0.5 million; the non-tax-incentive-derived increment is nearly $0.6 
million (Table 4.11). Thus, tax incentives have an hourly wage equiva 
lence of 9 cents (meaning the plant could absorb higher wages to the 
extent of 9 cents an hour for all employees over the 20-year period). 
Non-tax incentives are on average worth 11 cents an hour per worker. 
The difference in project returns between the best and worst tax incen 
tive package across the 112 cities amounts to just over $3 million, as
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does the difference between the best and worst non-tax incentive pack 
age. This is equivalent to paying workers 55 cents an hour less due to 
tax incentives and 57 cents an hour less due to non-tax incentives.
In the case of the large drug plant (Table 4.12), on average tax incen 
tives increase returns by $4.4 million, non-tax incentives by only $1.5 
million. All incentives together are worth an hourly wage equivalent of 
19 cents. For small soap plants (Table 4.13), non-tax incentives are 
more important than tax incentives, all incentives together adding 
about $0.56 million to returns for the average city. For large plastics 
firms (Table 4.14), tax incentives are only slightly more important than 
non-tax incentives. Together, these add about $1.4 million to returns in 
the average city. Most startling is how consistent the hourly wage 
equivalents are across these four firm types. The average total incentive 
package amounts to an equivalent of 20 cents an hour decline in wages 
for the small drug firms, 19 cents for the large drug firms, 22 cents for 
the small soap firms, and 14 cents for the large plastics firms. For all 16 
firms, the smallest average incentive is worth the equivalent of 9 cents 
an hour (for large industrial machinery firms), and the largest 24 cents 
an hour (for small plastics and small industrial machinery firms).
In summary, spatial differentials across the American economy due 
to basic taxes are large, but so are differentials due to tax and non-tax 
incentives. Whether these differentials are large enough to really matter 
depends, of course, on whether differentials in other factor costs are 
greater, and also on the quantity and quality of goods and services pro 
duced by state and local government. Not all firms experience the 
incentive system equally. In general, larger firms gain less from non 
tax incentives and more from tax incentives, whereas for small- and 
medium-sized firms, non-tax incentives are often of greater signifi 
cance. The relationship between the burdensomeness of the basic tax 
regime and the generosity of tax and non-tax incentives is random, 
except that, at the extremes, incentives tend to exaggerate differentials 
in the basic tax structure of states and cities. States and cities with very 
good basic tax structures tend also to offer very generous incentives. 
Certainly, there is no evidence to suggest that incentives nullify differ 
ences in basic tax loads.
Why don't incentives narrow the gap between the best states and the 
worst states in relation to returns on investment? Why don't high-tax 
places use large incentives to offset those high taxes, and low-tax
158
Table 4.11 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns for 
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places forego incentives because they are unnecessary? After all, the 
rationale for enacting incentives is usually couched in terms of the 
need to "remain competitive." One plausible hypothesis is that the 
competition for jobs is focused primarily on visible and explicit incen 
tive programs and not on overall after-tax returns. States and cities 
probably do not have good knowledge of the effective tax rates on var 
ious kinds of firms to begin with, and, from descriptions of the battles 
for particular firms, it does appear that states are trying to match other 
states' incentive packages, not after-tax returns. The same approach 
may well apply to the enactment of ongoing incentive programs, where 
one state feels compelled to offer a loan program because its competi 
tor states have one. In that case, a high-tax state and a low-tax state 
would be expected to be equally likely to enact, for example, a $2,000 
per job tax credit, and in so doing to believe that they are simply 
matching each others' bids. The result of this process, repeated many 
times in many states, would be a pattern of incentive offers that bears 
no relation to basic tax burdens and that leaves the substantial variation 
among states in after-tax returns little changed.
The importance of incentives in defining the generosity of local tax 
and incentive regimes is contrary to other established results in the 
hypothetical firm literature. In particular, in recent work using the 
AFTAX model, J. Papke (1995, p. 1710) concludes that "the differen 
tial cost imposed by these diverse [tax and tax incentive] systems is 
surprisingly small." Why should the two hypothetical firm models pro 
duce such different answers? The crude answer is that the two models 
(TAIM and AFTAX) operate in different ways, and, in some regards, 
make different assumptions about firm behavior. The crux of the 
detailed answer is that the multistate version of the AFTAX model sim 
ulates two states (or two locations) at a time, as it is mainly concerned 
with cross-border competition, and that it imposes some restrictive 
assumptions regarding the destination of sales (10 percent of sales are 
destined for the home state) and headquarters location. TAIM distrib 
utes sales across the United States in accordance with population size, 
simultaneously taxing across multiple states (in fact, all of the states in 
the model) and cities, and allows headquarters location both within and 
outside the states under consideration. In fact, Papke's work suggests 
that loosening the AFTAX assumptions results in greater differentials 
among competing locations. Indeed, even the cross-border simulations
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of AFTAX indicate much greater spatial differentials than the single- 
state (home-state expansion) simulations of the model.
We argued earlier that there is reason to believe that the state is more 
important than the locality in defining a site's tax and tax incentive 
regime. On average, firms pay a little more in state income and sales 
taxes than they do in local taxes. Moreover, the states play a key role in 
setting the parameters of local taxation and in providing or limiting the 
use of tax incentives. The same argument may be applied to non-tax 
incentives; usually, the states define what incentives should be allowed 
at the local level and how these should be provided. Moreover, most 
non-tax programs are provided through state, not local, government. 
What limited evidence we have suggests that, with the important 
exception of tax increment financing subsidies, the vast majority of 
non-tax incentive program spending is also done by state rather than 
local government. Here we return to a question brought up earlier in 
this chapter, but we now raise it in the context of returns on investment 
after all incentives: Is variation in returns among cities within a state 
more significant than variation across states?
Despite the importance of states in local financing policy, there 
remains substantial variation across cities within many of the states in 
our study. If the 112 cities are ranked from lowest to highest by the 
project returns after all state and local taxes and incentives, then, in 
many states, the cities are generally spread across the rankings. At the 
other extreme, in a few states, the cities are fairly tightly clustered in 
the rankings. In some states, the particular locality matters a great deal 
more than in other states. In many cases, it is the presence of an enter 
prise zone that sets one or more cities well apart from others in the 
same state. This is true in Georgia, Ohio, California (where the cities 
are grouped in two tight clusters, one containing cities without enter 
prise zones, the other with), and to an extent in Pennsylvania.
We used a simple one-way analysis of variance to explore the varia 
tion of cities across and within states. States with only one city in our 
sample (there were three of these) were excluded from the analysis. 
For each of the 16 multistate hypothetical firms, project returns at the 
109 city locations were the dependent variable, and the state in which 
the city is located was the grouping factor. In all cases, F-scores were 
significant at the 0.0005 probability level. In the main, then, states are 
an important determinant of city rankings.
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Before proceeding any further, it is crucial to point out that, while 
many of the following figures and maps identify directly the perfor 
mance of individual states (and indirectly individual cities), the results 
are for single hypothetical firms only. Best and worst cities (and states) 
vary greatly by the hypothetical firm under consideration. As an illus 
tration, for small drug firms, cities in New Jersey do not look competi 
tive; however, for many other sectors modeled, some cities in New 
Jersey perform very well. Thus, the data should not be interpreted as 
providing a measure of the overall relative competitiveness of a state or 
city.
Still, it is important not to minimize the level of variation within 
states. Map 4.1 plots the 20 best and 20 worst city returns, after all 
taxes and all incentives, for the small drug firm. A few states—Illinois, 
Iowa, Missouri, New York, and Florida—have a number of cities in the 
best 20 and none in the worst 20. Indiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Michigan, and Texas have more than one city in the worst 20 and none 
in the best. Some states manage to have cities in both the top and bot 
tom 20: California, Georgia, and Ohio. Figure 4.10, which plots returns 
for the best and worst city in each of the 24 states for the small multi- 
state drug firm, illustrates the wide variability in returns within some 
individual states, particularly Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wis 
consin. Other states are relatively tightly packed, in this case Illinois, 
New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington (these are states with a number 
of cities in our sample). Figure 4.11 plots similar information, but for 
all the cities in a state, not just best and worst; Figure 4.11 gives some 
sense of the distribution, and thus clustering, of returns within states. 
Three elements are clearly visible:
• Many states are clustered into one group (for instance, New Jer 
sey and Washington) or two (for instance, California, Pennsylva 
nia, Virginia, and possibly Michigan).
• A few states show no signs of clustering (such as Georgia, Texas, 
and Wisconsin). It is possible that the lack of any visible evidence 
of clustering is a function of the small number of cities modeled 
in some of these states (although this argument does not seem to 
apply to Texas).
• Putting the clustering issue aside, there tends to be a tremendous 
range in returns within individual states.
Map 4.1 Best and Worst Locations for Small Multistate Drug Firms
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Similar plots for the three other firms under consideration are provided 
in Appendix D. They confirm these three points.
This raises a still more general question: which are the best and 
worst locations for the small drug firm modeled? The best locations are 
scattered quite widely across the nation. Moreover, there is little geo 
graphic coherence to our results. Parts of the Midwest are clearly good 
for small drug firms, but other parts are clearly not. Similarly, bits of 
the Sunbelt (California, Georgia, Florida) are good for small drug 
firms, but other spots are quite bad (Texas). In order to develop a better 
sense of the regional coherence of project returns for small drug firms, 
complete results (for 112 cities in 24 states) are presented in Map 4.2. 
Here, project returns are plotted as contour relief using a triangulated 
irregular network (TIN) digital elevation model (DEM). Essentially, 
TIN structures are based on triangular elements with vertices at sample 
elevations and are derived through a form of interpolation that assumes 
the surface between three points to be a plane. In Map 4.2, vertices are 
returns at each of the 112 sites. The map has some rather obvious limi 
tations. There are only 112 vertices, with none, for example, between 
western Iowa and eastern California. Nevertheless, the map provides a 
sense of regional bunching not seen in Map 4.1. In particular, a highest 
peak region in an area around parts of Iowa and Missouri is visible, and 
a lowest trough region centered on the eastern Midwest is also clear. 
Otherwise—and this is the important point—no clear regional pattern 
of elevation contours emerges: the nation does not neatly divide itself 
into broad sections generally good for or bad for small drug firms. This 
same lack of regional patterning is apparent in similar TIN plots for the 
other 15 firms modeled.
Some dramatic changes are visible if Map 4.1 is compared to equiv 
alent maps for the other sectors (see Maps 4.3-4.5). California changes 
from being a highly competitive state for small drug firms (Map 4.1) to 
an uncompetitive one for large drug firms (Map 4.3); Florida moves 
from being a competitive state for small drug firms to a middling state 
for large drug firms; and the competitiveness of the western Midwest 
improves substantially from small to large drug firms.
Compare small drug firms (Map 4.1) to small soap firms (Map 4.4). 
Pennsylvania moves from being a state with a couple of cities in the 
bottom 20 (small drug firms, Map 4.1) to a state with none in the bot 
tom 20 and three in the top 20 (small soap firms, Map 4.4), and Wash-
Map 4.2 Small Multistate Drug Firms, TIN Digital Elevation Model of Project Returns
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ington shifts from being a state with no cities in the top or bottom 20 
(Map 4.1), to a state with three cities in the bottom 20 (Map 4.4). Com 
paring large drug to large plastics firms, California changes from being 
a highly uncompetitive state (large drug firms, Map 4.3) to a state with 
no cities in the bottom 20 (large plastics firms, Map 4.5); Pennsylvania 
moves from being highly uncompetitive, with a number of cities in the 
bottom 20 (Map 4.3) to a highly competitive state with a number of cit 
ies in the top 20 (Map 4.5).
In summary, some cities and states do consistently well, and some 
consistently poorly, but mostly there is a large degree of variation 
across sectors. Moreover, no obvious regional pattern of results is dis 
cernible, even within a single sector. This conclusion provides no sup 
port to those who have argued that states are involved in spiraling 
intraregional wars over new investment. If individual states were copy 
ing the incentives offered by their neighbors and making their overall 
tax burdens no greater than that of neighboring states, one would 
expect to see a regional pattern of standing offers. Furthermore, the 
variation in spatial results across sectors suggests that whether policy 
makers in states and cities have thought about it or not, they operate a 
de facto industrial policy, favoring some sorts of manufacturing invest 
ment and disfavoring others.
CONCLUSIONS
There are very wide differences in returns on investment after basic 
taxes among states and cities. These differences tend to be exaggerated 
if state taxes are considered alone because states with high state 
income and sales taxes have tended to have lower local property and 
sales taxes. The highest tax state placed a tax burden on manufacturers 
that was typically about three times as large as that of the lowest tax 
state. Eight states offered investment or jobs tax credits to firms any 
where in the state; in 14 of the 24 states, local property tax abatements 
are offered. These incentive packages ranged from zero to as high as 40 
percent to 45 percent of the before-incentive state and local tax burden. 
Tax incentives generally did not reduce the variation across states; 
large investment or jobs credits, for example, were not used primarily
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to offset high basic taxes. While enterprise zone incentives tended to be 
larger in states that offered less in the way of general incentives, the 
effect of enterprise zones was to increase the variation in after-tax 
returns across states, not to compensate for high basic taxes.
The discretionary incentives included infrastructure subsidies and 
customized job training at the state level, and general purpose grants, 
loans, and loan guarantees at both the state and local levels. Averaged 
over the 16 firm types and 112 cities in 24 states, the mean package of 
discretionary incentives, expressed in terms of present value wage 
equivalence, was worth about 9 cents an hour per employee. By com 
parison, tax incentives had a wage equivalence of 7 cents an hour. Non 
tax incentives were a major part of a state's entire incentive package (in 
fact, in some cases over 90 percent of state incentives derived from 
non-tax programs), but when local incentives were combined with state 
ones, the role of discretionary non-tax incentives within the overall 
package of incentives declined markedly. The reasons for this include 
the provision of very generous tax incentives—such as the property tax 
abatement—at the local level, the availability of certain state tax incen 
tives at the local level only, and the dearth of many large local non-tax 
incentive programs.
For the handful of cities/states at the top or at the bottom of the 
rankings for any particular firm type, there were quite substantial diver 
gences in returns between one city/state and the next due to tax and 
incentive differences. However, the inclusion of non-tax incentives 
very often did little to change the majority of cities in the top or bottom 
10. Mostly, cities that were highly competitive after taxes and tax 
incentives were also highly competitive after the inclusion of non-tax 
incentives. Overall, non-tax incentives did not ameliorate, but actually 
accentuated, the tax differentials between the best and worst cities.
Our research has not looked at spatial differentials in other factor 
costs (such as labor, energy, and transportation) or at the benefits firms 
receive from taxes, so we are not able to say whether a state's and 
city's tax and incentive regime could reasonably be expected to alter a 
firm's location decisions. However, our results suggest that, for the 
firm types simulated by TAIM, the range of results across all 112 cities 
(and 24 states) is not trivial. It is of course quite possible that factor 
cost differentials—in labor, energy, and transportation—could amount 
to much more than tax and incentive differentials. It is possible that
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labor costs in a bottom-ranked city may be much lower than in a top- 
ranked city. However, if tax and incentive regimes were designed to 
make up for locally high labor costs (or other factor costs), it would be 
logical to suppose that states in the South would tend to have burden 
some tax and incentive regimes, while California and states in the 
Northeast and Midwest would tend to have much lighter loads. As the 
maps in this chapter show, no regional pattern of taxes and incentives is 
discernible. Spatial variation in the tax and incentive burden looks to 
be quite random. Given that the severity of local tax and incentive 
regimes does not appear to bear an inverse relationship to factor costs, 
it seems reasonable to assume that in some cases tax and incentive dif 
ferentials between top- and bottom-ranked locations could sway plant 
location decisions.
NOTES
1. Texas is sometimes referred to as a no-income-tax state, but in fact the Texas franchise tax 
is based in part on federal taxable income and so is rightly classified as an income tax.
2. Iowa, however, exempts computing equipment.
3. Manufacturing corporations filing income taxes in the state of Wisconsin are required to 
report total sales tax paid on fuel and electricity, and the portion of the tax that applies to fuel and 
electricity used directly in manufacturing. They then receive a credit for the latter portion of the 
tax. According to the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, the average manufacturer reports that 
about 82% of fuel and electricity purchases are used directly in manufacturing. We impute this 
same percentage to the fuel and electricity purchases of the 16 firms in our model.
4. Without sales throwback, corporations selling in states where they have no tax nexus 
would be taxed on less than 100% of their income, since a portion of their total U.S. income 
would not be apportioned to any state for tax purposes. If all or most states applied the throwback 
rule, on the other hand, the corporation could pay state taxes on more than 100% of its income, 
since the sales to non-taxing states would become part of the numerator in the sales factor of 
every state in which the firm is taxed so that the sum of the sales factors in the various states 
would exceed 100%.
5. This hypothetical state had the same population as the state in question; this was necessary 
because population affects the apportionment of income to the median state, which in turn affects 
the firm's taxes paid to the median state.
6. Oakland and Testa (1996) have argued that it is crucial to measure not only the size of the 
tax burden, but also the benefits firms derive from the state and local goods and services paid for 
by business taxes. We agree; unfortunately the modeling of tax benefits is still in its infancy.
7. Our interpretation of the data for single-location firms is not much different to that of mul- 
tistate firms.
8. From 29.3% in Washington, Pennsylvania to 34.6 in Des Moines, Iowa, for the multistate 
simulation of firm #4 (large drugs) at level 6 (including all taxes and incentives).
9. Present value is calculated using firm-specific discount rates.
10. Eisinger (1988) argues that tax incentives often ameliorate burdensome basic taxes.

5 The Effects of Taxes and
Incentives on the Spatial 
Distribution of Investment Returns
A central question posed at the beginning of this book was the fol 
lowing: Are taxes lower, or incentives higher, in places with higher 
rates of unemployment? Previous work in this area has focused only on 
the incentive part of the question; further, the methods have been 
flawed and the results somewhat contradictory. We have shown that a 
proper analysis must include state and local tax systems as well as eco 
nomic development programs for a variety of reasons: because incen 
tives must be measured net of their state and federal income tax effects, 
because larger incentives in some places may simply be offsetting 
higher taxes, and because many exemptions and rules incorporated into 
the tax code could themselves be viewed as incentives. We have also 
made the case that the hypothetical firm approach provides a superior 
method for measuring the magnitude of tax differences and financial 
incentive programs.
The previous chapter established that incentives can be quite large 
relative to tax burdens and that differences in taxes and incentives 
across states and cities are substantial. While we do not test a causal 
model in this study, the magnitude of differences in returns on invest 
ment, before and after taxes and incentives, appears to be sufficient to 
make a difference in business location decisions at the margin. The 
question to be addressed in this chapter is a spatial one: How do taxes 
and incentives alter the geographic pattern of returns on investment in 
new manufacturing facilities? In particular, are the places that generate 
the highest rates of return the locations that have experienced the high 
est rates of unemployment and poverty or the lowest rates of job 
growth? In other words, is the spatial pattern of returns such as to draw 
investment towards the places where new jobs are most needed?
There are three ways in which the pattern of taxes and incentives 
could come to favor higher unemployment locations:
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• States with higher average levels of unemployment may offer 
lower taxes or larger state-funded incentives, on a statewide basis, 
than do states with lower unemployment.
• Localities (cities and counties) with higher levels of unemploy 
ment may offer lower taxes or larger local incentives, such as 
property tax abatements or locally operated loan funds, than do 
cities with lower unemployment.
• States may target incentives at high-unemployment places, 
through enterprise zone programs and the like, so that state- 
funded incentives are larger in higher-unemployment cities.
We will examine how taxes and incentives—statewide, local, and 
targeted—affect the spatial pattern of returns on investment. We con 
sider the spatial effects at two geographic scales: among the 24 states 
and among the 112 cities. At the state level, the role of local and tar 
geted incentives can be examined only by developing an "average 
locality" for each state, and each state is given equal weight in the cor 
relation analyses. At the city level of analysis, each city is given equal 
weight, and the contribution of a particular state's taxes and incentives 
to overall correlation coefficients is governed by the number of cities 
from that state that ended up in our sample. More populous states such 
as California, Texas, and Florida have greater influence on the relation 
ships calculated, as arguably they should.
THE PATTERN OF RETURNS AMONG STATES
To isolate the effects of state taxes and incentives, we first computed 
returns on investment in each of the 24 states as if there were no local 
tax system. We measured separately the effects of the basic state tax 
system and of four kinds of state incentive programs. Basic state taxes 
include all features of income and net worth taxes except investment 
and jobs tax credits, plus state property taxes (if any) and state sales 
taxes on manufacturing machinery and fuel and electricity. The value 
of state tax incentives (investment and jobs tax credits) is defined as net 
project returns after basic state taxes and tax incentives, less net returns 
after basic taxes only. Non-tax incentives are grouped into three cate-
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gories: 1) infrastructure subsidies, 2) job training and wage subsidies, 
and 3) general purpose grants, loans, and loan guarantees. Each of 
these three types of incentives was evaluated separately by comparing 
returns after taxes and tax incentives (taking tax incentive programs as 
entitlements) with returns after taxes, tax incentives, and the non-tax 
incentives of interest. The increment in returns provided the worth of 
the incentive to the firm.
The 16 firms modeled represent large and small firms in 8 indus 
tries. Each firm was further modeled as a multistate firm initially 
located in the median state and as a single-location firm with all of its 
operations (including the new plant) within the sample state. We 
present results for 5 of the 16 firms, selected to display the range of 
variation in project returns and the range of new plant sizes. 1 Table 5.1 
shows how returns and incentives for these five firms correlated with 
the state average unemployment rate in 1992. We also show the simple 
average of the correlation rates for all 16 firms.
Returns after basic state taxes were strongly negatively correlated 
with the state unemployment rate: the higher the unemployment rate, 
the lower were returns on new investment in that state. State tax sys 
tems, in other words, are "perverse" in their effects, tending to attract 
jobs to the states that need them the least. State tax incentives, on the 
other hand, were positively correlated with unemployment, but the cor 
relations were quite weak, ranging from 0.06 to 0.14 for multistate 
firms, 0.05 to 0.23 for single-location firms. Project returns after state 
taxes and tax incentives remained negatively correlated with unem 
ployment. These patterns held true for both location assumptions, 
although the negative correlations were stronger for the multistate 
firms.
The value of non-tax incentives is highly dependent on firm charac 
teristics; in part, this is due to program eligibility standards and ceil 
ings related to firm or plant size. As a result, there is more variability 
in the unemployment correlations. Overall, non-tax incentives, for 
both single-location and multistate firms, bear only a weak relation to 
unemployment rates, although if anything they are lower in higher- 
unemployment states. However, for job training subsidies and general 
loans and grants, the results differ dramatically by plant size. For the 
six smallest plant sizes, with assets of $5 million to $20 million, these 
kinds of subsidies were very weakly but positively correlated with
Table 5.1 Correlation between State Average 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Return on New Plant 
Investment in Each State (State Taxes and Incentives Only)3
Net project returns
Firm 
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a. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. Basic taxes include state corporate income and net worth taxes, state sales taxes on machinery anc 
equipment and on fuel and utilities, and state property taxes. Tax incentives consist of state income or net worth tax investment and jobs credits. The value 
of tax incentives is measured by the net project returns after taxes and tax incentives, less project returns after basic taxes only. The value of other incen 
tives is measured by the net project returns after taxes, tax incentives, and the other incentives, minus net project returns after taxes and tax incentives only 
The six smallest firms are numbers 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 15, with new plant assets of $5 million to $20 million. The seven largest firms are numbers 4, 6, 10 
12, 13, 14, and 16, with new plant assets of $110 million to $600 million.
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unemployment. For the largest seven plants, on the other hand, with 
assets of $110 million to $600 million, the correlation between unem 
ployment and job subsidies was quite negative, ranging from -0.41 to
-0.50, and the correlation between unemployment and general loans 
and grants ranged from -0.18 to -0.30. (These correlation figures 
include single-location and multistate firms.) The job training and gen 
eral programs in high-unemployment states apparently are targeted at 
small firms or have low ceilings on the grant or loan amounts, 
enabling those states to compete successfully (with low-unemploy 
ment states) for small firms but not for large firms.
The end result, considering net project returns after taking all state 
tax and other incentives into account, is that returns remain negatively 
correlated with unemployment, statewide incentives offsetting only 
slightly the perverse effects of state tax systems. To the extent that the 
classification of some features of the tax system as "basic" rather than 
as development incentives was arbitrary, the more important conclu 
sion is probably not that certain incentives exhibited a slight tendency 
to redistribute jobs to high-unemployment states: it is rather that the 
state income and sales tax systems as a whole, including all incentives 
whether explicit or not, had the opposite effect. This perverse effect is 
much stronger for multistate firms, which are probably the more rele 
vant for purposes of evaluating economic development competition 
among the states. For 12 of the 16 multistate firms, the correlation was
-0.36 or stronger. Overall, it appears that, at the state level at least, 
decades of interstate competition have not produced a pattern of 
returns on investment that could plausibly contribute to a redistribution 
of jobs to states in most need, but rather the opposite.
It is possible that these results are sensitive to our choice of year for 
determining the state unemployment rate. We chose 1992 for obvious 
reasons: the project returns calculated by the model reflect tax law and 
incentive programs as of 1992, and we wished to test the hypothesis 
that the pattern of returns in that year favored states that had higher 
unemployment at that time. Nonetheless, it is worth testing an alterna 
tive measure of unemployment; 1992, after all, was a recession year 
when unemployment peaked. We calculated as an alternative the aver 
age unemployment rate over the five-year period 1989 through 1993. 
This included two years of relatively low unemployment (which 
nationally averaged 5.3 percent and 5.5 percent in 1989 and 1990,
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respectively) and the two years surrounding the unemployment peak in 
1992. The correlation for our 24 states between the 1992 rate and the 
five-year average rate was quite high (0.88); in all but one state (Mis 
souri), the 1992 rate was higher than the five-year average. For each of 
the 16 multistate firms, we then correlated project returns and the value 
of incentives in each state with this five-year average unemployment 
rate. The results, shown in Appendix Table E.2, mirror the figures in 
Table 5.1 quite closely, with the exception that the basic tax systems 
were not as strongly negatively correlated with unemployment when 
the five-year average was used (with correlations at about 75 percent of 
the values in Table 5.1). The correlations with tax incentives, non-tax 
incentives, and all incentives taken together were very similar, with 
very comparable variation across firms as well.
Interestingly, the picture is quite different if we consider the rela 
tionship between taxes and job growth, rather than unemployment 
rates. We measured the percentage increase in state private nonfarm 
employment between 1980 and 1990, two years that represented 
approximately the same point in the business cycle. Although one 
might expect higher job growth to be associated with lower unemploy 
ment rates, this was not the case. The three states with the lowest 
unemployment rates (below 5.2 percent) also had below average job 
growth (from 11 to 23 percent). These were the Midwestern states of 
Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, which basically stagnated, with pop 
ulation growth occurring even slower than job growth, or the out- 
migration of people matching the out-migration of jobs. At the other 
extreme were three states (New Jersey, California, and Florida) with 
high 1992 unemployment rates (above 8.1 percent) despite high growth 
rates in employment during the previous decade (from 28 to 55 per 
cent).
As shown in Table 5.2, for multistate firms the value of incentives is 
negatively correlated with job growth. In other words, there is a mild 
tendency for state tax and other incentives to tilt the incentive surface 
towards states that experienced slow job growth during the 1980s. This 
effect is present both for tax incentives and for non-tax incentives; 
given a basic tax system that is approximately neutral, this produces a 
pattern of returns after taxes and incentives somewhat favoring slow- 
growth states.
Table 5.2 Correlation between State Employment Growth and Poverty Rates and Firm's Net Return on New Plant 
Investment in Each State in 1992 (State Taxes and Incentives Only, Multistate Firms Only)3
Net project returns
Firm (plant size in $ millions)
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a. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. Job growth is the percentage increase in state employment between 1980 and 1990. Poverty rate is the 
percentage of persons in poverty from the 1990 census (1989 income).
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The preceding results suggest two hypotheses (with opposite direc 
tion of causality) for further research, beyond the scope of the current 
project: 1) it is slow economic growth that drives states to adopt tax 
and incentive policies more favorable towards business, and 2) the geo 
graphic pattern of returns found in 1992 is similar to the pattern that 
existed at the beginning of the 1980s, so that lower taxes (and hence 
higher returns) on new investment helped cause greater state job 
growth during the 1980s. The first hypothesis is consistent with argu 
ments about "growth coalitions" and their effect on public policy at the 
state and local level, and with the view that the constituency concerned 
with growth is broader and more influential than the constituency con 
cerned with the unemployed. This hypothesis could be tested using our 
net project returns for 1992 as the dependent variable and with job 
growth during some prior period as one of the independent variables.
The second hypothesis could be tested only by constructing a state 
tax database for 1980 identical in structure to our 1992 database; this is 
a monumental task, more arduous than constructing the 1992 database 
because information on each state's tax laws as of 1980 is much more 
difficult to come by now. On the other hand, our 1992 results could be 
used in the future as the explanatory tax variable in a regression model 
predicting job growth from 1992 to some later year.
The poverty rate (percentage of persons in poverty as of 1989, from 
the 1990 census) is an alternative measure of economic distress. It is 
interesting that there is a small positive correlation between returns 
after basic taxes and the poverty rate: the higher a state's poverty rate, 
the higher the return on new investment (see Table 5.2). State tax poli 
cies may have the effect, then, of pulling new jobs towards states with 
higher concentrations of the poor. There is virtually no relationship 
between the value of tax or other incentives and poverty, however.
So far, we have considered the effects of state taxes and incentives 
only. Most tax-burden studies conducted by states have focused on 
states as the units of analysis rather than cities, but some have incorpo 
rated statewide average local property tax burdens into their compari 
sons. The problems entailed in doing so, and our imperfect solution, 
were described in the previous chapter, where we presented a compari 
son of effective state and local tax and tax incentive rates in the 24 
states. This was accomplished by constructing a representative city in 
each state, with a local tax system and property tax abatements typical
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of cities in that state. The representative cities were not given state or 
local non-tax incentives; the results that follow thus incorporate only 
the effects of state and local tax and tax incentive programs (including 
enterprise zone tax credits). 2 The correlations between these various 
tax rates (or incentive rates, which are like negative tax rates) and state 
average unemployment rates are presented in Table 5.3. This simplified 
table shows only the average correlation coefficient for the 16 multi- 
state firms.
Effective tax rates are defined as the reduction in the present value 
of project cash flow resulting from the introduction of state or local 
taxes at the location of the new plant, divided by the present value of 
income before all taxes. There is a very strong correlation between 
basic state tax rates and unemployment (reinforcing the results of Table 
5.1): the highest tax rates occur in the states with the highest unem 
ployment rates. Because states with higher state taxes tend to have 
lower local taxes, as shown in Chapter 4, the effective local tax rate is 
negatively correlated with unemployment. The combined state plus 
local tax rate, however, is working to draw investment towards the 
lower-unemployment states.
With tax incentives, the meaning of the signs is reversed; that is, a 
positive correlation indicates that the incentive is operating as we 
might hope, with larger incentives in higher-unemployment states. 
This is in fact the case, although it is primarily the state incentives that 
produce this result (and rather weakly at that). Moreover, it appears 
that this effect is largely attributable to the enterprise zone incentives 
provided by the states. This effect, weak as it is, may not be particu 
larly relevant. Since the representative cities are given enterprise zone 
incentives wherever the state allows enterprise zones or the like, these 
state comparisons grossly exaggerate the prevalence and importance 
of such zones. In most states, a small minority of potential sites for 
new industry will be located within an enterprise zone. Thus, the most 
salient comparisons across states are those that exclude enterprise 
zone incentives. Focusing on those numbers, we see that state and 
local tax incentives together bear virtually no systematic relationship 
to unemployment and do nothing to offset the strong perverse effects 
of state tax systems. The effective state plus local tax rates calculated 
after those tax incentives that are generally available (i.e., excluding
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Table 5.3 Correlations of Effective Tax and Incentive Rates in a
Representative City in Each State with State Unemployment, 
Job Growth, and Poverty Rates
Unemployment Job growth Poverty 
Tax and incentive rates rate rate rate
Basic tax rates before incentives
State
Local




State and local: total
State and local: EZ incentives only
State and local: non-EZ incentives only
State and local tax rates after tax incentives
After non-EZ tax incentives only































NOTE: EZ = enterprise zone. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. See Tables 4.6 and 
4.7 for definitions of effective tax and tax incentive rates. The correlations shown here are a sim 
ple average of the correlation coefficients for each of the 16 multistate firms. The unemployment 
rate is the state rate for 1992; the job growth rate is the percentage increase in employment 
between 1980 and 1990; the poverty rate is the percentage of persons in poverty, 1989.
enterprise zone incentives) are strongly positively correlated with 
unemployment.
The correlations between tax rates and job growth or poverty inci 
dence are mixed, with most correlations very weak. The only exception 
is the tendency for non-enterprise zone tax incentives at the state and 
local level to be higher in states with lower job growth. Local incen 
tives appear to be reinforcing this tendency found for state incentives 
alone in Table 5.2. 3
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THE PATTERN OF RETURNS AMONG CITIES
Business location decisions, in the end, are choices between particu 
lar places, not entire states. Local taxes and tax incentives, which are 
on average about equal in magnitude to state taxes and tax incentives, 
exhibit considerable variation within states. Arguably, then, the best 
test of the hypothesis that taxes and incentives redistribute jobs to high 
unemployment places is conducted at the city level. Our sample of cit 
ies was stratified into four city population size classes: 1) over 500,000, 
2) 100,000 to 499,999, 3) 25,000 to 99,999, and 4) 10,000 to 24,999. 
Since the sampling percentages and response rates varied by size class, 
results are shown separately for each of the four classes, although an 
average of the coefficients for the four classes is also computed. 4 The 
cities in the sample are listed, by size class and then by state, in Appen 
dix Table B.2, along with data on city population characteristics, tax 
rates, and tax incentives.
At the state level of analysis, employing representative cities, state/ 
local effective tax rates exhibited a strong tendency to be higher in 
higher-unemployment states. A similar, but less strong, relationship 
occurs when we shift to the city level of analysis, as shown in Table 
5.4: cities with higher unemployment rates tend to have higher state/ 
local tax rates (producing lower returns after basic taxes). Two factors 
no doubt explain the difference in the strength of the correlation: the 
use of city rather than statewide average unemployment rates, and the 
fact that more populous states are represented at the city level by more 
cities.
When we shift to the city level of analysis, tax incentives are much 
more prevalent and of greater magnitude. At the state level, they 
include only statewide investment and jobs credits, offered in just 8 of 
the 24 states. In the city analysis, these incentives are included along 
with state incentives targeted at enterprise zones or the like (where the 
city contains such a zone) and local property tax abatements, in enter 
prise zones or generally. Property tax abatements are allowed in 14 of 
the 24 states, and 22 permit enterprise zones (although such zones are 
so limited in two of the states that they play no significant role). State 
tax incentives now include state-funded enterprise zone incentives in 
43 of our 112 cities. 5
Table 5.4 Correlation between City 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Returns from New Plant Investment 
in Each City (Multistate Firms)3
Net project returns
Firm After basic 
(plant size, in millions) taxes












































































































a. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. Basic taxes include state and city corporate income and net worth taxes, state and local sales taxes on 
machinery and equipment and fuel and utilities, and state and local property taxes. Tax incentives consist of state income/net worth tax investment and jobs 
credits, sales tax exemptions or credits available only in enterprise zones, state property tax credits available only in enterprise zones, and local property 
tax abatements. The value of incentives is measured by the net project returns after taxes and incentives, less project returns after basic taxes only. The 
average correlation for all city sizes is a weighted average of the coefficients for the four city size classes; the weight for a size class is the U.S. population 
living in cities of that size divided by the total U.S. population living in cities of 10,000 or more, 
b. Value less than 0.005.
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As a result, state tax incentives are more strongly (and positively) 
correlated with unemployment at the city level, and this pattern is rein 
forced by local tax incentives. The net effect of state and local tax 
incentives is to offset the perverse effects of basic state and local taxes. 
This fundamental pattern is not altered by the addition of state and 
local non-tax incentives, which bear no discernible relationship to 
unemployment. (Infrastructure subsidies, job training subsidies, and 
general-purpose grants and loans are not treated separately here 
because of the paucity of such programs at the local level.) The com 
bined effect of local taxes, local tax incentives, and targeted incentives 
is to negate, but not reverse, the perverse pattern exhibited by returns 
after statewide taxes and incentives. That is, returns no longer bear any 
relationship to local unemployment rates; correlations are near zero.
The relationship between incentive size and the city unemployment 
rate does vary substantially by city size class. For the largest and 
smallest cities, the tax systems significantly favor low-unemployment 
places, and incentives do not contribute as much to the alleviation of 
this problem. For the middle two groups, on the other hand, there is 
virtually no relationship between unemployment and returns after 
basic taxes, but the tax incentives favor the high-unemployment cities 
to a much larger degree. Returns after all incentives are negatively cor 
related with unemployment for the largest and smallest cities, posi 
tively correlated for the medium-size cities. This is the case for both 
single-location and multistate firms. The results for the largest city 
size class should be interpreted with caution. The number of cities is 
small (12), and the correlations are heavily influenced by one outlier 
city, Detroit, which has by far the highest unemployment rate (19.7 
percent) but also has high state and local taxes, and so ends up near or 
at the bottom of the large city group in project returns.
The overall conclusion is that the spatial pattern of state and local 
taxes and incentives may well result in a spatial redistribution of jobs, 
but this redistribution will not bear any consistent relationship with 
local employment conditions. The winning cities will include those 
with high unemployment and those with low unemployment; the same 
will be true of the cities losing jobs.
Do taxes and incentives tend to draw investment to cities with 
higher poverty rates? Once again, the answer depends on the city size 
(see Table 5.5). Among the middle two size classes (cities with popula-
Table 5.5 Correlation between City 1990 Poverty Rate and Firm's Net Returns from New Plant Investment in Each 
City: Multistate Firms Only3
Net project returns
Firm (plant size, in millions)





















































































a. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. Poverty rate is based on the 1990 census (1989 income). See also notes to Table 5.4. 
b. Value less than 0.005.
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tions between 25,000 and 499,999) there is a significant tendency for 
investment returns to favor higher-poverty cities, and this is due 
entirely to the effects of tax incentives. For the largest and smallest cit 
ies, the results are quite ambiguous. (There is a small negative correla 
tion for the largest class, but, again, the small number of cities in this 
class and the effect of Detroit, with a very high poverty rate, lead one 
to interpret the correlations for this size class with caution.)
THE EFFECTS OF ENTERPRISE ZONES
While the employment data cited have suggested that only a small 
share of job growth occurs within enterprise zones, our sample of cities 
included 44 that contained enterprise zones or were located in a high- 
unemployment county that qualified for special state tax incentives. 
This group represented nearly 40 percent of the cities in our sample. 
This is not necessarily inconsistent with the jobs data; it could be that 
much job growth occurs in rural areas, smaller cities, and in enterprise 
zone cities but not within the zones themselves. Nonetheless, the prev 
alence of enterprise zones, particularly in the larger cities that also tend 
to have higher unemployment and poverty rates, suggests that further 
exploration is needed of the effects of zone incentives on the spatial 
distribution of investment returns.
We divided each city size class into cities without enterprise zones 
and cities with enterprise zones or similar designations (which include 
cities in distressed counties). For the three smaller size classes, and for 
all cities pooled, the enterprise zone cities had substantially higher con 
centrations of the unemployed, the poor, and blacks (see Table 5.6). 
This was not the case in the largest city size class, again due in part to 
the effect of Detroit, which was one of only two non-enterprise zone 
cities in the largest class. (The other is Seattle, with an unemployment 
rate of only 4.9 percent.) Enterprise zones are clearly concentrated in 
larger cities.
Table 5.7 compares cities of 25,000 population or more with and 
without enterprise zones. (There were enterprise zones in only 2 of the 
21 cities of 10,000 to 24,999 population.) The enterprise zone cities 
provided returns on investment after basic state and local taxes that
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a. The term "enterprise zones" is used here to include programs in three states that provide state 
incentives in selected distressed counties. EZ = enterprise zone.
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were slightly lower than returns in the other cities. Interestingly, the 
enterprise zone cities provided far more regular tax incentives (not lim 
ited to enterprise zones) as well as generous enterprise zone incentives. 
The total tax incentive package in the enterprise zone cities was on 
average 6 to 10 times as large as the tax incentives offered in the other 
cities. Other (non-tax) incentives were comparable in the cities with 
and without enterprise zones. The result of the more generous tax 
incentives was that returns on investment after all taxes and incentives 
were from 4 to 136 percent greater (considering the five firms in Table 
5.7) in the enterprise zone cities than in the other cities.
State-funded tax incentives provided only to firms locating in enter 
prise zones (investment and jobs credits for the most part, but also sales 
tax exemptions) account for most (about 80 percent on average) of the 
total state/local enterprise zone benefits. Furthermore, in cities with 
enterprise zones, the enterprise zone incentives account for 29 to 51 
percent of the total incentive package, including loans and grants. Thus 
it is due in part to the state-funded targeted incentives that the tax 
incentives overall are able to largely offset the perverse effects of state/ 
local taxes. Table 5.8 shows that, for all city sizes on average, enter 
prise zone incentives are positively correlated with the unemployment 
rate. This is hardly surprising, given that an above-average local unem 
ployment rate is generally one of the criteria for enterprise zone eligi 
bility. It is surprising, actually, that the correlation is not higher. This is 
due to the fact that some high-unemployment places have no enterprise 
zones, while some states permit enterprise zones in cities with unem 
ployment rates that are only average (at least among our sample). Inter 
estingly, non-enterprise zone tax incentives are also positively 
correlated with unemployment, and the relationship is more consistent 
across city sizes.
Thus, while property tax abatement is by no means limited to enter 
prise zones, the prevalence of additional state tax incentives in such 
zones appears to be enough to give zone cities a competitive edge 
(other things equal) that helps tilt the investment return surface towards 
higher-unemployment places. The exception appears to be the large 
city class, but once again the average unemployment rate figure is 
skewed by Detroit, one of only two large cities without an enterprise 
zone but with a very high unemployment rate. 6 More important is the 
fact that the 10 large cities with enterprise zones have unemployment
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a. EZ = enterprise zone. Because only 2 of the 21 cities under 25,000 population had enterprise zones, we confined the analysis to cities of 25,000 or more. 
The value of state enterprise zone incentives is measured by the difference between the present value of new plant cash flow after all tax incentives and the 
present value of new plant cash flow given all tax incentives except state enterprise zone incentives. The value of the total enterprise zone package is the 
difference between the present value of new plant cash flow after all taxes and tax incentives and the present value of new plant cash flow after all taxes 
and non-enterprise zone tax incentives. The value of local enterprise zone incentives is the difference between the value of the total enterprise zone pack 
age and the value of state enterprise zone incentives. The total incentive package includes job training, infrastructure, and general financing programs. 
Items may not add to total due to rounding. 
b. Firm size in millions of dollars.
Table 5.8 Correlation between City Unemployment Rate and Value of Incentives: Enterprise Zone versus Other 
Incentives (Multistate Firms)
Value of enterprise zone 
tax incentives
Firm (plant size in millions)























































































Note: For definitions, see notes to previous tables, 
a. Value less than 0.005.
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and poverty rates similar to those of the smaller cities with zones and 
higher than most cities without zones; these large zone cities also pro 
vide project returns that on average are higher than returns in the 
smaller nonzone cities. Consequently, then, the large cities as a group, 
excluding Detroit, reinforce the preceding conclusions that enterprise 
zone incentives, if effective, would tend to pull jobs towards high- 
unemployment places.
Nonetheless, the targeting of tax incentives alone is not sufficient to 
produce a pattern of returns on investment, after all taxes and incen 
tives, that favors higher-unemployment places, as we showed earlier. A 
comparison of Table 5.4 and Table 5.8 is instructive. The last column in 
Table 5.8 shows that, in the absence of enterprise zone incentives, 
returns on investment would be negatively correlated with unemploy 
ment rates, although the correlations are quite weak. An examination 
of the third column in Table 5.4, showing project returns with enter 
prise zone incentives included, reveals that the effect of enterprise 
zones is to offset, but not reverse, the perverse distributional pattern of 
returns (though, again, this is true on average for all cities but not the 
largest size class).
Remember that, in those 42 cities where the enterprise zone is just a 
part of the city, we have allowed the incentives that apply to firms 
locating within the zones to represent the incentive package for the 
entire city; this exaggerates the role of enterprise zones. (For the two 
enterprise zone cities that are actually part of a distressed county, the 
"zone" incentives do apply throughout the city.) At the same time, the 
distributional effects are muted by the use of city wide unemployment 
rates, which are presumably lower than rates within the zones. This 
seems a reasonable procedure on the grounds that the labor market 
effects will be felt well beyond the zone itself, even if direct hiring by 
the new enterprise zone firm is concentrated on zone residents due to 
statutory restrictions. Nonetheless, if only a small share of job growth 
occurs within enterprise zones, the correlations that include enterprise 
zone effects in 40 percent of our cities do exaggerate the role of enter 
prise zone incentives. The pattern of returns shown in the last two col 
umns of Table 5.8 may more accurately reflect the overall pattern.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the lack of any consistent pattern by focusing 
on a firm typical in terms of the correlation of taxes and incentives with 
unemployment—the instruments manufacturer building a $180 million
Figure 5.1 Rate of Return on New Plant Investment in Top 25 Cities: Multistate Instruments Manufacturer, $180 
Million Plant
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plant. We show only the top 25 cities (those with the highest internal 
rate of return for this plant after taking into account all taxes and incen 
tives), ordered by unemployment rate. For each city, the graph displays 
the rate of return after basic taxes and how this rate of return is bettered 
through the provision of enterprise zone incentives and other (tax and 
non-tax) incentives. Some cities that ranked poorly after basic taxes 
improved their position dramatically though non-enterprise zone 
incentives; others did so through enterprise zone credits. Certain cities, 
including some with relatively low unemployment, were very competi 
tive without incentives and enhanced their position further through 
incentives. In other words, incentives are not primarily compensating 
for high basic taxes, nor are they able to offset the tax disadvantage of 
high-unemployment cities.
The link between job growth in an area and the incidence of poverty 
is undoubtedly complex, given the interrelationships between poverty 
and the factors that contribute to it—unemployment, low-wage 
employment, wage discrimination, occupational segregation by race 
and gender, residential segregation, lack of human capital, and mis 
matches between jobs available and the skills or location of the poor. 
The attraction of new investment to poverty areas or poorer cities may 
well be an important part of an effective antipoverty strategy and is cer 
tainly part of the rationale for enterprise zones. Are enterprise zone 
incentives advantaging cities with high rates of poverty? Are the incen 
tives large enough to plausibly make a difference?
Not surprisingly, enterprise zone incentives are noticeably larger in 
cities with higher poverty rates, and this effect is amplified by the addi 
tion of local incentives to the more generous state incentives (see Table 
5.9). A comparison of the third and fourth columns of Table 5.9 (the 
value of non-enterprise zone incentives) and the fourth and sixth col 
umns of Table 5.5 (which combines enterprise zone and non-enterprise 
zone incentives) shows that tax incentives, and all incentives taken 
together, favor high poverty places to a substantially larger degree 
when enterprise zone incentives are included in the analysis. Without 
enterprise zones, project returns bear no consistent relationship to pov 
erty rates; with enterprise zones, the pattern of returns after all incen 
tives favors poorer cities to a degree.
Table 5.9 Correlation between City Poverty Rate and Value of Incentives: Enterprise Zone versus Other Incentives 
(Multistate Firms)
Value of enterprise zone 
tax incentives
Firm (plant size in millions)























































































Note: For definitions, see notes to previous tables.
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CONCLUSIONS
State tax systems exhibit a strong tendency to skew returns on new 
industrial investment in a perverse direction, producing higher after-tax 
returns in states with lower unemployment rates, other things equal. 
This perverse pattern is largely offset by state tax credits and by local 
taxes and tax incentives, which tend to be more favorable in states and 
cities with higher unemployment. Non-tax incentives, on the other 
hand, vary dramatically with firm characteristics; for large plants, such 
incentives at the state level very clearly favor low-unemployment cit 
ies, while for smaller plants the relationship is nonexistent. The large 
versus small distinction fails to hold up at the city level of analysis, 
however. The end result is a spatial pattern of returns on new invest 
ment that has little or no bearing to the spatial pattern of unemploy 
ment among cities.
The explicit development incentives are indeed laid out so as to 
make investment more attractive in the places most in need of jobs. It 
may be that, in the absence of state and local concern with develop 
ment, such incentives would not have been adopted and the state and 
local tax system overall would have remained perverse in its effects. 
We could then conclude that incentive competition has produced a neu 
tral (or random) spatial distribution of returns, which at least is better 
than what would have prevailed in the absence of incentives. However, 
that is the most we could say. Furthermore, to the extent that much of 
the focus of state level policy has been on features of the tax system 
that we have included in the "basic" tax, rather than as incentives, it is 
not clear that even this much can be said. The only firm conclusion is 
that, after at least a decade and a half of intense competition for invest 
ment and jobs, and the widespread adoption of pro-development tax 
policies and incentives, states and cities have produced a tax and incen 
tive system that provides no clear inducement for firms to invest in 
higher-unemployment places.
These results are consistent with the thesis that state and local eco 
nomic development incentives are adopted for a variety of reasons— 
high unemployment being but one, simple imitation of other states 
being another—and that such incentives are likely to persist even if 
state economic performance (and state unemployment rates) improve.
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Furthermore, to the extent that slow economic growth is the driving 
force, the relationship between incentives and unemployment will be a 
weak one, because slow growth, at least as measured by net job gains, 
is not clearly associated with high unemployment rates.
NOTES
1. From the 16 firms, we selected 5 that represent prototypes with distinct characteristics, 
such as size, profitability, and capital intensity. Each of the five is representative of a set of firms 
whose after-tax returns across states are highly correlated (0.9 or better). Firm 2, the large furni 
ture manufacturer, is a good proxy for firms 8, 10, 11, and 13. Firm 5, the small soap and toiletries 
firm, is a good proxy for firms 6,9, 11, and 15. Firm 7 (plastics, small) is a stand-in for firms 1 
and 9. Firm 14 (the large automobile manufacturer) is a proxy for 8, 10, 12, and 13; and firm 16 
(instruments, large) is a proxy for 3,4, 6, and 12.
2. Given the small number of cities in our sample in many states, and given the substantial 
variation across cities in the use of non-tax incentive programs, there was no way to establish with 
any confidence a representative package of local non-tax incentives for each state. While a state 
non-tax incentive package could obviously have been specified in the representative city analyses, 
this would not have provided us any additional information beyond the state-level analysis already 
conducted with state taxes and incentives only.
3. The positive correlation of 0.10 between state tax incentives and job growth in Table 5.3 
seems to be at odds with the negative correlation of-0.27 in Table 5.2. The apparent discrepancy 
is due to the inclusion of state enterprise zone incentives in Table 5.3.
4. In order to summarize the results across city size classes, we computed an average of the 
correlation coefficients for each size class. (An overall correlation coefficient for all of the cities 
pooled would not be valid because of the different sampling rates.) If the importance of the results 
for a city size class is a function of the portion of the U.S. population living in cities of that size, 
then the logical weights are population proportions. This is the method we chose: to compute a 
weighted average of the four correlation coefficients, where the weight is the total U.S. population 
in that city size class divided by the total U.S. population in the four city size classes together.
5. Enterprise zones existed in 44 of the cities, but the Ohio city with an enterprise zone does 
not benefit from any state enterprise zone incentives.
6. After 1992, Detroit won federal Empowerment Zone status.

6 Incentive Competition 
and Public Policy
State and local economic development policy has been the subject 
of much debate in the press in recent years, with most of the criticism 
focused on the large subsidy packages resulting from interstate bidding 
wars for major plants. It is important to remember that these bidding 
wars have been occurring against a backdrop of state and local tax pol 
icies and ongoing incentive programs that have been on the books for 
many years, themselves subject to escalation as a result of competitive 
pressures. The Urban Institute and the National Association of State 
Development Agencies first published their Directory of Incentives for 
Business Investment and Development in the United States in 1981; it 
catalogued the major tax incentives, loan and grant programs, loan 
guarantees, customized job training, and other programs offered rou 
tinely by the states. It is these kinds of programs, both at the state and 
at the local level, that have been the subject of our research, along with 
the overall effects of state and local tax regimes.
In this chapter, we review the major findings of our study and their 
implications for public policy at the local, state, and national level. Are 
the tax and incentive differences across locations significant enough 
that they should even be a concern of policy makers? Do the results of 
this study shed any light on the debate over the effects of incentive 
competition on the efficiency of industrial location and hence on 
national productivity? What have we learned about the possible 
national benefits of state and local competition as a result of the redis 
tribution of jobs? Should Congress intervene to limit competition, and 
how could this be done?
ARE TAX AND INCENTIVE DIFFERENCES IMPORTANT?
Most of the programs and policies that we call explicit economic 
development incentives—investment and jobs tax credits, property tax 
abatements, infrastructure subsidies, customized job training pro-
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grams, business loans, grants, and loan guarantees—have become 
widespread only in the past 20 years, as states and cities have 
attempted to respond to a more uncertain and competitive economic 
environment. These incentives operate against a backdrop of state and 
local taxes that themselves have been changed in response to those 
same economic pressures, but in ways that are much more difficult to 
identify. We have chosen to define a basic state and local tax system— 
including income, net worth, sales, and property taxes—that initially 
determines the competitiveness of a site for new business investment, 
by establishing the after-tax return on investment available at that site, 
given a particular firm and plant size and a particular technology and 
set of input prices. We then determine how the various explicit incen 
tives offered by states and localities alter that after-tax return and affect 
the relative profitability of different kinds of locations.
When we examined returns on investment at the starting point of our 
analysis—after basic taxes only—we found very wide differences 
among states and cities. The divergences were exaggerated when we 
examined state taxes only, for the simple reason that states with high 
state income and sales taxes tend to have lower local property and sales 
taxes. However, even when we looked at the results after paying all 
state and local taxes (but before receiving any incentives) we found 
very large differences between the returns available at the "best" loca 
tions and those available at the "worst" locations. Tax differences have 
very substantial effects on the spatial pattern of returns. Even when we 
ignored variation within states (by focusing on a representative city in 
each state), we found effective state/local tax rates on new investment 
that ranged, for example, from 3 percent to 13 percent for a small but 
profitable manufacturer of soaps and toiletries, and from 7 percent to 
27 percent for a large but low-profit automobile manufacturer (Table 
4.6). The highest tax state placed a tax burden on manufacturers that 
was typically about three times as large as the lowest tax state. When 
we looked at particular localities, the differences were more extreme.
Eight states offered investment or jobs tax credits to firms anywhere 
in the state (Table 4.4); in 14 of the 24 states, local property tax abate 
ments were offered (Table 4.3). Together, these defined the explicit tax 
incentives generally available as entitlements (although in a minority 
of places with abatements, they were discretionary); these incentive 
packages ranged from zero to as high as 40 percent to 45 percent of the
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before-incentive state and local tax burden. When enterprise zone 
incentives were added to the picture, an even larger share of state and 
local taxes (as high as 65 percent) was forgiven as an economic devel 
opment incentive in the cities with enterprise zones or similar pro 
grams.
Tax incentives generally do not reduce the variation across states; 
large investment or jobs credits, for example, are not used primarily to 
offset high basic taxes. Enterprise zone incentives tend to be larger in 
states that offer less in the way of general incentives. Nonetheless, the 
effect of enterprise zones is to increase the variation in after-tax returns 
across states, not to compensate for high basic taxes.
Many of the features of what we call the basic tax system have in 
fact been listed as tax incentives in the Directory of Incentives for Busi 
ness Investment and Development and have no doubt been enacted in 
some states for economic development purposes. To a firm building a 
new plant, some of these tax features, such as the exemption of manu 
facturing machinery and equipment from the sales tax, the exemption 
of inventories from the property tax, or the double-weighting of sales 
in the income tax apportionment formula, provide benefits comparable 
in size to the benefits from explicit incentives such as a new jobs tax 
credit.
The non-tax incentives included infrastructure subsidies and cus 
tomized job training at the state level and general purpose grants, 
loans, and loan guarantees at both the state and local levels. Averaged 
over the 16 firm types and 112 cities in 24 states, non-tax incentives, 
expressed in terms of present value wage equivalence, were worth 
about 9 cents an hour per employee, for each of 40 hours a week, for 
50 weeks a year, for 20 years. In other words, state and local non-tax 
incentives were worth the equivalent of paying all workers in the new 
plant 9 cents an hour less over the life of the plant. By comparison, 
non-tax incentives had a wage equivalence of 7 cents an hour. On the 
whole, discretionary incentives were larger for small plants (a wage 
equivalence of 13 cents an hour) than for large plants (5 cents an hour). 
Non-tax incentives were a major part of a state's entire incentive 
package (in fact, in some cases over 90 percent of state incentives 
derived from non-tax programs). Overall, infrastructure and training 
programs were of less importance to smaller firms than were general- 
use subsidies (see Table 4.14). In the case of large firms, infrastructure
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and training incentives were typically worth more than general-use 
incentives; in fact, for big firms, training incentives alone were often 
more substantial than general-use incentives. When local incentives 
were combined with state ones, the role of discretionary non-tax incen 
tives declined markedly. The combined package of state and local tax 
incentives was often as large as the combined package of non-tax dis 
cretionary incentives. The reasons for this include the provision of very 
generous tax incentives (such as the property tax abatement) at the 
local level and the dearth of many large local non-tax incentive pro 
grams. 1
At the local level and averaged over all 16 firm types, 48 percent of 
the increment in income due to incentives derived from tax incentives, 
52 percent derived from non-tax incentives. However, there was sub 
stantial variation by firm size. For small firms, non-tax incentives were 
much more important, making up 65 percent of the incentive offer. In 
the case of big firms, discretionary incentives were much less signifi 
cant; only 39 percent of the increment to income derived from non-tax 
incentives.
Do discretionary incentives change the competitive positions of 
states and cities? While there were a few notable cases where very 
large general purpose incentives produced great changes in state or city 
ranking on the basis of investment returns, overall the answer to this 
question is "not much." For the handful of cities/states at the top or at 
the bottom of the rankings, there were very substantial differences in 
returns between one city or state and the next due to tax and incentive 
variations; still, the inclusion of incentives very often did little to 
change the identity of the majority of cities in the top 10 or bottom 10. 
Mostly, cities that were highly competitive after taxes and tax incen 
tives were also highly competitive after the inclusion of non-tax incen 
tives. Moreover, the majority of cities/states in the middle of the 
rankings were often separated by very little, at any level of analysis, so 
that adding or deleting a particular program from the analysis could 
produce substantial shifts in rankings—but shifts that were of little sig 
nificance because the size of the differences in income between cities/ 
states was small.
In general, the range (that is, the difference between the best and the 
worst cities) was greater after the inclusion of non-tax incentives than 
after basic taxes or basic taxes and tax incentives. Averaged over the 16
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firm types, the range after the inclusion of non-tax incentives was 1.4 
times that after basic taxes and 1.3 times that after taxes and tax incen 
tives. So non-tax incentives did not ameliorate, but actually accentu 
ated, the differential between the best and worst cities. Also, the degree 
of accentuation appeared to be greater for small firms than for big 
firms. However, statistically there was no apparent relationship 
between the generosity of a particular city/state's non-tax incentive 
package and the burdensomeness of its taxes. In other words, non-tax 
incentives exaggerated, at the extremes, spatial disparities in taxes, but 
for most cities the connection between taxes and non-tax incentives 
was somewhat random.
Is it reasonable to claim that a city's and state's tax and incentive 
regime could influence location decisions? Our research has not looked 
at spatial differentials in other factor costs (such as labor, energy, and 
transportation) or in the benefits firms receive from taxes, so we are not 
in a position to give an unequivocal answer to the question. However, 
our results suggest that, for the firm types simulated by TAIM, the 
range of results across all 112 cities (and 24 states) is not trivial. Large 
income differences separated the best and worst locations. In the most 
extreme case, a hourly wage equivalence of $1.82 divided the top- and 
bottom-ranked cities (this was for the large drug plant simulation; see 
Table 4.9). There is a likelihood, of course, that factor cost differen 
tials—in labor, energy, and transportation—could amount to much 
more than $1.82 an hour. Specifically, it is quite possible that labor 
costs in our bottom-ranked city could be more than $1.82 an hour 
lower than in our top-ranked city. As it turns out, they are not. More 
over, if tax and incentive regimes were developed to compensate for 
locally high labor costs (or other input costs), one would logically 
expect burdensome tax and incentive regimes in southern states, with 
much lighter loads in California and states in the Northeast and Mid 
west. However, the maps in Chapter 4 indicate no regional pattern of 
taxes and incentives. Since the severity of local tax and incentive 
regimes does not appear to be inversely related to factor costs, tax and 
incentive differentials between top- and bottom-ranked locations could 
reasonably be expected to influence plant location decisions in some 
situations.
Obviously, most cities are not at the very top or the very bottom of 
the range, but in the broad middle, where not much separates most
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locations' tax and incentive regimes. In these cases, tax and incentive 
differentials may or may not have a decisive impact on plant location 
decisions; it will all depend on the other factor costs at the various sites 
competing for the investment. More generally, we are inclined to 
believe that, unless they have some special factor cost advantage, cities 
and states with severe tax and incentive regimes will tend to be elimi 
nated from location searches. In other words, the greatest impact of tax 
and incentive regimes may be to exclude at the outset some cities and 
states from the game—from competing for a new investment opportu 
nity.
Another way to assess the size of tax and incentive differences is to 
compare the value of the standing offer in a particular state—the set of 
such factors as tax incentives, loans, grants, and infrastructure subsi 
dies routinely available to new manufacturing plants—with the incen 
tive packages offered as one-time deals for certain facilities. Since auto 
plants have frequently been the target of bidding wars by states and cit 
ies, we will focus on the recent and much publicized subsidy package 
offered to Mercedes-Benz for locating a new plant in Vance, Alabama. 
Table 6.1 shows the nominal value of the initial subsidies and future 
tax abatements. It is these nominal figures that are promulgated by 
development officials and subsidy critics and that become the focus of 
debate. The up-front subsidies equaled $118 million, while the annual 
tax abatements of $3.1 million totaled $55 million over the first 25 
years of the plant's existence. Thus, the entire subsidy package was 
allegedly worth about $173 million. 2
For purposes of comparison with the results of this study showing 
the value to the firm of standing incentive offers, there are two prob 
lems with the publicized numbers for the Mercedes plant and with sim 
ilar figures for incentive deals in other places: 1) the figures show the 
gross cost of the subsidies to the state and local governments, not the 
net after-tax value of the subsidies to the firm; 2) future tax subsidies 
are simply added up instead of discounted. To determine the value of 
the subsidy package with these problems corrected, we created a new 
firm to be simulated using TAIM. The new firm is the large multistate 
auto manufacturer (firm no. 14), but with actual data on the Mercedes 
plant substituted for our average plant data (in particular, the value of 
land, infrastructure, plant, machinery and equipment, sales, and 
employment). Then we created an incentive package in an Alabama
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Table 6.1 The Subsidy Package for the Mercedes-Benz Auto Assembly 













Property tax abatement: $1.5 million/year for 10 years
Corporate income tax reduction: $1.6 milion/year for 25 years
Subtotal
Total value of subsidy package




After-tax discounted value/gross undiscounted value
After-tax present value to the firm of the standing incentive offers 

































St. Joseph, Missouri 32.9
Syracuse, New York 42.8
a. The figures for the gross undiscounted value of the subsidies are from Ken Blum, The Mercedes 
Bern Subsidy Package—Whose Benefits? Whose Losses? All estimates of the after-tax present 
value to the firm of the subsidy package or of standing incentive offers were generated by TAIM. 
The firm simulated was the large, multistate auto plant (no. 14) but with actual data on the value 
of new plant and equipment and new plant sales and employment for the Mercedes plant (as 
shown in the cited report) substituted for the average plant data in the usual model runs. Items 
may not sum to total due to rounding.
city to match the actual package, treating the initial subsidies as grants 
except for the sales tax exemptions (which were modeled as actual 
exemptions). The property tax and income tax abatements were treated 
as annual tax credits of $1.5 million for 10 years and $1.6 million for 
25 years, respectively. The value of these subsidies is then measured by 
TAIM net of the federal and Alabama state income tax effects, and dis 
counted to the present (1992).
The value to the firm of the $173 million nominal package was esti 
mated by TAIM at $86 million, or only about half of its nominal value. 
This figure can then be compared to the after-tax present value of the 
standing incentive packages offered in other cities. We selected 11 cit 
ies that offered the most generous incentives to large auto plants or that 
were among the top locations for such plants when cities were ranked 
by returns after all incentives, and simulated the value of their incen 
tives for the same Mercedes plant. As can be seen in Table 6.1, the best 
examples of these incentive packages represent about half of the spe 
cial deal offered in Vance, Alabama (over 60 percent in the case of 
Atlanta). Still, if Alabama's tax system were relatively burdensome to 
begin with, the packages in some of the other cities could have been 
sufficient to make those locations comparable, in terms of after-tax 
return on investment, to the Alabama site. The important points here 
are that 1) discussions of incentive packages in the press do not present 
accurate measures of their true worth to the firm, 2) standing incentive
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offers are not trivial in comparison with the much publicized one-time 
deals, and 3) incentive packages must be judged in the context of the 
basic state and local tax system. It is also important to note that the big 
deals usually are put together in a fashion to make them appear most 
attractive to the firms and usually include as part of the package the 
routine incentives that have been the focus of this study.
THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF INCENTIVES AND THE 
NATIONAL BENEFITS OF COMPETITIVE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
If the competition among states and cities for jobs is to produce net 
gains for the nation as a whole, it must be the case that the overall level 
of investment is greater as a result (because the competition has raised 
average after-tax returns on investment and thereby drawn capital from 
overseas or has increased the nation's rate of savings and capital for 
mation), and/or the redistribution of jobs must be such as to increase 
employment in the places where it provides the most benefit. Because 
reservation wages tend to be lower in high-unemployment places, the 
net benefits of a job (the wage paid minus the reservation wage) are 
more there. We have been investigating the latter hypothesis, namely 
that incentives are greater in places of high unemployment, opening up 
the possibility that incentives redistribute jobs from low-unemploy 
ment to high-unemployment states and cities.
The explicit tax incentives that have been the focus of our research 
do indeed exhibit some tendency to make investment more attractive in 
the places most in need of jobs. State tax incentives are positively, but 
very weakly, correlated with state unemployment rates (Table 5.1), and 
combined state and city tax incentives are positively correlated with 
city unemployment rates (Table 5.4). For state non-tax incentives, the 
picture is mixed. For large firms, higher-unemployment states provided 
smaller incentive packages, for most of the firms in our study, but for 
small firms the relationship was virtually nonexistent. At the city level 
of analysis, results are also mixed, but the general conclusion is that 
state and local non-tax incentives exhibit no discernible relation to city 
unemployment rates.
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The results for tax and non-tax incentives together lend only weak 
support to the hypothesis that incentive competition produces a spatial 
pattern of returns favoring places with more severe unemployment; the 
value of all incentives combined is mildly positively correlated with 
city unemployment rates (Table 5.4). However, this conclusion is tem 
pered, if not negated, by considering the overall pattern of after-tax 
returns. State tax systems exhibit a strong tendency to skew returns on 
new industrial investment in a perverse direction, producing higher 
after-tax returns in states with lower unemployment rates, other things 
equal (Table 5.1). This perverse pattern is offset to a degree by local 
taxes, which tend to be more favorable in states and cities with higher 
unemployment (Table 5.3). Nevertheless, the incentives taken in the 
aggregate are still not enough to clearly offset the effects of state taxes. 
The end result is a spatial pattern of returns on new investment that 
bears little or no relationship to the spatial pattern of unemployment. It 
appears that, after at least a decade and a half of intense competition 
for investment and jobs, and the widespread adoption of pro-develop 
ment tax policies and development programs, states and cities have 
produced a system of taxes and incentives with no clear inducement for 
firms to invest in higher-unemployment places.
These results are consistent with the following two arguments 
(although they certainly cannot be taken as proof of either one): 1) 
state and local economic development incentives are adopted for a 
variety of reasons, including high unemployment, but, more impor 
tantly, slow growth and simple imitation of other states; and 2) even 
where economic distress, as measured by high unemployment, pro 
vided the original political impetus to incentive adoption, incentives 
are likely to persist in spite of improvement in state economic perfor 
mance. The latter point is corroborated by recent experience in Iowa, 
which has remained a low-unemployment state but which has contin 
ued, in the three years since our analysis was conducted, to further 
enhance its already very competitive position by abolishing property 
taxes on manufacturing machinery and equipment.
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TAXES, INCENTIVES, AND EFFICIENCY
Recent critiques of incentive competition by academic economists 
have focused on the issue of efficiency in the location of economic 
activity. The arguments are aimed primarily or exclusively at firm-spe 
cific deals on the grounds that they distort the location decision, induc 
ing businesses to choose a site that would otherwise not be the least- 
cost location and producing a geographic pattern of plant locations that 
is less efficient for the national economy (Burstein and Rolnick 1995). 
The conclusion is that competition is a negative-sum game.
These economists begin with the assumption that incentives do 
make a difference, no doubt in part because they argue from a theoreti 
cal perspective that tells them that the decisions of profit-maximizing 
firms will be affected at the margin by differences in cost. The econo 
mists appear to be on reasonably solid empirical grounds in this case. 
Those who have reviewed the very extensive literature on the effective 
ness of tax policy or of incentive competition have concluded that the 
bulk of the evidence now appears to support the thesis that differences 
in tax levels do measurably affect rates of economic growth (Bartik 
1991b).
Unlike many of the labor and other activists who have been broadly 
critical of incentives, however, economists may in fact argue that state 
and local competition for business that focuses on broad tax and fiscal 
policies is actually beneficial and can increase efficiency in business 
location. Gates and Schwab (1991), for example, extend the Tiebout 
hypothesis to business location, arguing that having a variety of locali 
ties offering different bundles of taxes and public services will permit a 
business to choose the optimal tax-service bundle for that firm. Fur 
thermore, competition among governments will force them to be more 
efficient in providing services and to reduce general taxes on business, 
eliminating any fiscal surplus derived from the business tax base. 
Therefore, business taxes will come to approximate prices for each 
locality's bundle of public services, and efficiency in business location 
will be enhanced since all inputs will then be priced on the basis of 
marginal cost. According to such economic models, tax competition is 
good as long as it is not specific to a firm or sector. Tax prices should 
reflect only costs, not local preferences for particular kinds of firms,
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preferences that are often implicit in subsidy programs. The arguments 
against firm- or sector-specific tax policies are the same as the main 
stream economists' arguments against state industrial policy.
This line of thinking has led economists to call for federal interven 
tion to reduce incentive competition. In 1995, for example, a group of 
over 100 economists and others issued a press release calling for an 
end to "targeted business incentive programs" (Heartland Institute 
1995) but favoring statewide business tax relief. Others have proposed 
banning the use of federal funds to underwrite competition. There have 
been frequent calls for states to enact truces, and multistate agreements 
to cease bidding for firms have actually been reached, although the 
results so far have not been promising (Council of State Governments 
1994).
In reality, the world of industrial incentives runs on a continuum, 
from the one-time deals tailored to a particular firm that is the object of 
a bidding war, to such broad-scale tax policies as an across-the-board 
reduction in the corporate income tax rate. In between is a wide range 
of policies and programs that are targeted in one sense or another but 
are available on the same terms to more than one particular firm. These 
strategies include tax incentives that are actually entitlements: that is, 
investment tax credits and new jobs tax credits; sales tax exemptions 
for machinery and equipment, or for fuel and electricity used in manu 
facturing; and property tax abatements for all new industrial construc 
tion. The sectoral targeting here is generally quite broad, including all 
of manufacturing plus, in some states, categories such as warehousing, 
research and development, or corporate headquarters. However, the 
approach is more targeted than a general rate reduction, inducing more 
investment in areas such as manufacturing and drawing capital from 
others, such as services. Further, by applying only to income from new 
investment, the programs introduce additional distortions, lowering the 
cost of replacement capital relative to the implicit cost of keeping old 
capital.
Equally important, sectoral and industry targeting is implicit in 
many state and local tax systems and incentive programs. There is sub 
stantial variation among firms even within the manufacturing sector 
with respect to asset composition (the relative importance of working 
capital, plant and land, machinery and equipment, and inventories) and 
cost structure (for example, the share of costs accounted for by wages
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or energy, or the average wage level). As a result, there is wide varia 
tion in tax burdens across industries for any given location. States that 
rely heavily on local property tax financing for provision of local ser 
vices will have lighter corporate income and sales tax burdens, which 
will advantage firms with high profit rates and disadvantage firms with 
a high proportion of real property (plant and equipment) in their asset 
base. Similarly, a sales tax exemption for fuel and electricity could be 
worth several times as much to an energy-intensive operation as to the 
average manufacturing establishment. Table 4.5 illustrated these 
effects: the exemption of machinery and equipment from the sales tax 
represented a savings of 17 percent of total state/local taxes for the auto 
firm, but only 9.4 percent for the instrument manufacturer, while the 
exemption of fuel and electricity was worth 1.2 percent of taxes for the 
large drug firm but 6.6 percent for the small plastics company. Exemp 
tion of inventories from the property tax was worth twice as much to 
the large instruments manufacturer as to the large drug firm, and a sim 
ilar disparity in value applied to the exemption of manufacturing 
machinery and equipment, when comparing the instruments and auto 
firms. In states where real property is taxed but all personal property is 
exempt by statute and always has been, a firm will benefit from a 
higher after-tax return on investment than would occur in a city in 
another state that taxes personal property but that advertises a local 
exemption for machinery and equipment.
Incentives are never neutral, by sector, by factor of production, by 
type of capital, by new versus old investment, and certainly not by 
location. The important point is that state and local tax systems are 
never neutral either. Thus, the basic premise of Burstein and Rolnick 
(1996)—that state and local tax systems would exercise a neutral influ 
ence on the location of economic activity and the composition of 
investment in the absence of firm-specific incentives—is faulty. 
Reschovsky (1991) delineates some problems with the Tiebout model 
applied to business location; he argues that the prevalence of collective 
goods makes it difficult to achieve equality between business tax bur 
dens and business service bundles. Our research points up another 
problem: tax burdens will vary from one firm to another for reasons 
that probably have little bearing on the service needs of those busi 
nesses.
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The sectoral patterns that emerge from an examination of state and 
local taxes and incentives are surely not deliberate on the part of poli 
cy makers. It is unlikely that the impacts of particular tax policies or 
programs on different industrial sectors are even considered, even less 
that the end result can be taken as the expression of some well-thought- 
out industrial policy. There is probably as little rhyme or reason to the 
spatial preferences for different industries embodied in the pattern of 
returns after taxes and incentives in 1992 as there was in the pattern of 
these returns in 1972. It is difficult to argue that two decades of compe 
tition has produced a more efficient pattern of location inducements. 
Furthermore, since states and localities appear to engage in incentive 
competition to provide jobs and benefits to workers and residents at 
least as much as to gain tax base, there is some reason to believe that 
incentive competition will proceed beyond the point of efficiency that 
has been described, with states and cities providing subsidies to busi 
ness in the interest of job creation even if the long-term fiscal effects 
are negative. Tax and incentive competition will in all likelihood pro 
duce a pattern where a sizable fiscal surplus remains in some places 
that have sufficient inherent locational advantages to offset a poor tax- 
service bundle, while other places establish incentives so large that 
they create a fiscal deficit. The argument that tax burdens (after incen 
tives) will come to represent prices for public services seems optimis 
tic, at best.
If the federal government were to succeed in ending the firm-spe 
cific deals, would the outcome be more efficient location patterns, as 
Burstein and Rolnick maintain? There is reason to be skeptical. States 
and localities are very likely to respond to such prohibitions by exercis 
ing their ingenuity in devising other ways of providing indirect subsi 
dies to particular firms; the provision of free infrastructure and services 
would very likely become commonplace. It would be very difficult to 
monitor such activities or to define a practice that could feasibly be 
prohibited, since much infrastructure is already provided free in many 
places.
Secondly, states may respond to such restrictions by granting tax 
breaks to all firms instead of only to certain ones. This has already been 
happening. A major tax concession, granted in the heat of battle to one 
firm, becomes a politically contentious issue when other firms, long 
time fixtures in the local economic landscape, demand equal treatment.
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The solution is to extend the tax concession to all manufacturers. The 
firm-specific distortion has been exchanged for a sector-wide distor 
tion. This process could be accelerated if firm-specific deals were 
ended. If so, the loss of state revenues and the erosion of financial sup 
port for schools and infrastructure and social services would end up 
being much greater than it would have been if we had let the states 
make deals with individual firms.
The other possibility, of course, is that by outlawing firm-specific 
competition, the mega-deals would be reduced, and the subsequent 
pressure from other businesses to make the special deal a general enti 
tlement would not develop. It is difficult to say which scenario is the 
more likely.
Interestingly, one of the arguments made by some critics is that 
incentives are inefficient because they are given to many firms whose 
location decisions are unaffected by the incentive. They propose that 
state and local economic development policy, to be more cost-effec 
tive, should be directed at particular firms—those whose decisions are 
likely to hinge on tax burdens. Programs should be negotiated on a 
firm-by-firm basis, not be made as entitlements to a broad class of 
firms. Similarly, since an investment tax credit (ITC) targets new 
investment, an ITC is preferable to an across-the-board cut in tax rates; 
the rate cut would affect all firms, whether investing or not, and would 
have to entail a much larger loss in state revenues in order to influence 
the investment decision of the same extent as an ITC.
Others take a public balance sheet approach that leads to similar 
kinds of policies. A cost-benefit analysis of economic development 
programs should be conducted, with the public weighing the public 
benefits against the public costs. Public funds should be used, accord 
ing to these advocates, only for projects or firms that satisfy public- 
interest performance standards regarding labor practices, workplace 
safety, environmental record, wage levels, or the provision of health 
insurance ("responsible employer" legislation). Again, this implies 
greater targeting and a balancing of objectives, requiring something 
more like a negotiation process and less like an automatic entitlement 
such as an ITC.
Could it be that cost-effective use of public funds from a local per 
spective is exactly the opposite from what economists see as desirable 
from the standpoint of national economic efficiency? The apparent par-
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adox, of course, is just the age-old problem of the appropriate account 
ing region in benefit-cost analysis. As long as state and local 
governments are making decisions based on benefits and costs to their 
own state or to their own locality, they will devote public resources to 
projects that produce net benefits statewide or locally but merely redis 
tribute benefits when a broader accounting region is used. The federal 
government could certainly prohibit the use of federal funds to subsi 
dize these types of projects (while allowing them, perhaps, for such 
programs as job training, research and development, or technology 
transfer, which appear to enhance productivity instead of shifting the 
location of production).
INCENTIVE COMPETITION AND EQUITY
To the extent that tax incentives, considered in isolation, are redis- 
tributive in the desired direction, it is in substantial measure due to the 
prevalence of incentives targeted at high-unemployment areas, either 
enterprise zones or distressed counties. Almost all those who have been 
critical of incentive competition have allowed that the least harmful, or 
perhaps even beneficial, component of it is the redistributive element. 
The efficiency argument here is that there are immobilities of labor or 
other barriers that prevent capital from shifting so as to equalize levels 
of unemployment; subsidies to high-unemployment locations would 
therefore be justified. The equity argument is that high-unemployment 
places tend also to be ghetto areas, concentrations of African Ameri 
cans and of the poor. Such population groups face restrictions on 
mobility. Subsidization via enterprise zones is justified on just such 
grounds.
Interestingly, the states have been doing far more than the federal 
government to address distributional issues through economic develop 
ment policy. While the federal government finally passed a limited 
enterprise zone program focused on a small number of cities, states 
over the past decade have established numerous similar programs. 
States, in other words, have shown themselves quite ready to fund geo 
graphically targeted economic development programs.
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This raises the question: Should states and localities be prohibited 
from using Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) or other 
federal monies to subsidize businesses even if those subsidies are 
restricted to high-unemployment or high-poverty areas? To the extent 
that states are using the state CDBG allocations to underwrite local 
revolving loan funds for business support, and are targeting those funds 
at poorer communities, such a use of federal funds appears to be com 
plementing state targeting policies and the federal empowerment zone 
program. However, many of the CDBG-capitalized revolving loan 
funds we came across were not explicitly concerned with targeting 
localized areas of distress. Certainly, the federal government's ability 
to enforce targeting has been seriously eroded over the past two 
decades.
CAN AND SHOULD INCENTIVE COMPETITION 
BE CURBED?
To the degree that tax and incentive competition results in a redistri 
bution of jobs, our research lends little or no support to the argument 
that this redistribution has beneficial effects for the nation as a whole, 
shifting jobs from places with low unemployment to places with high 
unemployment. We also cannot say that it is clearly harmful, providing 
inducements to redistribute jobs in the opposite direction. Of course, 
one can only speculate as to what might otherwise have occurred; i.e., 
what the spatial pattern of returns on investment in 1992 would have 
looked like had states and cities never undertaken to influence their 
economic fortunes by offering inducements to industry in competition 
with one another. If this pattern would have been distinctly counterpro 
ductive, with higher returns in lower-unemployment places, then one 
could conclude that competition has at least nullified such effects.
While the arguments that tax and incentive competition in general 
enhances national welfare appear to us ill-supported, on redistributive 
grounds, neither are we persuaded that incentive competition improves 
locational efficiency. Although our study has not directly addressed 
this issue, it seems apparent from the magnitude of firm differences in 
returns that neither the basic tax system, nor the tax system with the
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standard package of incentives included, is likely to bear any system 
atic relationship to actual public resource costs associated with differ 
ent industries at different sites. Is there any reason to expect that the 
cost of providing services to an auto plant is twice as high in South 
Carolina as it is in Massachusetts, while the cost of providing services 
to a small soap manufacturer is higher in Massachusetts than in South 
Carolina? Or that in Texas, the average public service bundle for an 
auto plant is four times the service bundle provided a large drug manu 
facturer?3 These are the relationships that one would expect if effective 
state/local tax rates reflect differences in service costs. The effective 
tax rates on these various kinds of firms in these locations are quite dif 
ferent, and it is difficult to imagine that they represent "tax prices" for 
services. Further, it is not clear why one would anticipate the pattern to 
be more related to costs in the absence of incentive competition. Since 
few places appear to conduct any systematic study of fiscal effects, and 
since these effects are difficult to measure and far from obvious, it 
seems very unlikely that competition produces a set of after-tax returns 
more in line with public service cost differences.
It is interesting to note that a recent national conference on "the eco 
nomic war between the states" was attended by many who had gone on 
record in opposition to incentive wars and had argued that the federal 
government should intervene to end such competition. 4 Nevertheless, 
there were few concrete proposals on how that could be accomplished, 
beyond the federal government prohibiting the use of federal funds for 
industrial recruitment. How could the federal government intervene to 
prevent states and cities from using their own funds for such purposes? 
The practical difficulties in defining a competitive incentive that is to 
be prohibited seem insurmountable. If Iowa were to be precluded from 
enacting a property tax exemption to attract a new steel plant (as it 
did), would it also be prevented from making the same property tax 
exemption available to all steel manufacturers, or to all manufacturers, 
or to all corporations (including insurance companies using comput 
ers)? If so, would we then require Pennsylvania, which by state law 
defines the property tax as a tax only on real property, to start mandat 
ing that local governments also tax machinery and equipment and other 
personal property, so that Pennsylvania localities do not have a com 
petitive advantage?
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Cooperative agreements among states seem to be the only possibili 
ties for reducing incentive wars, and the history here is not cause for 
optimism. An important step in that direction, however, is simply to 
undertake efforts to improve the information on which economic 
development policy is based, so that policymakers in states and cities 
have a better understanding of the true costs of incentives and of the 
long-term fiscal and employment effects.
NOTES
1. The exception here is tax increment financing.
2. For this comparison, we used the estimates of the incentive package cost contained in the 
report by Blum (1995), which was critical of the incentive deal. These figures are actually more 
conservative than those reported in the Council of State Governments (1994).
3. Our representative city analysis showed the following effective state/local tax rates on new 
investment after all tax incentives: for firm 14 (the large auto plant), 7.8 percent in Massachusetts, 
13.3 percent in South Carolina, 21.2 percent in Texas; for firm 5 (soaps), 5.6 percent in Massachu 
setts, 4.7 percent in South Carolina; for firm 4 (drugs)—5.6 percent in Texas.
4. Papers presented at this conference, held at the National Academy of Sciences, Washing 
ton, DC, were printed in a special issues of The Region (June 1995), published by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

Appendix A
Characteristics of the Sample States and Cities
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SOURCE: Population, unemployment rates, and poverty rates: Bernan Press, County and City Extra 1994; change in total employment:: U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 1982 and 1993, County Business Patterns 1980 and 1990; "manufacturing employment in 1990: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992a, 7990 
Annual Survey of Manufactures. 
a. Columns may not sum to total due to rounding.



















































































































































































































































































































































































Ann Arbor, MI 
Springfield, MO 



































































































































































































































































































































































































Palm Bay, FL 
Riviera Beach, FL 
Sunrise, FL 









St. Joseph, MO 
Hoboken, NJ 
New Brunswick, NJ 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Population, unemployment rate, poverty rates, and percentage of population black: Bernan press, County and City Extra 1994; enterprise zone 
and property tax data: authors' survey; local sales tax rates: Prentice-Hall, State and Local Taxes: All States Tax Guide, Commerce Clearing House, State 
Tax Guide, and authors' survey.
NOTE: Poverty rate is percentage of persons in poverty from 1990 Census. Effective property tax rate is the nominal combined rate (city, county, and 
school) times the assessment ratio. Project returns are the present value of 20-year returns from investment by an out-of-state firm in a new plant in each 
city, after state and local taxes and tax incentives. Local corporate income taxes existed in the following cities (rates in parentheses): Detroit (2 percent) and 
Hamtramch (1 percent), Michigan; New York City (8.85 percent); and Dublin (2 percent), Fairfield (1.5 percent), and Wilmington (1 percent), Ohio. Local 
gross receipts taxes were imposed in the following Washington cities: Olympia (0.1 percent), Seattle (0.215 percent), and Tacoma (0.11 percent).
Table A.3 Average Effective Local Property Tax Rates by State3
Our sample data ACIR: selected cities







































































































































































































































a. Where assessment ratios or tax rates vary by class of property, we show the effective rate for real property. Rates are the sum of city, county, and school 
district tax rates, plus other minor special district taxes in many states. Effective rate is the nominal rate times the assessment ratio.
The property tax rates for the representative cities were determined in three ways. In eight states, it was possible to compute a statewide average effective 
property tax rate on industrial property. This is simply the total property taxes collected on industrial property divided by the total value of industrial prop 
erty in the state, where value is equal to assessed value divided by the assessment ratio. In the case of Massachusetts, however, the "statewide average" is 
actually the unweighted average of the industrial tax rates in the 23 cities that had in excess of $200 million in industrial valuation in fiscal year 1994, as 
calculated by the authors.
Unfortunately, none of the other 16 states report data on property taxes collected by class of property. For these 16 states, we compared our rates with 
those for chosen cities reported in Selected Features of Fiscal Federalism (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR]1992). The 
ACIR table, in turn, was based on tax rates published in the Commerce Clearing House (CCH) State Tax Reporter 1991. The CCH cities represent a non- 
random selection of cities of 20,000 population or more. There are problems with the CCH data for 3 of the 16 states. These three states are New York 
(where nominal rates only were shown, with the erroneous statement that assessment ratios are uniform statewide when in fact there is large variation), 
Pennsylvania (where some data that could be corroborated were erroneous and produced effective rates as high as 20 percent, and South Carolina (where 
effective rates appeared far too low). For the remaining 13, the range of tax rates and the median rates corroborate our sample and the validity of our median 
rates, for the most part. Where there are significant differences, we have substituted the ACIR medians for our own if our sample of cities was quite small.

Appendix B
The Hypothetical Firm Model: 




The Hypothetical Firm Model: 
Assumptions and Details of Operation
THE FIRM'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
AND NEW PLANT FINANCING
In order to focus on the effects of incentives on returns from a new invest 
ment, we assume that each hypothetical firm would have been in a "steady 
state" but for the expansion. That is, each year the gross value of the deprecia 
ble assets in place on January 1, 1992, is maintained by undertaking replace 
ment investment equal to retirements. With straight-line depreciation, annual 
depreciation of these assets is constant, and therefore accumulated depreciation 
and the net value of these assets also remain'constant. Replacement investment 
is financed by rolling over long-term debt, so that total long-term debt and in 
terest expense for existing assets remain constant. The result is that the simu 
lation of firm operations in the absence of new plant investment produces a 
constant net income after taxes each year for the 20-year period; net income is 
also equal to cash flow. This becomes the baseline cash flow for purposes of 
computing the addition to cash flow each year attributable to the new plant in 
vestment, which is simply the firm's total net cash flow with the new invest 
ment less the baseline cash flow.
The model includes one spreadsheet that contains the formulas for calculat 
ing the basic financial reports—an income statement, a balance sheet, and a 
statement of cash flows—for 20 years, as well as supporting statements for cal 
culating the amortization of long-term debt, depreciation, replacement invest 
ment, federal income taxes, median state income taxes, and sample state 
income taxes. The financial statement spreadsheet draws information from 
four database spreadsheets: 1) a firm database, showing, for each of the 16 hy 
pothetical firms, balance sheet and income statement data for the original firm 
and the new plant, codes indicating the depreciation schedules appropriate to 
that industry, and private loan rate assumptions by asset category; 2) a table of 
federal tax depreciation schedules and straight-line (book) depreciation sched 
ules; 3) a state tax database, including tax rates and other parameter values for 
all relevant features of state sales and income taxes, including investment and 
jobs credits (statewide and for enterprise zones only); and 4) a local tax data 
base, including the parameters of the state property tax system (assessment ra 
tios by property class and depreciation schedules applied to personal property
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valuation), local property tax rates and abatement schedules, an enterprise zone 
existence variable, and local sales tax rates.
The Excel spreadsheet model begins by constructing a complete set of fi 
nancial statements for one of the 16 prototype firms. The initial balance sheet 
is for January 1, 1992; the firm then builds a new establishment, with the plant 
placed in service on July 1, 1992. Short-term assets and liabilities (inventories, 
accounts payable and receivable, etc.) are increased proportionately as a result 
of the expansion. New property, plant, and equipment are added in the same 
proportions to total assets as for the existing firm. Additional net working cap 
ital (current assets minus current liabilities) necessitated by new plant and the 
new plant fixed assets are financed by a combination of additional long-term 
debt, retained earnings, and the sale of common stock, in such a way as to 
maintain the same ratio of debt to equity. Retained earnings generated during 
1992 (i.e., net income after taxes) are used first; if additional equity is required, 
the firm issues common stock. The proportion of debt used to finance the ex 
pansion is larger than the proportion of debt in the existing firm's balance 
sheet, but, as the new debt is retired, the average debt ratio over the 20 years 
will be equal to the existing debt ratio. That is, we assume that the average cap 
ital structure of the firms in the Compustat database for that industry is also the 
target or ideal capital structure that the firm seeks to maintain in the long run.
The cost of equity varies by firm. Data from ValueLine were used to deter 
mine an average beta value (a measure of risk, or stock price volatility relative 
to the market) for firms in each industry. The cost of common stock for an in 
dustry was then computed according to standard portfolio theory as the indus 
try beta value times the average market risk premium for common stock of 7 
percent plus the risk-free rate of return in 1992 (estimated at 7 percent). An ad 
justment was made for the use of preferred stock, which was assumed to carry 
an interest rate of one percentage point above the firm's cost of long-term debt; 
this made very little difference, as the ratio of preferred stock to common stock 
was very small for the firms in our study (based on the Compustat data). Table 
B.I shows the resultant weighted cost of equity for each of our firms. From this 
was deducted an assumed inflation premium of 4.0 percent to arrive at the real 
discount rate for each firm. This was then used to discount the additional cash 
flow available to equity investors attributable to the new plant to arrive at the 
present value of project returns.
New plant private debt financing terms vary by asset class and loan size. 
(Because of the small-issue industrial revenue bond [IRB] size limits, we do 
not simulate the use of IRB financing for any of our firms.) The interest rate 
assumptions are shown in Table B.2. The long-term rates (applied to financing 
land, plant, and infrastructure) are based on corporate A-rated bond rates for 
1992; the short-term rates (3-4 years, for financing short-lived equipment and
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Motor vehicles & parts
Motor vehicles & parts
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NOTE: Cost of equity is the same for both firm sizes in an industry because data on beta coeffi 
cients by industry did not allow size distinctions. However, for firm number 13 we used the beta 
for auto parts and supplies; for firm number 14, we used the beta for automobile manufacturers.
working capital) are based on Federal Reserve data on commercial and indus 
trial fixed-rate bank loans in 1992, with interest rates declining substantially as 
loan size increases. Interpolation was used to derive rates for intermediate-term 
loans (for equipment lasting 7-12 years).
The new property plant and equipment are depreciated for tax purposes ac 
cording to the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) sched 
ule that applies to buildings (31.5 years, straight-line), infrastructure (15 years, 
150 percent declining balance), and machinery and equipment (200 percent de 
clining balance, over a period of 5 or 7 years depending on the industry). The 
depreciable basis of each asset is its acquisition cost (from the database of firm 
financial characteristics) plus state and local sales taxes on machinery and 
equipment, where applicable. Depreciable assets are assumed to have zero sal 
vage value and to be replaced at the end of the appropriate class life (20 years 
for infrastructure, 40 years for buildings, 5 to 15 years for machinery and 
equipment). Since we are using a 20-year time horizon, replacement schedules 
are modeled only for machinery and equipment. Assets are depreciated on the 
books according to the appropriate Alternative Depreciation System (ADS) 
straight-line schedule (20 years for infrastructure, 40 years for buildings, 5 to 
15 years for machinery and equipment).










































NOTE: Corporate A-rated bonds carried an interest rate of 8.8 percent on average during the first half of 1992 (Survey of Current Business, January 1993), 
p. S-16). Commercial and industrial bank loans with terms of 3-4 years during the first half of 1992 carried interest notes of 5.9 percent for loans over $1 
million, 7.7 percent for loans of $500,000 to $1 million, and 8.8 percent for loans under $500,000 (U.S. Federal Reserve Board 1993 and 1994, Table 19).
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INCOME TAXES AND APPORTIONMENT
Using the income statement, federal income taxes are calculated as follows: 
from income before income taxes, deduct the excess of tax over book depreci 
ation and state income taxes paid. The remainder is federal taxable income; the 
progressive federal rate structure is applied to this amount. The calculation of 
state income taxes also begins with net income before income taxes. The ex 
cess of state tax depreciation (which in some instances is different from the fed 
eral) over book depreciation is then deducted, along with income taxes paid to 
other states (in a few states) and federal income taxes (in three states). Nonbusi- 
ness income is then deducted, and the remaining taxable income of the firm is 
apportioned to the hypothetical median state and the sample state (one of the 
24 actual states in our study) according to those states' apportionment formulas 
(based on some combination of payroll, property, and sales). Income appor 
tioned to the sample state plus any nonbusiness income allocated to that state 
are then taxed according to that state's schedule (generally a flat rate in the 24 
states). In most states, nonbusiness income, which we assume consists entirely 
of corporate bond interest, is allocated entirely to the headquarters state (the 
median state for our multistate firms and the sample state for our single-state 
firms). From state taxes, we then deduct any state credits for new investment 
or job creation, carrying them forward to apply against future taxes (as state 
law allows) if they cannot all be used in 1992.
We assume that income taxes are paid concurrently, that is, that corpora 
tions file and remit taxes quarterly and end up paying exactly what they owe 
each year, so that the income tax actually paid during 1992 exactly equals in 
come tax liability for 1992. Net worth taxes, on the other hand, are usually 
based on the end-of-year balance sheet and are generally paid only when the 
corporation files its return in the spring of the following year. Thus, the firm's 
1992 income tax payment reflects income and costs from its new plant, which 
was in operation during the latter half of 1992, but the net worth tax it pays in 
1992 is based on the January 1, 1992, balance sheet, before any new plant as 
sets and liabilities were acquired.
Apportionment is based on the shares of the firm's payroll and property lo 
cated in the sample state and in the median state, and on the destination of sales. 
For the single-state firm, all payroll and property, before and after the new 
plant is opened, are located entirely in the sample state. For the multistate firm, 
all payroll and property of the existing firm are located in the median state, 
while the new plant payroll and property are located in the sample state.
We assume that the firm is selling in national markets, with sales to each 
state in proportion to the state's population. All firms have a tax nexus in the 
sample state and in the median state. The single-state firm has sales offices in
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the median state that make it taxable there; some of its income will be appor 
tioned to the median state because the sales factor for the median state is posi 
tive, even though the payroll and property factors are zero. The multistate firm 
would pay a small amount of taxes to the sample state even in the absence of 
the new plant, for the same reason.
All firms are assumed to have 20 percent of their sales destined for the "oth 
er" states, in which they are not taxed. A portion of these sales may be thrown 
back to the sample state if the sample state has a throwback rule. (The median 
state does not require throwback.) Our assumption is that sales to the sample 
state come first from production facilities in the sample state. If production 
there is less than sales to the sample state (which depends on the state's popu 
lation), goods are exported to the sample state (and to the other non-taxing 
states) from the firm's median state facilities. In that case, there is no throw- 
back to the sample state because the plant in the sample state is not producing 
any goods destined for out of state. If sample state production exceeds local 
sales, the excess is exported to the median state and to the other states in pro 
portion to the assumed populations, with the goods produced in the sample 
state and exported to the "other" non-taxing states subject to throwback.
The median state and the sample state combined always have 80 percent of 
the population (approximately the share of the 24 states in our study) and 80 
percent of the sales; the larger the sample state population, the smaller the me 
dian state population. This has the effect of accentuating the importance of the 
income tax in the larger states, since more of the firm's income will be appor 
tioned there, but reducing the impact of throwback rules in the larger states 
(which are more likely to absorb all of the new plant's production). Both effects 
seem realistic and follow from the assumption that firms will find it profitable 
to maintain sales offices only in states where there is a substantial market; the 
26 smaller states account for only 20 percent of total sales. The assumption is 
also consistent with data from Wisconsin income tax returns showing that, for 
apportioning corporations, only about 16 percent of sales were to non-taxing 
states and therefore subject to throwback.
CALCULATION OF PROPERTY TAXES
Property taxes are paid in one calendar year based on the value of property 
at the end of the previous calendar year. The multistate firm pays the same prop 
erty taxes to the median state each year, based on the original firm's constant 
assets, and begins paying property taxes to the sample state in 1993, based on 
new plant assets that first appear on the balance sheet at the end of 1992. The 
calculation of property taxes paid in the sample state begins with the valuation 
of taxable classes of property. Inventory and land values are constant from 1993
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onward, since neither asset depreciates and we assume no inflation. (Both items 
increase from 1992 to 1993, reflecting the new plant.) Three states tax inven 
tories of raw materials, goods in process, and finished goods differently. We 
follow the Wisconsin tax study (1990) in assuming that 40 percent of invento 
ries are finished goods; we assume that 25 percent are raw materials, and that 
35 percent are goods in process. Plant and infrastructure are valued at book val 
ue, which reflects straight-line depreciation over 40 and 20 years, respectively.
Each category of personal property other than inventories is valued accord 
ing to the state's guidelines for depreciating machinery and equipment, which 
are usually by category (furniture and fixtures, transportation equipment) and 
industry (for manufacturing machinery and equipment), just as federal depre 
ciation schedules are. Of the 18 sample states that tax at least some kinds of 
personal property, 14 publish state depreciation guidelines to be used by local 
assessors. The other four (Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia) al 
low assessors to use whatever guidelines they think appropriate; for these 4 
states, we assumed depreciation schedules representing the average of the other 
states. In the average state, a piece of machinery and equipment will be valued 
at 48 to 51 percent of acquisition cost on average over the life of the equipment. 
This figure is as high as 62 to 65 percent in Alabama, and as low as 28 to 35 
percent in Indiana, reflecting differences in how rapidly the equipment is de 
preciated and in the minimum percentage allowed as long as equipment re 
mains in use.
Once property has been valued, the assessment ratio appropriate for each as 
set category is applied, which may be mandated by state statute or left to local 
discretion. The assessed value is then multiplied by the local property tax rate. 
The consolidated local property tax rate is the sum of rates for the city, the 
school district (if independent of the city), the county in which a majority of the 
city is located (where counties exist and levy taxes), and other special districts 
overlying the city. Where the city includes within it more than one school dis 
trict or other special district, the district rates that apply are the rates in the area 
of the city representing the most likely location for new industry, where local 
officials were able to identify such an area, or the average for the city, where 
such areas could not be identified.
HOW INCENTIVES ARE INCORPORATED INTO FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS
Public capital grants lower the portion of the acquisition cost of assets that 
must be financed from equity; this increases cash and net income in 1992. Pub 
lic loans at below-market rates, or loan guarantees that reduce interest rates, 
lower annual interest expense on the income statement, which increases cash
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flow; public loans do not increase overall long-term debt (the public debt sub 
stituting for higher-cost private debt). The availability of job training or of 
wage subsidies lowers operating costs during 1992 and thus increases net in 
come after taxes. Sales taxes on purchases of machinery and equipment in 
crease the acquisition cost of assets and hence the amount of debt and equity 
that must be raised to finance the new plant. (For tax purposes, sales taxes can 
not be deducted in the year paid but must be capitalized into the cost of the asset 
and then depreciated.) This occurs in 1992 and in subsequent replacement 
years. If the state has a sales tax that applies to fuel and utilities, this will in 
crease fuel and utility expense each year.
JOBS CREDITS AND EMPLOYEE ELIGIBILITY
In order to model jobs credits generally and enterprise zone credits in par 
ticular, it was necessary to make some assumptions about how many of a firm's 
new hires met each state's eligibility criteria for these credits. These eligibility 
criteria relate sometimes to place of residence, sometimes to unemployment 
status, sometimes to both. Table B.3 shows the assumptions made, based in 
part on research by Bartik (1991b, p. 95). Bartik found that new establishment 
hires consisted of 6-7 percent local residents previously unemployed and 16 
percent local residents previously not in the labor force. If all such individuals 
were considered "unemployed" for enterprise zone incentive purposes, then an 
average expectation would be that about 25 percent of new hires would be local 
(city) residents who were previously unemployed. We assume that 60 percent 
of those unemployed had been unemployed 90 days or more, that new hires are 
disproportionately from the enterprise zone because of proximity, and that the 
zone accounts for a disproportionate share of the city's unemployed (since high 
unemployment is a criterion for establishing a zone). One further assumption 
was required to complete the table: either that 50 percent of new hires are from 
within the city (regardless of employment status) or that 50 percent of new 
hires are unemployed (except within the zone).
Table B.3 Unemployment and Residence Assumptions for Enterprise 
Zone Incentives (New Plant Employees in Each 
Category, %)
iinpmninvmpnt «*»*.,* Residence at time of hiring
at time of hiring
All
Unemployed



















Computational Structure of TAIM
Models of operating ratios, balance sheets, and tax and income statements 
were built in a single Microsoft Excel workbook (the INCOME workbook), the 
details of which are provided in Appendix B. These models reference descrip 
tive databases held elsewhere containing information such as firm operating ra 
tios, federal and state tax codes, and the various state asset-depreciation 
schedules. In order for the INCOME workbook to carry out its various calcu 
lations, it must receive information on what state, industrial sector, firm size, 
spatial structure, and incentive type level are to be modeled. It receives this in 
struction from a series of Visual Basic procedures (the PROGRAM). Once IN 
COME has this information, it runs through the spreadsheet model, building a 
set of operating ratios and calculating balance sheets and income and tax state 
ments for the firm. Finally, INCOME produces a series of output numbers, in 
cluding the present value of the annual increments to after-tax cash flow over 
20 years, the internal rate of return on the incremental cash flow, the present 
value of taxes paid to federal and various state and local governments, and the 
nominal value of incentives awarded. PROGRAM then reads the results (after 
tax cash flow and so on) of INCOME'S calculations into a series of variables 
and deposits these into a RESULTS file.
The preceding description is true only for simulations of tax regimes with 
out any discretionary incentives. The modeling of discretionary incentives in 
volves some important modifications. As indicated earlier, states have laws and 
administrative rules that govern the way in which discretionary incentives are 
dispersed. In order to be eligible for an incentive, a firm must meet certain cri 
teria. Moreover, the amount of discretionary incentives provided to a firm will 
depend on the sort of investment the firm intends to make. Thus, once IN 
COME has created the operating ratios and balance sheets for a new invest 
ment, this information needs to be made available to a rule-based expert system 
(the NON-TAX-INCENTIVE-SYSTEM), which determines, for example, the 
discretionary incentives for which the investment is eligible. Each program, 
each state, and each city has its own expert system. Information is transferred 
between INCOME and the NON-TAX-INCENTIVE-SYSTEM by PRO 
GRAM. Based on information it has received, the NON-TAX-INCENTIVE- 
SYSTEM checks the incentives for which the investment qualifies, calculates 
a likely incentive amount from each incentive program based on historical ra 
tios for that type of benefit, and then compiles the best (using an algorithm that
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minimizes the cost of debt) package of incentives available from each state for 
a firm of that particular type (defined by its sector, size, and headquarters struc 
ture), making sure that no incentive program rules are broken by the package.
Once this has been accomplished, the NON-TAX-INCENTIVE-SYSTEM 
distributes incentives to appropriate asset categories (land, plant, machinery, 
infrastructure, and working capital). Thus, the NON-TAX-INCENTIVE-SYS 
TEM must take the entire incentive package and distribute the total public fi 
nancing to the appropriate (and permitted) asset classes, making sure that no 
asset class receives more public funding than would have been provided by the 
private sector. Finally, for incentives in the form of loans, loan guarantees, and 
linked deposits, future interest and principal payments must be generated in ac 
cordance with general program rules. PROGRAM reads this loan schedule in 
formation into a series of 5 x 20 matrices (one for each of five asset classes over 
a 20-year period). These matrices then replace the existing public financing 
schedule in INCOME. INCOME subsequently recalculates its financing of as 
sets, taking into account this new public subsidy. It produces a new balance 
sheet and income statement and applies the relevant tax codes to that income. 
PROGRAM takes these results and puts them into the RESULTS workbook.
The addition of city-level incentives brings a further level of complexity. 
Firms receive these incentives on top of—or, in some cases, as replacements 
for—state programs. Data on city-level incentives are held in a separate data 
base. The INCOME workbook references this database to calculate appropriate 
abatement and tax increment financing (TIF) awards in each city. Further Vi 
sual Basic modules also reference this database to construct city-level grant, 
loan, and loan guarantee incentives available in each city in each state and to 
build the best package of city incentives. The detailed operations of TAIM are 
summarized in Figure C. 1.
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Appendix D
Additional Results on the Worth and 




Table D.I The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small 



































NOTE: Negative values are shown in parentheses.
Table D.2 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Large 
Furniture and Fixtures Firms, 112 Cities
Hourly, 
per-employee 
Size of wage equivalent 
Mean Coefficient range of range 





























Table D.3 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Large 
Soap Firms, 112 Cities
Hourly, 
per-employee 
Size of wage equivalent 
Mean Coefficient range of range 




























Table D.4 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small 




































Table D.5 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small 



































NOTE: Negative values are shown in parentheses.
Table D.6 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Large 
Industrial Machinery Firms, 112 Cities
Hourly, 
per-employee 
Size of wage equivalent 
Mean Coefficient range of range 





























Table D.7 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small 



































Table D.8 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Large 
Electronic Components Firms, 112 Cities
Hourly, 
per-employee 
Size of wage equivalent 
Mean Coefficient range of range 





























Table D.9 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small 
Auto/Auto Parts Firms, 112 Cities
Hourly, 
per-employee 
Size of wage equivalent 
Mean Coefficient range of range 




























Table D.10 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, 
Large Auto/Auto Parts Firms, 112 Cities
Hourly, 
per-employee 
Size of wage equivalent 
Mean Coefficient range of range 





























Table D.ll The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small 



































Table D.12 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, 
Large Instruments Firms, 112 Cities
Hourly, 
per-employee 
Size of wage equivalent 
Mean Coefficient range of range 




























Table D.13 Average Value of Incentives, Multistate Firms ($)
Value of all tax incentives
Value of enterprise zone 
tax incentives only
State and local 
non-enterprise zone incentives
Firm 
(plant size, in millions) State Local
State and 
local State Local
State and Tax Other Total 
local incentives incentives incentives
Average for all city sizes
#2: Furniture ($40) 197,835 192,501
#5: Soaps ($20) 98,328 85,914
#7: Plastics ($5) 20,144 24,528
#14: Autos ($600) 1,305,375 2,873,683
#16: Instruments ($180) 557,012 728,300 






































































NOTE: Items may not add to totals due to founding.
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Detailed Results: Correlations between Project Returns 
and Unemployment Rates for States and Cities
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Table E.I Correlation between State Average 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Return on New Plant 
Investment in Each State (Multistate Firms, State Taxes and Incentives Only)
Net project returns
Firm 



























































































































































































NOTE: Negative correlations are shown in parentheses.
Table E.2 Correlation between State Average Unemployment Rate 1989-1993 and Firm's Net Return on New Plant 



































































































































NOTE: Negative correlations are shown in parentheses.
Table E.3 Correlation between City 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Returns from New Plant Investment 
in Each City: Selected Multistate Firms, by City Size Class
Net project returns

















































































































































































NOTE: Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. For each firm, the number in parentheses is new plant investment in millions of dollars. Basic 
taxes include state and city corporate income and net worth taxes, state and local sales taxes on machinery and equipment and fuel and utilities, and state 
and local property taxes. Tax incentives consist of state investment and jobs tax credits, sales tax exemptions or credits in enterprise zones, state property 
tax credits in enterprise zones, and local property tax abatements. The value of incentives is measured by the net project returns after taxes and incentives, 
less project returns after basic taxes only. The average correlation for all city sizes is a weighted average of the coefficients for the four city size classes; the 
weight for a size class is the U.S. population living in cities of that size divided by the total U.S. population living in cities of 10,000 or more, 
a. Absolute value less than 0.005.
Table E.4 Correlation between City 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Returns from New Plant Investment 
in Each City: Average for All City Sizes by Firm
Net project returns
Firm 


































































































































































































































































NOTE: Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. For each firm, the number in parentheses is new plant investment in millions of dollars. Basic 
taxes include state and city corporate income and net worth taxes, state and local sales taxes on machinery and equipment and fuel and utilities, and state 
and local property taxes. Tax incentives consist of state investment and jobs tax credits, sales tax exemptions or credits in enterprise zones, state property 
tax credits in enterprise zones, and local property tax abatements. The value of incentives is measured by the net project returns after taxes and incentives, 
less project returns after basic taxes only, 
a. Absolute value less than 0.005.
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Table E.5 Effective Tax and Tax Incentive Rates in a Representative City 
in Each State: Correlations with State Unemployment, Job 



















































































































State and local total
tax incentives
State and local
enterprise zone tax 
incentive package
State and local non-
enterprise zone 
tax incentive package
State and local taxes
after non-enterprise 
zone tax incentives
State and local taxes











































































































NOTE: See Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 5.3 for explanations of terms.
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